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ABSTRACT 
Brenda Christine Estrada 
Youth Gangs in Central America: A Comparative Analysis of Las Maras in 
Honduras and Nicaragua 
October 1,2008 
For the last two decades, Central America has hosted a particular form of gang 
organization called Maras. This research compared four factors to analyze the extent in 
which Honduras and Nicaragua are different in their hosting of the Mara phenomenon: 
Migration and deportation trends; the state of the drug and arms trafficking; government 
approaches to youth gangs; and the role of obligatory military service. The data suggests 
that two of these factors, migration and deportation patterns, as well as government 
approaches to youth gangs, play central roles in determining the difference between 
Honduras' problem with Maras and Nicaragua's lack of it. Furthermore, the other two 
factors serve to aggravate an already precarious situation. Conclusively, this research 
suggests that countries need to implement indigenous prevention policies and strategies 
that commence at a domestic level, rather than relying on repressive methods suggested 
by foreign institutions. 
9 








\ ,.,*'. > Nassau 
- • 
> The Bahamas 
Havana Turks & Caicos is. 
;~-,--:'!;.; iOubai-- Dominican Republic 
jtPdrt-au-Prmce 





















(a) Map of the region published in the UNODC study "Crime and Development in Central America: 
Caught in the Crossfire", May 2007. ISBN 978-91-1-030038-4. 
(b) This map cannot be employed for any commercial use without the strict permission of the UNODC. 
(c) Authorization granted on August 20, 2008 from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for 
Mexico- Central America & the Caribbean. 
10 
LIST OF TABLES 
Chapter 5 
TABLE.5 1 MIGRATION IN THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REGION BETWEEN 1980-1989 (THOUSANDS) 93 
TABLE.5 2 ESTIMATED POPULATION OF NON-AUTHORIZED RESIDENTS IN THE U.S. -1990 AND 2000 
(THOUSANDS) 94 
TABLE.5 3 HONDURANS RESIDING IN OTHER COUNTRIES: 1970,1980,1990 96 
TABLE.5 4 COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S., 2005 
(THOUSANDS) 98 
TABLE.5 5 MAJOR U.S. CITIES/STATES HOSTING HONDURAN MIGRANTS (2004) 99 
TABLE.5 6 COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S., 2006 
(THOUSANDS) 100 
TABLE.5 7 MIGRATORY TRAFFIC FOR NICARAGUAN NATIONALS: COSTA RICA AND UNITED STATES, 1984-
FEBRUARY2006 104 
TABLE.5 8 MAJOR U.S. CITIES/STATES HOSTING NICARAGUAN MIGRANTS (2004) 105 
TABLE.5 9 FOREIGN BORN POPULATION FROM CENTRAL AMERICA IN THE U.S., 1970-2004 105 
TABLE.5 10 HONDURANS AND NICARAGUANS DEPORTED AND NATURALIZED FROM 1992-2002 106 
TABLE.5 11 HONDURANS EXPELLED FROM THE U.S. 1992 -1999 107 
TABLE.5 12 DEPORTED HONDURANS FROM THE U.S. VIA AIR: 2000-2008 107 
TABLE.5 13 NICARAGUANS RE-EMBARKED, DEPORTED, AND REJECTED: 1996-2005 108 
TABLE.5 14 DRUG SEIZURES IN HONDURAS 1996-2000 115 
TABLE.5 15 DRUGS SEIZED IN HONDURAS 1998 -2003 115 
TABLE.5 16 DRUGS SEIZURES IN HONDURAS 2003 - 2006 116 
TABLE.5 17 DRUGS SEIZED IN NICARAGUA 1997-2002 119 
TABLE.5 18 DRUGS SEIZED IN NICARAGUA 2003-2006 120 
TABLE.5 19 DRUGS CONFISCATED IN NICARAGUA 1991-2001 120 
TABLE.5 20 REPORTED DELIVERIES OF SELECTED ARMS TO CENTRAL AMERICA 126 
TABLE.5 21 LEGAL FIREARMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, 2000 127 
TABLE.5 22 ESTIMATES OF REGISTERED FIREARMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, 2006 127 
TABLE.5 23 ESTIMATES OF ILLEGAL FIREARMS CIRCULATING IN CENTRAL AMERICA, 2006 128 
TABLE.5 24 HONDURAN MILITARY STATISTICS, 2005 EST 153 
TABLE.5 25 NICARAGUA'S MILITARY STATISTICS, 2008 156 
11 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Chapter 2 
FIGURE.2 1 PRIVATE OFFICERS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, 2002 48 
FIGURE.2 2 HUMAN SECURITY ENTRY POINTS 53 
Chapter 4 
FIGURE.4 1 GANG STRUCTURES 77 
FIGURE.4 2 "CLICKA" STRUCTURE 78 
Chapter 5 
FIGURE 5.1 AVERAGE AGE OF HONDURAN MIGRATING POPULATION 101 
FIGURE 5.2 COUNTRIES OF RESIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL HONDURAN MIGRANT POPULATION 102 
FIGURE 5.3 TOP THREE CENTRAL AMERICAN DESTINATIONS FOR U.S. CRIMINAL DEPORTATIONS 1994-2005 
110 
FIGURE 5.4 ESTIMATED SHARE (%) OF THE POPULATION WHO USE COCAINE ANNUALLY 118 
FIGURE 5.5 SHARE OF CENTRAL AMERICAN (%) USING CANNABIS IN 2006 121 
FIGURE 5.6 ANNUAL PREVALENCE OF THE USE OF AMPHETAMINES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE CENTRAL 
AMERICAN POPULATION 15-64 YEARS OF AGE, 2003 122 
FIGURE 5.7 ANNUAL PREVALENCE OF THE USE OF ECSTASY AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN 
POPULATION 15-64 YEARS OF AGE, 2003 122 
FIGURE 5.8 SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION FOCUS 146 
FIGURE 5.9 INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES FOR YOUTH: HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA 147 
Chapter 6 
FIGURE.6 1 ELEMENTS OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: WEIGHING THE FACTORS 163 
12 
"The quality of human existence is the ultimate measure of development" 
Alan Berg. 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: YOUTH GANGS AND VIOLENCE, A GLOBAL CRISIS 
Life in Latin America is becoming increasingly crippled by violence and crime. 
Its history of military rule combined with armed revolutions, guerrillas, and death squads, 
is a testimony to the violence the region has experienced over many years. Today, 
although rebel movements are still present in a number of countries in Latin America, the 
violence that has become notorious is of a different kind. It is no longer revolution and 
the fight for freedom and justice; instead, criminal violence has become the alternative 
option for many individuals to overcome exclusion, poverty and marginalization. 
Over the years, Latin America has become one of the most violent regions in the 
globe. Its cities are considered the most unsafe in the world (Manrique, 2006). By 1990, 
74.5 percent of inhabitants of major cities were victims of some type of criminal act 
(Ibid). Studies carried out by the United States Congress show countries like Colombia, 
Brazil, Venezuela and El Salvador as epicentres of violent criminality (Ribando, 2005). 
The rate of homicide per 100,000 habitants is one of the standard international indicators 
used to measure violence (UNDP, 2002 in Gaborit, 2005). For example, PAHO (2002) 
published tables of statistics comparing homicide rates between 1990 and 2000 in the 
Americas. Accordingly, Colombia witnessed a rate of 69.4 per 100,000 in 1996; Brazil 
experienced, in 1998, 26 homicides per 100,000, and Mexico reached a rate of 17.8 
homicides per 100,000 in 1992. However, by the year 2003, data on homicides in the 
Americas reported that the highest homicide rates were experienced by Colombia with 65 
homicides per 100,000 habitants and Honduras with 55 per 100,000. Meanwhile El 
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Salvador had 45 and Jamaica had 44 per 100,000 (PAHO, 2003). However, by 2004 the 
numbers changed; according to Gaborit (2005), Brazil reported a homicide rate of 25 per 
100,000 by 2004, while Honduras was estimated to be 45.7, compared to Nicaragua with 
only 10.3 homicides per 100,000. Although the rates of homicide appear to fluctuate, 
increasing for some countries and decreasing for others throughout the years, it is evident 
that the region still experiences a high level of homicide rate and violence compared to 
other parts of the world. 
In the last two decades, Central America has hosted an aggressive and extremely 
violent form of gang organization called Maras. The Maras have created terror and 
social fear which have unquestionably hindered development for many local 
communities. This has affected elements of social capital such as the trust citizens have 
among their community members, building tensions and leading to the deterioration of 
social relations and interactions. As of 2007, Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador were 
home to the largest numbers of mareros, with memberships ranging from 36,000, 14,000 
and 10,500 (United Nation, 2007) individuals respectively. Nicaragua and Costa Rica 
have significantly fewer gang members with 4,500 and 2,260 youths each. More 
importantly Nicaragua, although the poorest country in the region, it is considered one of 
the safest (Ibid). However, gang violence is a global problem that is not limited to the 
Central American region. For instance, Brazil deals with quadrilhas, which are primarily 
drug-trafficking gangs of male youths between 13 and 25 years old. In Colombia, youth 
crime is responsible for the high levels of violence in the country. Their gang formations, 
most commonly known as sicarios, are highly involved with the drug cartels. By 1990, 
there were approximately 120 youth gangs in Medellin, which involved an average of 
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3,000 youths in drug-related activities (Rodgers, 1999). Evidently, within the Latin 
American context, the manifestations of youth crime vary considerably, regardless of the 
generality of causes attributed to crime and violence specific to the region. This thesis 
intends to provide some insights into the unique phenomenon occurring in Central 
America called Maras. 
Central America began to experience the first manifestations of Mara gang 
activity in the early 1990s as a result of events in the United States. Following the 
Rodney King riots in Los Angeles, a task force formed by the U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service deported nearly 1,000 gang members from the Unites States back 
to El Salvador (Walker, 2004; United Nations, 2007; Rodgers, 2007; Reisman, 2006). 
Gang activity mushroomed and spread since to the neighbouring countries of Honduras 
and Guatemala, but it has not plagued Nicaragua to the same extent, despite similar 
socioeconomic conditions and geographic proximity. In addition to this increase in Mara 
activity in Central America, recent years have also witnessed a variety of new activities 
in these countries. Some are criminal in nature, for instance, the drug and firearms 
trafficking activities which have expanded across die region. Others are social such as 
the increase in illegal migration from Central America to the United States. 
The United Nation's Crime and Development Report (2007) for Central America 
evaluates the impact that crime has on development on three levels: society, the 
economy, and governance. Local community leaders globally are in agreement that 
crime destroys social and human capital, while it is bad for business and undermines 
governance. Although crime takes various forms, the victimization of humans and the 
physical insecurity that people experience around the world is increasingly caused by 
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youth gangs. Crime thus, serves as a mechanism of disempowerment that interferes with 
the social, economic and political development of the communities affected. Although 
governments and international organizations have proposed and implemented many 
strategies in hopes to reduce the crime and violence in regions mainly affected by them, 
the situation aggravates further every day. 
This research will analyze why Honduras and Nicaragua are different in their 
hosting of the Mara gang activity. I have identified four factors of comparison that this 
research will look into: a.) migration and deportation patterns of each country; b.) the 
state of drugs and arms trafficking; c.) government approaches to youth gangs; and c.) the 
conditions of obligatory military service in each country. The research question 
therefore becomes one of investigating if and to what degree do these factors dictate the 
scope as to which Nicaragua and Honduras host Maras. 
Thesis Statement 
The stark difference between Nicaragua's and Honduras' gang situation has 
already been discussed by a number Latin American authors. Rocha (2006), Rodgers 
(2005), and Cruz (2007) have questioned the difference between both countries and 
briefly speculated on the motives that might give reasonable explanations to the query. 
Reasons range from migration patterns to different social and political histories that 
include the Sandinista heritage in Nicaragua. However, there is need for a more in-depth 
analysis of the variables already mentioned in the literature, as well as the consideration 
of additional probable causes that have remained unexplored. I was also able to identify 
that despite the growing concern about the Mara phenomenon as a transnational problem, 
few English-language academic studies addressed the issue. This research is an attempt 
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to overcome the scarcity of academic information regarding Central America's Maras in 
North America by contributing information directly from the region. 
As the section of criminology and development studies make evident in this 
research, it is important to highlight the large number of variables that interact in the 
dynamics of crime, especially when it comes to the Mara phenomenon. After identifying 
and deconstructing the main variables offered in the literature that respond to this 
conundrum, I argue that Nicaraguan society lacks the mara presence that Honduras 
experiences, due to two fundamental factors: migration and deportation patterns, and 
governmental approaches to youth gangs. At the same time, I argue that two other 
significant factors further aggravate the Mara problem in Honduras: the international 
drug trade juxtaposed with the availability of firearms, and the elimination of obligatory 
military service. 
A Note on Methodology 
This research focuses specifically on Honduras and Nicaragua to analytically 
compare four key variables and determine to what extent they influence the presence of 
die Mara phenomenon in each country. Both countries were chosen for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, both share similar socioeconomic conditions, representing the two 
poorest nations in Central America. Secondly, they are geographically next to each other. 
Of the countries in the northern Central American triangle that have a Mara problem, 
Honduras is the only country sharing borders with Nicaragua. Thirdly, Honduras 
statistically appears to be the country with the largest presence of Mara Salvatrucha (M-
13) and M-18 groups in the region, while Nicaragua has the least. Although technically 
Costa Rica is the Central American country with the fewest number of Maras, I decided 
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not to include it in the research because its socioeconomic conditions differ significantly 
from those of Nicaragua and Honduras; considering that Costa Rica is the most affluent 
country in the region that has benefited from one of the most developed welfare systems 
in the region (BBC News, 2008; World Bank, 20082). Additionally, Honduras and 
Nicaragua share a similar culture and the same democratic political systems of 
government. One marked difference between these two Central American countries is 
their political past. 
The objective of this thesis is not to study how they [Maras] came about in the 
region. Rather, I am to analyze why Nicaragua has remained immune to this problem 
while Honduras is so vulnerable to it. As mentioned above, I have identified four 
variables to provide empirical explanations for this manifest difference. The first of these 
is migration and deportation patterns. The patterns for each country have been analyzed 
to measure the extent in which they contributed to the differences of Mara presence. 
Secondly, I evaluated the state of drug trafficking as well as consumption for each 
country. Included in this section is also the analysis of the availability of firearms. The 
purpose is to gauge the relevance and extent to which the presence of drugs and guns 
contributed to Mara activity for each country. Thirdly, I compared individual 
government approaches to youth gangs during the last 20 years; I analyzed the programs 
and policies implemented, as well as the results achieved to measure how they increase or 
deter mara activity. The last factor that remains unexplored in the literature which I deem 
significant is the assessment of obligatory military service in both countries. By 




analyzing the past and present conditions of military service in each country, I aim to 
demonstrate the extent to which this factor may have contributed to the presence, or lack, 
of Maras. 
For purposes of this thesis, the research has been carried out by using evidence 
from a variety of secondary sources. For the literature and theoretical constructs, most of 
the data was accessed using library resources, as well as online databases and journals. 
The location of the data for the factors was facilitated by the search of online sources. 
Fortunately, many of the Honduran and Nicaraguan government offices offer online 
support and many of the documents could be accessed via internet. In addition, books 
and articles were directly received from Central America to further support this research. 
Over 350 online documents and articles were reviewed for this work; more than 70 
primary sources from libraries were employed as well. The data was analyzed through 
method of comparison, therefore parameters and categories were set for each factor and 
gathered according to each country in order to avoid data mining. For example, for the 
section on migration and deportation patterns, the categories included numbers of 
migrants, main destinations, deportation statistics all within a specific time frame of the 
last 20 years, in order to clearly observe the trends. For the analysis of drugs and 
firearms trafficking, the categories included consumption as well as seized products. 
Archival data from government documents, as well as studies from non-
governmental sources (that assess the results of government approaches to maras and 
youth deviance) were used to evaluate the manner in which they have an effect on the 
problem. Using official reports from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the 
Small Arms Survey, and national governmental reports as well as local newspapers, 
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statistics on the state of the drug and weapons economy were researched for each 
country. This included information of drugs seized, estimates on drug consumption, and 
estimations of legal and illegal weapons circulating in each country. Finally, to measure 
the conditions of military service for each country, once again data from government 
documents were employed to discover whether this factor has any significant role on the 
levels of Mara activity in Nicaragua and Honduras respectively. 
My research recognizes the limitations of relying on secondary data and statistics 
for this case study. However, the data acquired proved to be sufficient to build a strong 
case and provide an accurate conclusion to the research question in a holistic manner, 
rather than in an atomistic fashion. Although statistics are at times inconsistent and hard 
to rely on, my intentions are to observe patterns and trends as well as compare 
tendencies. Specific numbers are therefore not essential for my argument. 
In order to provide the link between Mara gang activity and the factors mentioned 
above, it is important to offer a theoretical framework in which to situate the research. 
This thesis shall begin with the discussion of the intersection of criminological and 




Conceptualizing Youth Gangs 
Before examining the various approaches that try to explain youth gang activity, 
this research needs to define and conceptualize the object of study. To begin with, a large 
amount of literature has been produced that explains youth gangs by a wide variety of 
parameters that range from the criminally instrumental to the purely recreational (White, 
2007). I present the premises that seem most appropriate to this specific research. Early 
contributions, like those of Thrasher (1927), are still applicable in the attempt of defining 
the concept of youth gangs today: 
A gang is an interstitial group, originally formed spontaneously, and then 
integrated through conflict. It is characterized by the following types of behavior: 
meeting face to face, milling, movement through space as a unit, conflict, and 
planning. The result of this collective behavior is the development of tradition, 
unrefiective internal structure, esprit de corps, solidarity, morale, group 
awareness, and attachment to a local territory (Thrasher 1927, p. 57). 
Gangs are also extremely heterogeneous social institutions. They can have diverse 
motivations, activities, structures and rituals; they all vary across regions and countries. 
Gangs in Africa vary significantly from those in South America or the Caribbean. It is 
important to define to the reader what we mean by the category of youth. Rodgers (1999) 
considers this to be a problematic area because of cultural boundaries, meaning what is 
considered youth in North America might be considered adulthood in another region. In 
North America adulthood begins at the age of 18 whereas in Latin America it officially 
starts at 21. In this case, the socio-cultural category of youth is more ambiguous than just 
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limiting it to age. It is often more appropriate to relate it to behavioural patterns and 
activities, as well as the social role, rather than physical maturity. 
Hagedorn (2005) suggests that gangs today are organizations of the socially 
excluded. He also differentiates between groups of armed young men and 
institutionalized gangs, but believes that one central mechanism for the persistence of 
such gangs is their participation in the underground economy. According to a United 
Nations (UN) report (2007), an institutionalized gang is a framework through which 
membership flows, that continues from generation to generation, and holds its own set of 
conventions and rules. These frameworks generally include clandestine gang histories, 
initiation rituals, ranking systems, rites of passage, rules of conduct, and rivalries. Gang 
members often pledge unconditional loyalty to their group, which becomes their primary 
source of identity and constitutes the family nucleus of their lives. The assumption has 
been that most gang members are male, fall between the ages of seven and twenty-five, 
and come from impoverished or socially excluded urban backgrounds (Rodgers, 1999). 
The nature of youth gangs and the study of their emergence can be streamlined into two 
perspectives. The following section presents an assessment of the literature on youth 
gangs taking into account these two discourses. 
Juvenile Delinquency: A Criminological Perspective 
In the spirit of sifting through the very broad topic of crime, I have decided to 
ground the analysis to the specific phenomenon of youth gangs. In this regard, I have 
identified three main approaches to which address the landscape of the debates; first from 
a criminological perspective; followed by a brief review of the intersection between 
crime and development theories, and finally from a developmental perspective. 
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From Biological to Strain Theories of Crime 
The evaluation of criminological theories is essential as it provides a scientific 
explanation for the phenomenon of crime, aiming to establish causal effect relationships 
between variables and understand its complex nature. In this case, the purpose is to 
search for a theoretical framework that can lend itself to the explanation of the existence 
of youth deviance and more specifically, gang formations. The earliest contribution to 
criminology was the classical theory of crime, based on the original works of Cesare 
Beccaria (1775) (See Gottfredson and Hirchi, 1990; Cullen and Agnew, 2006; 
Schmalleger, 2002; Shoemaker, 1996; Roshier, 1989). The theory states that the 
government system is responsible for the crime or deterrence of crime in a society and 
makes three assumptions regarding human nature: a.) people have free will, b.) people are 
hedonists , and c.) people have rationality. According to Beccaria, the existence of crime 
in a society is caused by irrational and ineffective law, not by individuals. He also 
responds to demonology, a belief still strong at the time, namely that crime is caused by 
supernatural forces, i.e. the devil (See Miller, et al., 2006; Void and Bernard, 1979; 
Gottfredson and Hirchi, 1987; Taylor, Walton, and Young, 1973; Bell, 2007). 
Lombroso's (1911) work laid the foundations of what is considered the "Positivist 
school" of criminology. He argues that crime is caused by biological factors beyond the 
control of a single individual (Cullen & Agnew, 2006). Other theories of the late 1700s 
and early 1800s such as physiognomy and phrenology, focused on the physical aspects of 
humans; certain features like facial features by themselves were not the cause of crime, 
only that those with certain features were deemed criminals. Psychological theories of 
3 Philosophical concept in which people by nature, seek pleasure and avoid pain. See Hedonist 
International (2007). 
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crime focus on the way people are different, especially in the way they think, 
"psychological theories, on the other hand, presume that the offender is in some way 
mentally flawed" (DeKeserdy and Schwartz, 1996, p. 192. Also see Wilson and 
Herrnstein, 1985). 
Theories emphasizing the setting include theories of social disorganization and 
routine activities (See Kubrin, 2003; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Cullen and Agnew, 
2006; Markowitz, Bellair, Liska and Liu, 2001; Cohen and Felson, 1979). According to 
Shaw and Mckay (1942), delinquency originates from the interactions of societal life, 
namely the daily experiences that people are exposed to. Furthermore, they argued that 
geography mattered. Accordingly crime tended to be higher in slum areas, which were 
located in the centre of the city. This theory of social disorganization was strongly 
criticized. Opponents argued that the approach romanticized the upper class locations 
and inherentiy assumed that any person could be prone to crime so long as they were 
located in areas of high criminality. Criticisms are also based on the value judgment of 
the term "disorganization". Simply put, what may appear disorganized to some, to others 
it could simply be a different way of doing things (Cullen and Agnew, 2006). 
In the literature, one also comes across the learning and cultural transmission 
theories of crime (See Thornberry, 1990; Bell, 2007; Miller et al., 2006). Learning 
theories state that criminal behaviour is acquired from others through the internalization 
of values, rules, actions and conducts of groups. Sutherland's and Cressey's (1960) 
differential association theory argues that criminal behaviour is learned through the 
interaction witfi important peers in one's neighbourhood. Aker's (1994) social learning 
theory is similar, but is much broader stating that crime can also be learned through 
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imitation and differential reinforcement. 
Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) also draw on Sutherland's differential association 
and discuss the notion of a subculture of violence. Subcultures arise when value systems 
conflict with conventional standards. Thus, the values, beliefs, rules of deviant 
subcultures provide rationalization for being criminal. Still, what might be considered 
normal, appropriate, and popular or wrong, varies considerably across different social 
groups in a given society. In an attempt to further comprehend the dynamic of youth 
street gangs, some researchers came up with theories that would give reason to the 
existence of youth formations that expressed themselves in deviant ways. 
Merton's (1938) strain theory served as support to Cohen's (1955) gang culture 
theory. Strain theory was originally put forth by Robert Merton's work and later revived 
by Agnew, and Messner and Rosenfeld (2002) (Also see Agnew, 1992; Broidy, 2001; 
Akers, 2000; Hoffmann and Miller, 1998). Merton aimed to discover "how some social 
structures exert a definite pressure upon certain persons in society to engage in 
nonconformist rather than conformist conduct" (Merton, 1938, p. 672). According to 
Merton's strain theory, some individuals in society who are placed under pressure to 
achieve certain goals, while being prevented to do so in a legitimate manner, will react to 
this exclusion in a number of ways, including crime. North American society has 
idealized the 'American Dream' represented by the need of having expensive material 
things and life styles, where the emphasis is on success, but not on how it is achieved 
(Messner and Rosenfeld, 2002). Cohen attempted to explain the origin and content of 
delinquent subcultures through an analysis of middle class values and aspirations. 
According to Cohen, felony is caused by goal blockage, or stress factors as suggested by 
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Merton, the difference being that lower class working boys are measured by middle class 
standards which they often cannot live up to, therefore crime becomes a way of gaining 
respect. Cohen's theory received significant criticism. Matza (1957) concluded that 
Cohen "attributed to working-class youngsters the problems that torment the middle-class 
adult" (Matza, 1957, p.52). Others like Kitsuse & Dietrick (1959) had more 
methodological issues, arguing that Cohen's theory was basically untestable. Defleur 
(1970) attempted to apply the theory to evaluate youth crime in Cordoba, Argentina, and 
found that key social factors identified by Cohen did not play a significant role in 
producing youth deviance in that society. 
Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) work follows the same strain premise in viewing 
society as exclusive leading low-class youth to respond by forming gangs. Additionally, 
they identify three types of gang formations: a.) the criminal subgroup, which engages in 
theft, extortion, and other means of securing income; b.) the conflict subgroup, which 
uses violence to gain status; and c.) the retreatist subgroup, which dedicates itself more to 
the consumption of drugs. Critics of this theory argue that in reality, gang formations do 
not really obey to one prototype of subculture; rather, they seem to have a combination of 
characteristics of all three (See for example, Akers and Sellers, 2004). 
The theories previously discussed, for the most part, are based on individual 
behaviour. Before discussing structural theories, it is important to mention the Labelling 
approach which can be originally traced to Tannenbaum's (1938) work. This author 
states that crime is not a manifestation of individual differences but learned as part of an 
educational process in the community. Others, like Becker (1963) and Lemert 
(1951/1972), acknowledge that people first participate in norm violation by chance or 
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simply as part of growing up, and that it is society which defines what is a criminal, and 
stigmatizes youth as criminals. Labelling theory contends that through stigmatization, 
the criminal justice system creates crime and deviance as offenders come to identify 
themselves according to the expectations suggested by labels. The power to label 
behaviour as 'deviant' arises partly from the unequal distribution of power within the 
state, and because the judgment carries the authority of the state, it attributes greater 
stigma to the prohibited behaviour. Following the same line of argument, an interesting 
concept was set forth by Braithwaite (1989), who suggested that crime is higher when 
shaming is stigmatizing and lower when it is reintegrative. His theory attempts to 
explain why some societies experience higher crime rates than others. Braithwaite 
claims that shaming is necessary for social control; however, the key issue is what 
follows shaming: reintegration or stigmatization. Braithwaite states that societies with 
high levels of urbanization and residential mobility are less communitarian and are less 
likely to have interdependency between its citizens. Therefore, when there is a lack of 
communitarianism and trust, society will engage in shaming that is stigmatizing, 
categorizing and attributing stigma to large numbers of people. In turn, these people 
come together to develop ongoing criminal subcultural groups that provide learning 
experience and environments for crime. Unlike labelling theories, Braithwaite does not 
suggest non-intervention; rather, that reintegration must occur because shamed 
individuals are at a turning point in their lives. With reintegration, offenders are offered 
forgiveness and support in order to become once again a member of the community. In 
this case, what is shamed is the criminal act, not the criminal. 
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In addition to individual theories, there are structural theories that include Marxist 
and non-Marxist approaches, which view social conflict as the source of most of society's 
problems, including crime. According to the conflict perspective, crime is a result of 
social inequality, caused either by power struggles between different groups in society, or 
the general deprivation, alienation or marginalization experienced by those in the lower 
classes. Although Marx's (1883/1967) contributions did not strongly address crime, he 
concluded that the economic system of capitalism was the source of most social 
problems, including crime, because it generates conflict through competition for profit. 
Marxism tends to focus on societal forces rather than the motives of individuals and their 
dualistic capacity for both, right and wrong, as well as moral and immoral traits. This 
conceptual line of reasoning has led to the formulation of other structural theories of 
crime. 
Among the first Marxist criminologists, Bonger (1916/1969) argued that the 
capitalist mode of production breeds crime. He believed that the key cause of criminality 
is the mental state of egoism, which is rooted in economic relations. Capitalism is based 
on individual profit and therefore is inherently self-centered. Those in the proletariat who 
are impoverished, exposed to harsh living conditions, incited by the material desires 
produced by the bourgeoisie, combined with poor moral training, are more vulnerable to 
the intensification of egoistic impulses, which consequently can lead to crime. For 
Quinney (1980), in the effort of securing its own benefit and profit, the capitalist class 
engages in economic crimes, denies people basic human rights and needs, and uses the 
state to protect its interests. Therefore the crime committed by the poorer classes is seen 
as retaliation to their marginalization and unequal treatment. Other authors like 
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Greenberg (1993), Currie (1997), and Colvin (2000) detail the way in which unequal 
social structures produce criminal behaviour. For instance, Currie (1997) also sees 
capitalism as the root cause of crime. Furthermore, he argues that it is the extreme 
subordination of society to the imperatives of the market that dictates the upsurges of 
violence in certain societies. 
As emphasized by Schulte-Bockholt and Kenney (2008), the study of crime in 
North America, with strong individual linkages to deviance, has segregated studies and 
conditions from the global South, generalizing the applicability of crime theories to the 
rest of the world. However, general criminological perspectives have also been produced 
by non-western academics that attempt to explain criminality in Latin America focusing 
beyond individual approaches and expanding into social structures, with special 
concentration on the role and function of the state. (For more on Latin American 
Criminology, see Del Olmo, 1999; Aniyar de Castro, 1990, Bergalli, Ferracuti, and 
UNSDRI, 1969; Bergalli, 1972; Delgado, 1999; Elbert, 1999, Simonetti and Virgolini, 
2002). 
Intersecting Criminology and Development: A Brief Interval 
In the general discussion of crime, the fields of development and criminology 
have offered many more theories that attempt to explain the origin of deviance. For 
instance, criminological discourse includes postmodernist and feminist approaches to 
crime (see Henry and Milanovic, 1993; Gelsthorpe and Morris, 1990). In terms of the 
development discourse, theorists have built on modernization theory and dependency 
theory to provide explanations for crime. In the literature, the intersection of these two 
fields has led to what Huggins (1983) calls the "Traditional Criminology-Modernization" 
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approach and "Radical Criminology-Dependency" perspective (Schulte-Bockholt and 
Kenney, 2008). 
The traditional criminology-modernization perspective claims that delinquency in 
developing societies will increase in the initial stages of the modernization process. 
Marginalization and social disorder are by-products of economic development and 
growth, therefore fostering conditions for increased crime. However, as prosperity 
increases, it is expected that crime rates fall and the nature of delinquency will become 
less violent. According to this perspective, crime is largely committed by lower class 
young males residing in marginal peripheral areas, assumptions shared by theories of 
social disorganization, which argue that crime tends to concentrate in slum areas (See for 
example, Shaw and MacKay, 1942). According to Clinard and Abbott (1973) and 
Shelley (1981), ideally, the benefits of the modernization process eventually trickle down 
to the marginalized classes through political and social struggles, facilitated by the 
systems of participatory democracy. However, in the cases of developing societies, 
especially Latin America, organic participatory democracy was almost non-existent due 
to heavy foreign intervention in national politics. In addition, the authoritarian traits of 
Latin American societies and governments potentially hindered any possibility for mass 
participation. 
The Radical Criminology-Dependency perspective expands beyond individual 
behaviour and takes into consideration societal power structures. They place significant 
emphasis on Latin America's dependency path and history of colonialism and 
exploitation, which inevitably led to structural deficiencies, poor conditions for the 
masses and the unequal distribution of wealth. It is this inequality that constitutes a 
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causal factor for crime (Zaffaroni, 1982). According to Schulte-Bockholt and Kenney 
(2008), criminologist associated with "radical criminology-dependency", view criminal 
law as an instrument of the colonial and neo-colonial states to gain access to resources 
and to maintain control over the dependant states, "studies show how colonial regimes 
created new laws and categories of crime to reinforce foreign domination" (Schulte-
Bockholt & Kenny, 2008, p. 7). 
Traditional criminological theories appear to mainly have individual approaches 
to gang formations, which prove to be inadequate within a Latin American context as 
they fail to grasp the socioeconomic realities of the region, caused by distinct historical 
events. Traditional theories based on the individual tend to ignore the setting as well as 
structural factors that evidently contribute to a young person's criminal behaviour. 
Conversely, the radical criminology-dependency perspective focuses on structural causes 
that take into consideration multiple factors inherent to the global South. Although the 
approach lacks the scientific focus on crime, my work finds itself better supported by this 
theoretical framework. 
Youth Gangs and Development 
Criminological theories attempt to give reasoning behind crime, but mese 
perspectives do not consider important dimensions of delinquency in the global South in 
general, and Latin America in particular. This general literature on street gangs fails to 
highlight important structural factors that are essential for examining the causes of crime 
in developing societies. In this sense, it is important to review the reasons offered for 
crime phenomenon in the South under a developmental lens, specifically addressing the 
existence of youth gangs and their impact on the development of their communities. 
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A Latin American Context 
The study of gangs4 by North American scholars has been strongly challenged by 
Latin American criminologists; which is one reason this literature has been relegated to 
the fringes of western criminology as a discipline. Nevertheless, youth gangs have 
become a global and even transnational phenomenon; therefore their study cannot be 
limited to a specific condition and must be evaluated in a global context (Boraz and 
Bruneau, 2006). With this in mind, and for the purposes of this research, the dimensions 
of the debates to be presented are situated in a Latin American context. There are a 
number of related causal factors and issues that are broadly and extensively discussed in 
the literature on youth gangs in this region. 
It is evident that the citizens of the underdeveloped parts of the world are 
suffering the highest levels of crime and violence. Africa, Latin America and to a lesser 
extent Asia, are notorious for the insecurity their populations are subjected to, with 
differences in the expressions and patterns of crime, including youth gangs. These 
differences can be attributed to a number of factors. The first is the impact of neoliberal 
policies and the retreat of the state. 
Hagedorn (2005) attributes the appearance of youth gangs to the effects of 
neoliberalism. In the 1980s, a large number of Latin American countries were forced to 
endorse drastic market-oriented reforms, in efforts to end hyperinflation and stabilize 
their economies. These measures included budget austerity, reduction of public spending 
and employment, privatization of state-owed enterprises, access to foreign trade, cut back 
in social welfare and services (For more on the impact neoliberalism in Latin America, 
4 (For more on American gangs, see Thornberry et al., 2003; Egley, Maxson, Miller, and Klein, 2006; Huff, 
1990; Huff 2002; Delaney, 2006; Dudley and Gerdes, 2005; Esbensen, Tibbetts, and Gaines, 2004; 
Shelden, Tracy, and Brown, 2004; Elliot, 1994; Howell, 1998). 
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see Weyland, 2002; Baer, 2002; Jimenez, 1992; Walton, 2004; Stokes, 2001; Palacios, 
1998). The role of the state has changed, leaving people to their own fate. According to 
Rapley (2006), gangs are born due to the necessity of marginalized areas to "protect" 
themselves, to maintain order in the multiplying and expanding ghettos that are products 
of the skewed inequality. This inequality, consequently, arises from neoliberal policies 
disrupting the income inequality, "leading to the emergence of pockets of vast wealth and 
areas of abject poverty" (2006: 6). The retreating state, however, proved ineffective in 
offering citizens appropriate security. In turn, the wealthy rely on private security forces, 
while the urban poor create their own security measures through gang formations or 
vigilante groups. Hagedorn (2005) argues that this retreat of the state in developing 
countries has created conditions of "social disorganization" (2005:157). This social 
disorganization has weakened and delegitimized social institutions unable to control the 
rapid urbanization. Therefore, young men arm themselves and join gangs, para-military 
and rebel groups, death squads, and drug cartels that replace or complement the space 
vacated by public authority. Elkus (2007: 1) refers to gangs as "anti-state formations" 
that have created a power network of their own, taking advantage of the weakness of the 
state. He argues that these actors thrive in conditions where neoliberal policies have 
worsened already existing inequalities. 
The social exclusion created by the public institutions that are ideally designed to 
protect young people, is considered to be a fundamental element in the emergence of 
youth gangs and violence. Exclusion produces social and economic vulnerability. 
According to Cruz (2007), young people who join gangs are those whose families 
struggle to survive and who have few opportunities to attend school or find employment. 
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This was also emphasized by Jaramillo and Bedoya (1991), who pointed out that sicarios 
from Medellin, Colombia, had families who shared similar traits: poor economic 
conditions and broken families with mostly women heading the household. 
According to Berkman (2007), social exclusion is not only furthered by the state, 
but is also carried out by the communities and even one's own family. The state and 
society fail to provide the adequate structural opportunities and incentives for young 
people to develop into productive adults. Communities blame youth for their problems 
and family feuds, and broken families damage communication, all of which contributes to 
the formation of youth gangs (Ibid). Rojas Aravena (2005) writes that the violence 
produced by juvenile gangs is not the result of irrational behaviours, but rather a response 
to the failure to provide for their necessities, and to the dynamics that they encounter 
living in a situation of social exclusion. 
Other consequences of neoliberalizing policies are poverty and inequality. In 
2002, the number of Latin Americans living in poverty reached 220 million, representing 
43.3 percent of the total population (UN-HABITAT, 2004). Indeed, the difference 
between the rich and the poor are the most extreme in Latin America compared to the rest 
of the world. The GINI coefficient, which is the standard inequality indicator, registered 
a global average of 0.4 by 1999. Latin America, registered the highest, with Brazil's 
0.64, Bolivia's 0.60, Nicaragua's 0.59 and Guatemala's 0.58 (Ibid). By 2007, Panama 
registered a coefficient of 0.56; Guatemala had 0.55, and Nicaragua 0.43, still much 
higher than the world average (World Bank, 2007). 
According to Moser and van Bronkhorst (2002), the economic difficulties that the 
region suffered during the 1980s and 1990s unleashed a series of problems that have been 
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further aggravated by globalization, increasing the levels of poverty and inequality in the 
majority of the population. An important factor has been the rise in the number of 
female-led households, and the increased amount of young people living in marginalized 
neighbourhoods characterized by violent crime. According to Birdsall and Hakim 
(2007), unemployment levels were higher in 2007 than in 1990, while deep-seated 
inequality remains a prominent feature in the region. In most countries, less than 10 
percent of the population controls 50 percent of the wealth. In addition, adolescents aged 
10-19, represent 21.9 percent of the population in Latin America, ranging from 17 
percent in Uruguay to approximately 26 percent in El Salvador (Moser and van 
Bronkhorst, 2002). While Bourguignon (2001) does not specifically address youth crime, 
he views delinquency in the region as the social costs of poverty and inequality. For him, 
the economic motivation behind crime is essentially the seizure of somebody else's 
property. Another motivation is the pursuit of illegal activity even at the risk of being 
caught and punished. Therefore if the person does not consider he or she could lose 
much out of an illegal situation, this individual will do it anyway because of the chance to 
gain economically. Strocka (2006) strongly suggests that the growth in violence and the 
parallel rise of youth gangs in Latin America are largely consequences of the 
convergence and interaction of global transformations and local trends. At the global 
level, she refers to the increased culture of material consumption, as well as liberalized 
market economies which weaken the role of the state. Domestically, nations seem unable 
to fight economic recession. 
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In many Latin American countries, the interplay of these global and local 
transformation processes has led to increasing inequality and social exclusion. 
Neoliberal economic restructuring has been associated with the exclusion 
of large parts of the population from the labor market and a resulting 
persistence and intensification of poverty, particularly in urban areas, which 
are now home to three-quarters of Latin America's population.20 (...) 
Inequality—that is, the unequal distribution of economic, political, and social 
resources—is a major determinant of crime and violence in Latin America. 
The region has the highest levels of inequality worldwide, and cross-national 
studies have shown that countries with a higher degree of inequality also 
have higher levels of violence (Strocka, 2006, p.g.138). 
She establishes the correlation between poverty, inequality, and youth gangs by 
stating that social exclusion has been greatest among the urban poor, especially male 
youths from slum neighbourhoods, who are exposed to disproportionate levels of 
violence. Neoliberalizing reforms have led to the decrease of male participation in the 
local workforce. This, in turn, has created a pool of young unemployed men, and 
increasingly girls, who turn to gangs in order to demonstrate their masculinity, and/or 
gain an acknowledged identity, receive protection, as well as economic sponsorship. She 
further argues that the U.S. derived culture of consumption further frustrates young 
people's desire, serving as a push factor to join gangs. Here we can clearly observe 
traces of Merton's (1938), as well as Messner and Rosenfeld's (2002) works. Other 
authors like Buvinic, Morrison & Shifter (1999), suggest that "poverty and inequality 
contribute to feelings of deprivation, frustration and stress, all powerful antecedents of 
violence. Violent behaviour, on the other hand, impoverishes people and likely 
consolidates inequality" (Buvinic, Morrison & Shifter, 1999, p.g. 38). 
The relationship between poverty, inequality and crime is not as simple as it 
appears. It is certain that poverty and inequality as single variables interact with other 
factors as determinants of crime, making it hard to establish a solid correlation. The 
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United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime argues that although poverty seems to have a 
direct effect on crime, it is more subtle (2005). After all, large parts of the world suffer 
from poverty, but their societies are not ridden with crime. Cruz (2007) argues that 
although many authors attribute poverty as a fundamental player in the emergence of 
gangs: 
Pointing to poverty as a fundamental factor often obscures the interactive or 
procedural character of the gang phenomenon. A deeper analysis of the 
phenomenon reveals that social exclusion, which is often, though not always, 
associated with poverty, is a more significant factor (Cruz, 2007, p. 26; also see 
Rocha, 2001; Castro and Dominguez, 2004; Arana, 2005). 
A third issue addressed in the literature is the rapid rate of urbanization the region 
has been experiencing in recent decades. Latin America is considered the most 
urbanized region in the developing world (Skinner and Steinberg, 2003; Brennan and 
Galvin, 2002). As of 2001, an estimated 390 million people resided in cities, constituting 
almost 75 percent of the Latin American population (UNCHS, 2001). Thus, by 2000, 
urbanization was highest in South America representing 77.2 percent, followed by 
Central America with 62.8 percent and the Caribbean with 63.1 percent of the total 
regions population (UN-HABITAT, 2004). Nearly 42 percent of the urban population 
lived in the region's fifty cities exceeding one million inhabitants. Parallel to this, the 
region hosts a large slum population. By 2001, approximately 128 million people were 
living in urban slums. This represents 32 percent of the urban population in Latin 
America, and 14 percent of the world's urban slum populations (Ibid). In Latin America, 
64 percent of the poor live in urban, not rural areas (Human Security Cities, 2006). 
Urbanization is often associated with youth violence and the formation of gangs. 
In the developing world, urbanization is characterized by the unorganized and unplanned 
37 
increase of populations in cities caused by the internal migration from rural to urban 
areas, due to the lack of opportunities in the former. According to Sanidad-Leones 
(2006), increased difficulties in rural areas exacerbated by natural and man-made 
calamities brought about the massive migration to the cities. Uncontrolled urbanization 
has led to the proliferation of slums and marginal neighbourhoods. In economic terms, 
urbanization worsens poverty because of increased unemployment, little or no access to 
basic needs, inflation and the deterioration of the family nucleus. The slums or barrios 
are often characterized by detrimental living conditions with high population densities 
(Moreno and Warah, 2007). These urban regions suffer from extreme levels of 
deprivation, and studies have shown that disease and mortality rates are significantly 
higher in slums (Ibid). Other aspects such as the inability to access services, housing, 
land, education, health care, and unemployment, are ripple effects caused by the neglect 
of the state. These have significant repercussions which include the rise in violence, 
especially in the vulnerable demographic category of children and adolescents (Skinner 
and Steinberg, 2003). In short, children who cannot attend school, and who subsequently 
have no access to legitimate employment, who do not have an actual home and come 
from broken families, are more likely to turn to illegal activities to support themselves: 
"Youth gangs are mushrooming, especially in Latin American and African countries, 
where rapid urbanization is straining families' abilities to meet the social and economic 
needs of young people" (UN-HABITAT, 2004) 5. Moncaleano (2006) argues that the 
relationship between urbanization and youth gangs is somewhat complex. Still, it is 
evident that the increase in youth crime and delinquency in general is linked to the 
5 For this particular reference, I did not include the page number as the document was accessed online: 
http://ww2.unhabitat.org/mediacentre/documents/sowc/Featurechild.pdf 
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growth of cities which are characterized by overcrowding, invasion of personal space, 
precarious living conditions as well as the lack of a social security net. 
According to the United Nations (2005), urbanization is an inevitable side effect 
of development and may be essential for the growth to occur. The problem is that these 
demographic shifts are fast, unmanaged and uncontrolled: 
The rate at which urbanization occurs is also relevant, as population instability, 
or the rate at which people change their households, is strongly associated with 
crime, and urban populations are typically areas of high turnover. Since informal 
social controls are the most effective means of preventing crime, areas with little 
sense of community coherence are most vulnerable to criminality. The 
anonymity associated with transient populations is an enabling factor for a wide 
range of organized, and not so organized, crime activities. Illegal immigrants, 
runaways, drug dealers, and sex workers tend to congregate in urban areas 
(United Nations, 2005, p.g. 8). 
On the other hand, Gilbert (1999) states that urbanization itself does not produce 
poverty, crime and political protest, which does not suggest that poorly managed 
urbanization cannot lead to undesirable forms of social development. For the most part 
though, contributions concur on the influence urbanization has on the increase of youth 
crime (For more see Carrion, ND; Martin-Barbero, 2002, Hagedorn, 2005; PAHO, 1997; 
Lungo and Martel, 2004; UNFPA, 2007). 
Other Prominent Issues on Youth Gangs 
The factors mentioned above are prevalent in the literature. However, other 
determinants also contribute to the youth gang crisis in Latin America. I have identified 
four relevant features that contribute significantly to youth crime in die region: 
The first factor is the culture of violence. According to Cruz (2007), gangs are 
products of societies that cultivate violence. The term refers to a system of norms, 
values, attitudes, which enables and legitimizes the use of violence (Huezo, 2001; 
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Martfn-Baro, 1992). It is certain that Latin America's history has been filled with 
political turbulence and bloodshed. Decades of authoritarianism, state terror, uprisings, 
political and social violence, have characterized the history of the region. According to 
Chavez, the cycles of state repression and popular resistance, typified by armed rebellions 
"consolidated a cultural pattern that mediated class and ethnic conflict with violence" 
(Chavez, 2004, p. 32). Violence became internalized and transferred to communities and 
families, therefore legitimizing the use of it to deal with conflict. The culture of violence 
not only destroys the social fabric and relies on the use of terror as a method to deal with 
social defiance, but disregards any value and respect for human life (Ibid). Waldmann 
(2007) nonetheless challenges the broader sense of the culture of violence, which Pecaut 
(1987) defined is inclusive of all socio-cultural structures and symbols that connect, 
produce and perpetuate violence. Thus, the broad nature of Pecaut's definition is not 
helpful, and he questions whether more specific factors in the collective consciousness or 
"whether cultural makeup in the narrower sense- understood as the general view of what 
is desirable, worthwhile, and normatively acceptable- is responsible for the difficulties in 
putting a stop to escalating violence" (Waldmann, 2007, p.g.64). Youth gangs appear to 
be the products of such culture of violence resulted from the conflicts in the region. 
The second factor is the lack of social capital. Although various definitions of 
social capital are in use, it is the general consensus that the term refers to the components, 
such as trust, obligations and expectations, networks and social norms that contribute to a 
social organization, allowing members of a community to cooperate in benefit to the 
whole society (Narayan, and Woolcock, 2000; Putnam, 2002; Halpern, 2005; Mockbee, 
1995; Sharma, 2005; Kay and Johnston, 1948; Franke, 2005). Cruz (2007) argues that 
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"gangs emerge in settings marked by community disorganization, that is, community 
contexts where there is a lack of trust among people, neighbours, and members of the 
community" (Cruz, 2007, p. 41). At the same time, gangs hinder and obstruct the 
development of productive social organizations. Likewise, Amaya Cobar (2007) asserts 
that in order to understand gangs, it is important to study their origins as a multifactor 
phenomenon that includes conditions of exclusion and marginalization, as well as the 
lack of social capital. 
An extensive study on Central American gangs demonstrated the relationship 
between social capital, or the lack thereof, and the rise of youth gangs (ERIC, IDESO, 
IDffiS, IUDOP, 2007). In this work, Cruz, Carranza, and Santacruz G. (2007) argue that 
gangs create their own perverse social capital, which is characterized by strong bonds 
between gang members, organized participation and solidarity, and their own norms and 
values that allow them to recognize what is or is not permitted (Rubio, 1997 in ERIC, 
IDESO, IDIES, IUDOP, 2007)6. This type of social capital is not beneficial to the 
community at large. On the other hand, positive social capital is generated by beneficial 
networks that work together for human development, and therefore stops or reduces 
criminal conduct within a community. When positive social capital is lacking, youth 
gangs tend to appear with their own version of it. 
A third issue to address is the, proliferation of firearms. The State of World's 
Cities Report 2004/5 argues that Latin American cities and their urban areas have the 
highest concentration of gun ownership rates in the world with 19.7 percent on average 
(UN-HABITAT, 2004). The combination of social exclusion, lacking access to basic 
6 By definition of Rubio (2007), perverse social capital involves the acquisition of positive benefits for 
members of a group, but also involves negatives results for the extended community. 
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needs, and the proliferation of fire arms is proving to be a deadly recipe for the region. 
According to Stohl and Tuttle (2008), at least 45 million to 80 million small arms (and 
light weapons) circulated in Latin America. Every year between 73,000 and 90,000 
people are killed by firearms, making guns the leading cause of death among Latin 
Americans between the ages of 15 and 44 (Ibid). During the decades of the Cold War, 
large amounts of surplus weapons were transferred to allies by the U.S. as well as the 
Soviet Union (Lumpe, 1998; Phythian, 2000; World Council of Churches, 2001; 
NACLA, 2008; Lumpe, 1999). Specific developments on the armament of the Central 
American region will be discussed below. 
According to statistics of the RCMP (2006), the number of firearms circulating in 
Guatemala is estimated to be around 0.9 to 2 million, while 70 percent of criminally 
violent deaths are caused by firearms. Honduras' National Congress estimated that 
around 400 to 500 thousand illegal firearms were in circulation and that approximately 68 
percent of deaths were caused by violence involving firearms. Brazil is estimated to have 
almost 18 million firearms in circulation, which cause 80 percent of the violent deaths in 
the country. Meanwhile it is assumed that 200 million firearms are in circulation in the 
United States (RCMP, 2006). 
The United Nations Crime and Development Report of 2007 stated that according 
to the International Action Network on Small Arms7: 
There are an estimated 1.6 million guns in Central America, of which about 
500,000 are legally registered. Many of these weapons are remainders from 
military conflicts in the region in the 1970s and 80s [sic], most notably in El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. After these conflicts ceased thousands of 
military weapons ended up on the illicit market in those nations (...) Firearms are 
7 http://www.iansa.org/regions/camerica/camerica.htm 
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used to commit more than 70% of all homicides in El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras (in United Nations Crime and Development Report, 2007, p.g. 67). 
According to the RCMP report, firearms are obtained illegally by gangs given 
that some gang members are involved in the theft and re-sale of guns. The availability of 
weapons by itself does not contribute to the creation of youth gangs as such. However, it 
does influence the violent nature of youth gangs and aggravate their interactions with 
society: either by employing guns in their attacks, or smuggling them as part of the 
underground economy. According to Chavez (2004: 36), the proliferation of firearms 
and explosives is a major factor in the vicious spiral of violence in Latin America. 
Accordingly, "dominant cultural attitudes favor the possession, the carrying and the 
frequent use of guns in what is increasingly being called a 'culture of arms'" (Ibid). Still, 
the relationship between youth gangs and guns is limited to the economic activities of the 
gang, as well as their employment in crime (RCMP, 2006). The situation is only made 
worse when these gangs have access to military-type weapons (Ibid). Cohen and Rubio 
(2007) agree that gang membership is a complex social issue, and among one of the risk 
factors for this type of organization is the ready availability of guns, apart from other 
factors like dysfunctional families, marginalization, etc. According to Elbert (2004), 
gangs in Central America have been improving their arsenals to include automatic assault 
rifles, such as Ak-47s, facilitated by the illegal networks that run cross this region. 
According to the Small Arms Survey (2007), the availability of weapons, social 
dislocation, and anonymity of large urban centres contribute to armed violence. 
Therefore, when the state is unable to address the needs of young people living in 
precarious conditions, the option they are likely to pursue is to join drug and arms 
trafficking networks or gangs. 
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A fourth issue brought forth by the literature is the presence of narcotics and drug 
trading. The globalization of a drug economy (Briceno-Leon and Zubillaga, 2002) as an 
etiology of youth violence and gangs is a complex one to evaluate. The analysis has to 
take into consideration the production and distribution of narcotics and the relationship 
they hold with youth criminality, as well as the increasing consumption of drugs among 
youth or the population at large. The production and distribution of illegal narcotics have 
acquired sophisticated forms of organization and consolidated into extensive networks in 
the underground economy that thrives in many marginal slums and neighbourhoods in the 
region. Mockbee (1995) establishes this relationship by arguing that poor communities 
are most susceptible to the economic gain that drug trafficking offers. For a young 
person with few limited opportunities in terms of employment and education, the 
economic mobility that drug trafficking offers is highly attractive. In the case of Latin 
America, the drug industry is of significant relevance, especially because of the 
geographical locations of production and distribution areas. Moser and Winton (2002) 
conclude that the geographic location of Central America, between consumers and 
producers of drugs makes it a logical passageway for narcotics. In this same sense, the 
2007 UN Crime Report on Central America, states that South America produces an 
estimated 900 tons of cocaine annually, most of which is shipped to 10 million users in 
the United States and Europe, a market worth some US$ 60 billion in 2003. Thus, there 
has been a significant increase in drug smuggling, sales, and consumption in the region. 
A 2001 study by the Inter-American Observatory on Drugs showed that an estimated 43 
percent of gang members were involved in the sales of narcotics (OID, 2001). It also 
demonstrated the relationship between the year in which the members joined the gang 
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and their involvement in the selling of drugs (Ibid). Del Olmo (1997) addressed links 
between drugs and youth gang activity by stating that narcotics use generates alternate 
states of consciousness that can lead to violent behaviour. Drug use leads to a physical 
and psychological dependence, and young people are driven to join gangs that can offer 
them the support to their addictions. Cruz (2007) argues that drugs play an important role 
in young people's affiliation to gangs. Consumption is viewed as a form of recreation, 
while it attributes to the social dynamics of violence within the group. He concludes that 
the presence of narcotics paves the way for young people to join gangs and strengthen 
"their link to the dynamics of violence, introducing them into complex processes of 
addiction, trafficking, and criminal networks" (Cruz, 2007, p.g. 46). 
It is important to mention that the issue of migration was also considered in the 
literature. Latin American migration is discussed as a predominant factor in the 
emergence of gangs, especially in the Central American context (for more on Latin 
American migration see Gonzalez and Sanchez, 2002; Pizarro and Villa, 2005; 
UNESCO, 1998; Pellegrino, 2000, Castillo, 1995). I will refrain here from expanding on 
migration because an upcoming section will exclusively deal with this issue as it relates 
to the Mara phenomenon. Other contributing factors discussed in the literature pointed to 
the role of media, culture of consumerism, and the globalization of needs (Surette, 1994). 
This relates to Merton's strain theory and the 'American Dream' concept. 
Implications for Development 
While it is important to review works that discuss the impact of youth gang 
activity on development, this aspect of my research proved to be somewhat challenging. 
Literature on the impact of youth crime on development in Latin America is not 
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abundant. However, most documents seemed to evaluate the general socioeconomic 
costs of crime for a society's development. 
In this respect, most of the contributions evaluate the socioeconomic costs of 
violence and crime. For instance, Luz (2008) argues that the monetary cost of violence in 
Latin America is considerable. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
economic losses as a result of criminal violence in the region was approximately US 
$140-$170 billion by the late 1990s, or almost 12 percent of the regional GDP (Ibid). 
These costs fall primarily on the shoulders of the public sector and the state, and they 
represent a great burden for poorer countries. Luz also highlights that elevated violence 
rates not only contribute to the destruction of human life, but have negative consequences 
for the social and economic spheres as well. For example, high crime rates keep away 
potential investors, foreign or domestic. Therefore, it is manifest that development 
projects are truncated by the significant impact of armed violence in the young 
population. Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter (1999) presented a detailed analysis of the 
socioeconomic costs of violence: 
Social violence impedes economic development. At the microeconomic level, 
social violence reduces human capital formation by inducing some individuals to 
invest not in education but in the development of criminal skills; it also dissuades 
some individuals from studying at night for fear of violent crime. At the 
macroeconomic level, it reduces both foreign and domestic investment; it may 
also reduce domestic savings if people have less confidence in a country's future 
growth prospects (1999, p.12). 
They created a typology of the socioeconomic costs of violence and divided them 
into four categories. The first is direct costs which refer to the efforts employed to 
preventing violence, treat its victims, and punish its perpetrators. The second category 
includes non-monetary costs, which refer to impacts such as increased homicide, and 
drug and alcohol use of a society. The third category refers to economic multiplier 
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effects, such as decreased human capital, lower rates of labour market participation, poor 
employment productivity and lower savings and investment. The last category includes 
the multiple social effects, such as inter-generational transmission of violence, 
destruction of social capital, and a poor quality of life. 
Another study by ECLAC (1998), argued that the evaluation of the impact of 
violence can be hard because of the lack of accurate statistical data. The authors too used 
the work of Buvinic et al. (1999) and Trujillo and Badel (1998) to demonstrate the impact 
of violence, classifying the costs into direct, non-monetary and economic, as well as 
social multiplier effects. Further studies produced by organizations like the International 
Centre for Research on Human Rights (CIIDH, 2006) or the UN together with the World 
Bank (2007) also referred to this categorization to analyze the costs of violence. The 
joint report by the UN and the World Bank on the Caribbean (2007) detailed specific 
costs of crime on aspects such as tourism and business, as crime threatened visitors and 
deterred investments. According to a 2006 World Health Organization (WHO) report, 
the consequences of youth violence affect the health and physical integrity of people as 
well as family and peer relationships; increase levels of fear in the community, and add 
pressure on the health and public services of a country (WHO, 2006). 
The UN Crime and Development Report on Central America (2007) argues that 
crime impedes development on three levels: society, business and governance. 
Accordingly, crime erodes social and human capital. Fear of crime restricts mobility, 
which affects economic and social dynamics, especially in regards to education. 
Criminal groups seek the disempowerment of communities, and people want to reduce 
their chances of being victimized. Therefore a brain drain occurs when people leave who 
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feel unable to enjoy the basic security of life. In terms of the economy, crime creates 
instability, which in turn discourages investment, both foreign and domestic. The 2007 
UN study also shows that crime and violence destroy the relationship between the people 
and the state by undermining democracy. The only ones likely to benefit from the 
situation are private security companies. The following table shows the number of 
officers employed in the private security industry in Central America in 2002: 
Figure.2 1 Private Officers in Central America, 2002 
Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama 
Source: Adapted from Godnick, Muggah, and Waszink, 2002, p.3. 
The importance of the study of youth gang violence and crime in development is 
clearly manifested. Moreover, its implications are evident and should provide much food 
for thought for policy-makers who setup development projects in communities or regions 
affected by crime. However, this brings up a fundamental issue. As previously 
discussed, much of Latin American literature in criminology has not been well accepted 
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by western scholars, and therefore has been rarely taken into consideration in the 
formulation of policy work. According to Schulte-Bockholt and Kenney (2008), Latin 
American literature has had a critical nature rooted on digestion problems originating 
from the imposition of U.S. perspectives on delinquency through various agencies that 
address crime and victimization research and strategies, 
[i]t cannot be accepted that outside professionals bringing with them and 
promoting ideas, conceptions, and theories, perhaps valid for another society, 
can, in a few days' time, make an accurate scientific analysis of a foreign reality. 
There are others who have a much deeper understanding of the region, who know 
its problems and attempts at solutions, and who nonetheless,... are not called 
upon to contribute (Del Olmo, 1981, p.g. 64-65). 
The U.S. models of crime and social control have had eclectic effects on Latin 
America's crime reality. Most U.S. programs are based on repressive approaches to 
problems, therefore one of the gravest impacts of applying imported models of crime has 
been on incarceration (Rico, 1998; Schulte-Bockholt & Kenny, 2008). Incarceration 
trends, especially in Central America, are usually characterized by overcrowded facilities, 
violence, and continuous homicides. Rather than serving as reformative centres, 
jailhouses represent schools for increased criminal activities and cultures. However, the 
impacts of such models go beyond incarceration, transpiring into actual state policy 
effectiveness. 
The Human Security Paradigm 
Finally, it is appropriate to briefly present to the reader an important issue that is 
relevant to this thesis. The concept of Human Security encompasses a multidisciplinary 
understanding of security. This emerging paradigm challenges the concept of national 
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security and argues that security is an issue that needs to be addressed at the level of 
individual, not that of state, to create policies that will have a more direct positive impact 
on human development. A 1994 UN Report introduced the concept which by now is 
extensively discussed in the academic literature, having become the cornerstone for 
numerous projects addressing security concerns. Human security has diverse definitions 
and contains many aspects that are not pertinent to this research. Still, aspects of the 
literature on human security pertain to this theoretical framework, making it applicable to 
policymaking. 
The United Nations (1994) definition of human security identified two separate 
concepts that are interconnected: freedom from fear and freedom from want. It also 
stated that threats in seven different areas need to be considered: economic, food, 
environmental, health, personal, community, and political security. The Human Security 
Network defines human security as freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, 
safety, and their lives (1999). The Commission on Human Security (2003) argues that 
the concept means protecting vital freedoms, namely, protecting people from critical and 
pervasive threats and situations, as well as building on their strengths. Sen (2000) calls 
upon Obuchi's idea of human security and describes it as "the keyword to 
comprehensively seizing all of the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and 
dignity of human beings and to strengthening the efforts to confront these threats" (Sen, 
2000, p.l). It is evident that the above noted organizations and authors share common 
ground in their definitions of human security (For more on Human Security 
contributions, see Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2006; Richmond, 2001; Paris, 2001; 
Kleinschmidt, 2006; Stoett, 1999; McRae and Hubert, 2001; Weissberg, 2003; Nef, 1999; 
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Thomas, 2000; Myers, 1993; Ramcharan, 2002). However, these conceptualizations 
have not gone without criticism. According to Paris (2001), the concept of human 
security used by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is too broad and 
virtually covers every aspect of life. It lacks precision and is ambiguous because 
"existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, 
encompassing everything from physical to psychological well being, which provides 
policymakers little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy goals" (Paris, 2001, 
p. 88). 
Others like Henk (2005) argue that the concept is not concretely defined and can 
be subject to an alternative range of definitions. The International Studies Association 
(2006) argues that the human security framework is highly problematic as it grants an 
excuse for stronger states to intervene in the affairs of weaker ones under the pretext that 
they threaten international stability. This negatively affects the sovereignty of citizens of 
weaker countries, limiting their ability to play an active political role, hence reinforcing 
imperialism. Many are the critiques and counter-critiques found in the literature on this 
issue (For more see Oberleitner, 2005; Hoogensen, 2006; Paris, 2005). 
For the purposes of this research, the aspect of human security most appropriate to 
speak to is the freedom from fear. The Human Security Report (2005) applies a narrower 
definition of the concept. It states that the focus of human security is violent threats to an 
individual, as the issues of poverty, environment, and health are already addressed 
elsewhere. Therefore it is much more effective to address issues that deal with the 
interrelatedness of security, development and protection of civilians. According to 
Acharya (2005), before the terrorist events of 9/11, freedom of fear entailed the 
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protection of the dignity of an individual, and the prevention of cruelty to people caught 
in zones of conflict. With this in mind and constricting the analysis further, the Human 
Security Research and Outreach Program of the government of Canada (2006), delves 
into the discussion of the freedom of fear in urban spaces. According to Hawrylak, 
Houghton and Lawson (2006), the rapid growth of urban areas has turned the cities into 
powerful actors that can deeply influence human security. Therefore, it is vital to adopt 
an urban approach in which human security effectively contributes to policies and 
programs that will directly further peace building strategies. These authors insist that 
urban armed violence is largely neglected by international actors, while human security is 
increasingly being shaped by the unique dynamics of urban realities. 
As previously discussed, the rapid forms of urbanization have led to the creation 
of marginal slums. The lack of public security or police has resulted in the emergence of 
a private security market for the elite, while gangs in the marginal slums use extortion to 
sell security to the poor. The aspect of urbanization has become part of the human 
security agenda because the trends of recent years have demonstrated the growing urban 
violence causing deaths among young people. "Examining human security through an 
urban optic reveals that poorly-policed slums are generating conditions for what are 
effectively 'urban child soldiers'" (Ibid, p.g.12). Consequently, they argue that future 
human security policy must have at least three main entry points, represented in the 
following flowchart: 
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Adapted from: Hawrylak, Houghton, and Lawson, in Human Security Research and Outreach Program Discussion Paper, 2006, p. 18 
With this new approach, Human Security-Cities (2007) has also turned its 
attention to the implications of urbanization for policies and programs involving the 
protection of individuals. According to this report, since the end of the Cold War, human 
security has been shaped less by conflict between, but rather by strife within countries. 
The increased hostility and insecurity in the slums of major cities brought about the focus 
of these studies on violence reduction. A typology of urban crime classifies urban 
conflict into four categories: organized crime, anomic crime, open armed conflict, and 
endemic community violence (Human Security-Cities, 2007). The last category includes 
urban gang formations and vigilante groups or militias, who have the greatest impact on 
civilian casualties. As noted above, the failure to provide public security leads to its 
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'privatization'. Hence, gangs take it upon themselves to offer protection, which in turn 
leads to violent clashes with other such groups as well as the police. 
The purpose of including the concept of human security is to provide a stronger 
case for the importance of youth gang violence and the impact it causes. In this new 
'Urban Century', the international community must acknowledge the increased effects 
these actors have on human livelihoods, and introduce policies and strategies that will 
address the role gangs play in threatening human safety and well being. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
UNDERSTANDING HISTORY TO SITUATE THE PRESENT 
Historical conditions are very important for analyzing the structural causes of 
crime in the countries used as my case studies. Central American history resonates with 
countless narrations of repression, violence, peasant rebellion, and political turmoil. 
Considered the backyard of North America, the region experienced extensive bloodshed 
in pursuit of a fake inorganic democracy by some, and social justice by others. During 
the decade of the seventies, at least 40,000 Nicaraguans were killed in the political 
insurrection against dictator Anastasio Somoza, while an estimated 12,000 more died in 
the subsequent Contra War. Similarly, almost 60,000 Salvadorians were killed during 
their civil conflict in the 1980s, and an estimated 50,000 to 75,000 Guatemalans have 
been killed during this period of civil strife. Millions have been displaced and thousands 
were forced to become refugees (Berryman, 1985). Central American politics has fitted 
itself within a conventional framework of liberals and conservatives, while U.S. influence 
has largely determined the rules of the game. Evidendy, this history has shaped the 
current political, economic, and social dynamics of the region. Thus, it is of central 
importance to provide the reader with a succinct account of the main historical events for 
Honduras and Nicaragua to contribute to the understanding of today's reality. 
Honduras: A State for Sale 
The civil conflicts experienced by El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala did not 
cross over into Honduras. However, its past is as rough as its geography, which includes 
the making of a 'banana republic', nineteen years of nearly uninterrupted military rule, 
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and a shift to neoliberal democracy. Honduras played a fundamental role in the sequence 
of events that affected its neighbouring countries, especially El Salvador and Nicaragua. 
The country's strategic location at the center of the isthmus, and its borders with three 
countries that experienced violent political conflicts, made it inevitable for Honduras to 
be shoved in the middle of the region's turmoil. Honduras is a country that has 
undergone agrarian reforms, experiences high levels of peasant and union activity, but 
has also been heavily burdened with corruption and dependency. 
The Banana Republic 
Politics in Honduras have generally been unstable. Following its separation from 
the United Provinces of Central America in 1839 until the 1900s, the country was 
governed by sixty-four presidents, few of whom were constitutionally elected (Anderson, 
1988). Throughout most of the twentieth century, the country lived through long 
successions of presidents and military men, who played a strong role in the country's 
administration. Economically, throughout the nineteenth century, Honduras did not have 
significant contact with the world market, making it relatively self sufficient and quite 
isolated in comparison to its neighbours, which had managed to position themselves 
economically and politically through coffee exports. However, by the turn of the century, 
an increase in the demand for bananas attracted U.S. investment bringing dramatic 
growth to the agricultural industry in the northern part of the country. By 1930, the 
production of bananas, mainly by U.S. fruit companies, "had catapulted Honduras into 
the position of the world's leading banana exporter" (Morris, 1984, p.g.5). The largest 
and most powerful banana company was the United Fruit Company, originally created by 
a Boston-based businessman, Minor C. Keith. It was later directed by Samuel Zemurray, 
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an Alabama entrepreneur, who was one of the first to recognize the potential of the 
Honduran banana industry. He also founded the Cuyamel Fruit Company that would 
later merge with United Fruit. Owning most of the infrastructure and technology that 
gave way to the unparalleled economic growth, foreign banana companies soon 
controlled the politics of the country. For instance, in 1911, Zemurray financed the 
overthrow of President Miguel Davila and installed General Manuel Bonilla in his place 
(Euraque, 1996; Anderson, 1988). This facilitated extraordinary concessions to the 
banana companies ranging from duty free imports to the right to build infrastructure. 
This banana enclave led to the failure of Honduras to develop a strong ruling class that 
would defend national interest. Local entrepreneurs were displaced, and the ruling 
groups that did emerge competed for the wealth and political resources offered by the 
foreign companies. Consequently, Honduras was coined with the generic term "banana 
republic", which according to Meyer and Meyer (1994) is a disparaging label for Latin 
American states "whose economic dependence on the cultivation of bananas as its 
principal export crop led to foreign banana corporations exercising unprecedented 
influence on its internal affairs" (1994: 53). 
Banana companies continued to operate and exert great influence in the country 
well into the 1980s. By 1988, U.S. transnational corporations not only had absolute 
control over the five largest firms in Honduras, they also controlled 88 percent of the 20 
largest and 82 percent of the fifty largest companies in the country (Acker, 1988). 
Bananas still remain a leading export for Honduras (For more details on the banana 
history of Honduras see Euraque, 1996; Morris, 1984; Lapper & Painter, 1985; Anderson, 
1988; Acker, 1988). 
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From Caudillo Politics to Militarism to U.S. Linchpin 
A number of leaders played significant roles in regional and national histories in 
Latin America. These popular leaders often termed caudillos were considered defenders 
of traditional customs, local livelihoods and national values, who radiated natural and 
charismatic leadership and whom the masses trusted (Burns, 1980). Honduran history 
also contains elements of caudillismo, disguised under the concept of democracy, which 
has been more characterized by political bossism and strong-man rule. 
Honduras, for the most part, has had a traditional two-party system: the Liberal 
Party, which tends to have center-left policies, and the National Party which holds to 
more conservative positions. The National Party managed to consolidate its power, 
when, General Tiburcio Carias Andino, became president in 1932, a position he would 
hold for the next sixteen years (Lapper & Painter, 1985). Under his dictatorship, 
Honduras managed to sail without serious upheavals through the depression of the 1930s. 
He also kept the banana companies happy, as he recognized their importance for the 
stability of his government. However, his regime eventually became associated with 
fraud and corruption and by 1948 his term came to an end. 
The military seized power in 1956 and the government established was led by a 
military council consisting of three officers: General Roque Rodriguez, Colonel Hector 
Caraccioli, and Major Roberto Galvez Barnes. However, due to military interest in 
maintaining the facade of a democratic state, the liberal Ramon Villeda Morales was 
elected president in 1957. Under his term, the first agrarian reform was introduced. This 
unsettled powerful landowners, fruit companies, and a clique of conservatives, who 
supported a coup in October of 1963, headed by Colonel Oswaldo Lopez Arellano 
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(UNAH, 2005; Anderson, 1988; Lapper & Painter, 1985). According to some, his 
influence on politics was extensive and dangerous, as he used violent repression against 
enemies or opponents of his government (See for example Anderson, 1988). To others, 
his government was dynamic, achieving projects of material progress, stabilizing the 
tensions of the country, and effectively dealing with conflicts with El Salvador (See for 
example UNAH, 2005). Lopez Arellano's first presidential term ended in 1971, 
nevertheless, in 1972 he carried out his second coup against the elected president Ramon 
E. Cruz. He governed Honduras until 1975, when he was forced to resign because of 
corruption scandals involving banana companies. Up until 1981, the country was run by 
a series of military men, which included General Juan Melgar Castro and General 
Policarpo Paz Garcia. Following the overthrow of Nicaraguan dictator, Anastasio 
Somoza Debayle, by the Sandinistas, the United States began strengthening its relations 
with Honduras (Ibid). 
The U.S. role in Honduras during the 1980s is unprecedented in Latin American 
history. After the Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua, civil war broke out in El 
Salvador. Honduras was strategically located between these two countries for the United 
States to anchor its regional defense strategy. By 1981, The U.S. National Security 
Council had approved US$ 19 million for covert operations against Nicaragua in 
Honduras (Lapper & Painter, 1985). Although the constitutional president was Roberto 
Suazo Cordova, the country was heavily influenced by General Gustavo Alvarez, who 
became the Americans' number one ally in the region. In 1982, the Reagan 
administration pledged a 50 percent increase in military aid to Honduras, financing the 
infamous Contra operations against Nicaragua's left-wing government (Ibid). By 1984, 
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it was announced that the northern Honduran area of Puerto Castilla would serve as base 
for U.S. military facilities, where foreign as well as Honduran troops would be trained for 
combat. Honduras became a large U.S. military base, with headquarters and airfields 
spread all throughout the country. Furthermore, for most of the 1980s, American military 
supplied Honduras not only with money, but with arms, helicopters, and military 
munitions, converting the country into the region's anti-communist citadel. 
The U.S. is doing all it can to keep the Contras intact in Honduras, for at least 
another year and they're using 'persuasive' methods to see it that Honduras 
remains willing to go on being an accomplice in the aggression against 
Nicaragua. (Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto in Barricada International, 
1989, p.g. 4.) 
The Democratic State and Neoliberalism 
At the dawn of the 1990s, Honduras was considered one of Central America's 
"emerging democracies", after almost 20 years of military rule (Envio, 1990). The 
elections of 1990, where young nationalist Rafael Leonardo Callejas was elected 
president, were hardly influenced by democratic processes, but by three main factors 
inherited from the 1980s. The first was the draconian economic measures imposed by 
financial lending institutions, largely a result of the economic debt crisis that Latin 
America in general was experiencing. The second issue was the desire to lessen military 
influence in the political and economic matters of the country; and third, the lack of 
leadership and strategy from the popular movements who were unable to communicate 
the poorer classes' interests to those in the elites. The United States, the World Bank and 
the IMF supported Callejas. Given that the latter were the authors of the neoliberal 
economic package that the country was to inherit, it was to their best interest to have a 
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president who would consolidate the stabilization policies and structural adjustment 
programs. These policies, however, were dictated by the needs of the international 
market and U.S. geopolitics, and aimed at aligning Honduras with the rest of Central 
America. 
Attempts to introduce the neoliberal model began in 1988 during Jose Azcona's 
presidency. While Honduras had been a regional military platform for the U.S., it also 
became one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid in the world (Envio, 1990). In addition, 
the country received nearly US$ 1.4 billion in bilateral and multilateral loans during the 
same period, nearly doubling its foreign debt (Ibid). Rather than investing this money, 
the government wasted the funds in forms of subsidies to appease producers and 
consumers. During the 1980s, the exports of goods and services had contracted and 
dropped so much that by 1988 the country suffered from severe economic deficiencies, 
while depending on foreign transnational corporations as well as U.S. aid. International 
financial institutions required the Honduran government to tighten its monetary, fiscal, 
and its salary policies. The results, however, produced more problems that forced the 
country into taking even harsher measures. By 1990, international financial institutions 
had suspended aid to Honduras unless its government agreed to structural adjustment 
programs, which the then president, Jose Azcona, rejected. 
Days after taking power in 1990, Callejas implemented neoliberal measures by 
immediately devaluating the currency and increasing the sales tax, while maintaining the 
previous measures imposed by the World Bank and IMF. Similar economic adjustments 
were implemented during the government of the next President, Carlos Reina, although 
his term came to be instrumental in changing the power dynamics of military. He was 
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the first to take power away from the military and to name his own Minister of Defense, 
rather than accept the nominee typically suggested by the Armed forces. While Honduras 
entered the twenty-first century in a democratic fashion, the country's politics and 
strategies are influenced by the global economic system. In this case, the model has 
transformed from a classic neoliberal model to what we now refer to as the globalization 
of markets. Today, Honduras is one of the poorest countries in the western hemisphere, 
highly characterized by the unequal distribution of income as well as high rates of 
unemployment. The economy still relies on heavy exports of agricultural products, 
mainly bananas and coffee, and its growth continues to be extremely dependent on U.S. 
demand. 
Honduran politics have evolved considerably throughout the years from a 
dictatorship to what appears to be a democratic state. A view of Honduras' history, 
would lead one to assume that by today, the country would be a modest regional success. 
With no history of internal armed conflict, flows of monetary aid, natural resources and 
an apparent democratic political system, Honduras should have cultivated economic and 
social development for its people. However, the country's present socioeconomic 
condition of extreme poverty and insecurity is a reflection of the political disparity, 
corruption, and social polarization, all consequences of poor and unpatriotic leadership, 
that have been trademarks of Honduran history. On the one hand, the country's cultural 
heritage and social dynamics include collective forms of engaging in politics and 
government, therefore fragmentation was bound to occur to a greater or lesser extent. On 
the other hand, the country is extremely vulnerable to external influences to the degree 
that one needs to question whether it is truly a sovereign nation in control of its affairs. 
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With this in mind, could the Maras, the object of this study, be simply another set of 
actors that have identified this lack of social and political cohesion in Honduras? 
Nicaragua's History of Insurgency 
Within the Central American region, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala were 
the three countries that experienced marked social upheaval during the twentieth century. 
With distinct social and political formations, it is no surprise that Nicaragua's history is 
significantly different from that of neighbouring Honduras. Nicaragua inherited a very 
unequal society from the days of the Spanish colonization, with an elite focused on 
concentrating its wealth while perpetuating the poverty of the population at large. This, 
in turn, contributed to the country's history of rebellions and political turmoil. The 
following section presents the main historical developments that occurred in 20th century 
Nicaragua. 
The Somoza Dynasty 
Like Honduras, Nicaragua broke away from the United Provinces of Central 
America in 1838 to become an independent republic. From then on, the political power 
was a constant struggle between the liberals and conservatives, but by the early 1900s, 
the United States intervened military to protect its own economic interests (Rudolph and 
Millet in McCuen, 1986). From 1912 until 1932, with exception of a brief interval in the 
mid-1920s, Nicaragua was occupied by the U.S. Marines, who created the National 
Guard in order to maintain internal order (Walker, 1997). During this same period, the 
nationalist guerrilla leader, Augusto Cesar Sandino, opposed the U.S. occupation of 
Nicaragua and constantly frustrated the Marines' efforts to restore stability. Sandino 
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eventually forced the withdrawal of the U.S. military by 1932, and control of the National 
Guard was given to Nicaraguan, Anastasio Somoza Garcia. By 1934, Somoza had 
Sandino assassinated, two years later he staged a coup and rigged the elections, officially 
becoming president of Nicaragua in 1937. With this began a "the longest lived dynastic 
dictatorship in Latin American history" (Walker, 2000, p.g. 68). 
From 1936 up until 1979, three members of the Somoza family ruled Nicaragua. 
With the support from the United States, the first Anastasio Somoza Garcia ran the 
country until he was assassinated in 1956. His son, Luis Somoza Debayle, took over the 
presidency and ruled until his death from a heart attack in 1967. Thereafter, his brother 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle took over until overthrown by the Sandinistas in 1979 
(Culturegram, 1996). Although the three Somozas had distinct forms of dictatorship, 
with the last one being by far the greediest and the most violent, they all consolidated 
their power through the co-optation of key elites, direct control of the National Guard, 
and support from the United States. The Somozas carefully cultivated their relationship 
with the Washington during their rule. Nicaragua's foreign policy was in line with that of 
the United States. Although there were occasional tensions between both countries, 
mostly due to the Somozas' undemocratic styles of governing, the dictators were 
supportive of American policy, and the United States benefited from the relationship 
(Solaun, 2005). The Somoza regime was considered acceptable, especially because the 
alternative had communist or at the very least socialist orientations. In short, the 
Somozas used the United States to maintain power, and Washington used them to 
maintain influence in the region and perpetuate their pro-American stance (For more on 
the Somoza regime see Walter, 1993; Crawley, 1979; Morley, 1994). 
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The Rise of the Sandinistas and the Contra War 
The Somoza rule accentuated class differences and social problems. They 
accumulated a fortune worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and by the mid-1970s, the 
family owned approximately one quarter of Nicaragua's financial assets and major agro-
exporting industries (McCuen, 1986). The rural peasants were displaced and 
marginalized; the elite were further constricted, and social conditions in the country were 
appalling. Therefore, it is no surprise that rebellion and opposition was on the rise. In 
1961, a small guerrilla organization, the FSLN, was founded (McCuen, 1986). 
Commonly known as the Sandinistas, this revolutionary group named after the 
assassinated Sandino, viewed like a martyr by many Nicaraguans, was formed with the 
goal of overthrowing Somoza rule. For the following 15 years, the movement carried out 
small-scale attacks, but the struggle against Somoza became less and less of a class-based 
revolution. After the December 1972 earthquake, virtually all sectors of the Nicaraguan 
society united efforts to oust the dictatorship. The Somozas and their associates had 
engaged in the pilfering of international aid that was destined to those affected, losing 
their support among the middle and upper class (Berryman, 1985). As the Sandinista 
attacks and threats increased, the government responded with a violent 
'counterinsurgency' campaign, carried out by the National Guard. The 1978 murder of 
Pedro Chamorro, a well known Nicaraguan figure and editor of the opposition newspaper 
La Prensa, ignited a sudden mass uprising to Somoza's rule. Riots broke out and the 
Sandinistas seized the National Palace in Managua and full civil war ensured. While the 
Sandinistas took government employees hostage, the government responded by bombing 
the opposition. The United States sought to intervene by persuading Somoza to step 
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down, in order to prevent the left wing rebel movement from assuming power. However, 
the Sandinistas, with the support of most of Nicaraguans, launched a final offensive 
forcing Somoza to flee the country, while the guerrilla movement took control in 1979. 
The civil war had cost the lives of almost 50,000 people (McCuen, 1986). 
The ten and a half years of Sandinista rule can be divided into two periods. The 
government of National Reconstruction (1979-1985) where the new Marxist-oriented 
administration seized the Somozas' fortune, redistributed their lands to the peasants, 
suspended the constitution, and began tightening controls. They issued decrees to avoid 
the veneration of a strongman that could lead to another dictatorship. They were 
generally respectful of civil and political rights and created a mixed economy where the 
bulk of the production remained in the hands of a heavily regulated private sector. It also 
sought to maintain or establish trade and aid relations with other countries, regardless of 
regime type. The results of these policies were generally positive and Nicaragua was 
experiencing GDP growth and stabilization. According to Walker (1997), one of the 
most striking phenomena of these years was the explosion of grass roots organizations. 
This had been encouraged by government policies aiming to create true participatory 
democracy. The Sandinistas thus furthered the growth of organizations representing 
neighbourhoods, women, youth and others. 
They allowed them significant autonomy, channelled resources through them to 
the people, and gave them formal representation in governmental decision-
making bodies and on die Constitutional State- the corporative structure that 
served as the country's legislature until 1985. In turn, these organizations played 
a central role in the implementation of social programs and boosted production 
(Walker, 1997, p. 10). 
However, the Sandinista government was seen by Washington as an extension of 
Soviet-backed communism. Concerned that the Sandinistas were aiding left-wing rebels 
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in El Salvador, the United States suspended economic aid to Nicaragua and funded the 
Contra War for most of the 1980s. Although the second period of the Sandinista rule, 
called the Constitutional Period (1985-1990) was a time of important achievements, it 
represented significant political setbacks for the movement. When Sandinista Daniel 
Ortega was elected president in 1985, the U.S. responded by imposing a trade embargo 
on the country that severely affected its economy. The war against the Contras also 
strained the economy, as there was a shift of budget from social programs to the military. 
This period resulted in the decline of the innovative programs implemented during the 
first stage of Sandinista rule. The Contras also deliberately targeted the country's 
infrastructure, committed massive human right abuses, and destroyed rural clinics, 
schools, and food-storage facilities, worsening the economic situation for the population. 
Eventually, the Sandinistas agreed to ensure free elections if the Contras disarmed. 
Consequently, in the 1990s election, and after much American anti-Sandinista 
propaganda and strategizing, the U.S.-backed Violeta Chamorro won the presidency (For 
more on the Sandinistas see Bugajski, 1990; Murphy and Caro, 2006; McCuen, 1986; 
Morley; 1994). 
The Shift to Neoliberalism 
Violeta Chamorro promised to end the war and the American economic embargo, 
opening the floodgates of U.S. aid to Nicaraguans. This might have been her winning 
ticket in the 1990 elections against Daniel Ortega from the FSLN. The Sandinista 
government whose term in power was suffering from economic hardships due to the 
Contra war and worsened by the structural adjustments policies it had to introduce in 
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order to alleviate deficit and control inflation. Although the power shifted to the UNO 
coalition, this did not herald the disintegration of the revolutionary process of the FSLN. 
Rather, the party initiated a period of redefining its role in Nicaraguan society and its 
relationship with the new government (Linkogle, 1996). Meanwhile, the new president 
Chamorro was moving towards a market economy and opening investment inroads. 
Although structural reforms had actually begun under the Sandinistas, Chanaorro, who 
was ideologically dedicated to neoliberalism, continued the process. After 1990, the 
country's reinsertion into the global economy and international political relations were 
highly reinforced by U.S. policies. During the first years of Chamorro's government, the 
United States injected millions of dollars of aid into Nicaragua, with the objective to de-
sandinitize the country, as well as strengthen Nicaragua's neoliberal social order. The 
new government announced radical measures that included massive public-sector layoffs, 
privatizations, rate increases in public services, reduction on social spending, and the 
elimination of subsidies on basic consumption (Robinson, 1997). This led to chronic 
social conflict between the government and the popular classes, where strikes and 
negotiations were at the order of the day. Conversely, Chamorro's government 
consolidated democratic institutions, advanced national reconciliation and reduced 
human rights violations. However, the introduction of neoliberalism in Nicaragua 
increased social inequalities and consumption differentials, accentuated the concentration 
of wealth and created widespread impoverishment. It drove most Nicaraguans into 
desperate social and economic conditions of extreme poverty. 
After the 1990 elections, Nicaragua has had four peaceful and free presidential 
elections. In 1996, Arnoldo Aleman was elected president who continued to liberalize 
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the economy, followed in 2001 by Enrique Bolafios. During the latter's government, 
Nicaragua was still very much in line with U.S. policy. However, in 2006, the 
presidential election was won by Sandinista Daniel Ortega, bringing the FSLN back to 
power after 16 years in opposition. Presently, Ortega and the FSLN still hold office, 
attempting to re-align their politics with those of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in defiance 
of the U.S. (Silva, 2008). 
Nicaragua's history and transition to democracy has been unique and fragile. Its 
society has endured significant polarization that remains prominent in today's affairs, 
pushing its people to neopopular politics. Although there is a legacy of hatred and 
distrust left by the abuse of power, product of forty-seven years of dictatorship, followed 
by civil war and the vicious Contra War, history has proved that the fabric of Nicaraguan 
civil society is strong and resourceful. However, the magnitude of intervention this 
country suffered leaves room to question its authentic sovereignty as well, and to what 
extent this intervention affected its civic culture and state of democracy. Evidently, 
Honduras and Nicaragua currently share similar political and economic conditions, while 
their past is markedly different. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THEMATIC ANALYSIS: MARAS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
Latin American youth gangs vary across the region according to their structures, 
motivations, interactions and origins (Strocka, 2006). Brazil's Galeras Cariocas are 
more egalitarian and less cohesive. Its Quadrilhas are mainly interested in economic 
gain. Peru has Pandillas who fulfill many social functions in terms of identity, control 
over territory and neighbourhood protection. But other youth gangs like the Chilean 
Pandillas or Costa Rican Chapulines are more concerned with pleasure-seeking 
activities, like drug consumption or sports. The Colombian Sicarios and the Central 
American Maras are extremely violent gangs who engage in drugs and arms trafficking. 
Presence in the Region 
As mentioned above, Central America has its own very specific kind of youth 
gang formations. Depending on the region, their labels vary, as well as their nature and 
structure, such as Nicaragua's pandillas, while Costa Rica is home to chapulines (Leibel, 
2002; Strocka, 2006). The northern triangle of Central America, made up of Honduras, 
Guatemala and El Salvador, is home to a gang formation known as Las Maras. Maras 
are characterized by extreme violence, highly structured and organized systems. The 
resemble organized crime cartels, engage in illegal activities such as drugs and arms 
trafficking, kidnappings, etc., (Cruz, 2007; U.S. Department of Justice, 2002; Boraz and 
Bruneau, 2006; Ribando, 2005). Recent years have seen a growing academic interest 
because these gangs have become a great threat to the security of countries in the region. 
The statistics on the number of Maras operating across Central America varies 
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extensively. The most consistent figures are offered by the 2007 UN Crime and 
Development Report. It estimated that by 2005, gang membership in Honduras oscillated 
around 36,000, compared to 10,500 in El Salvador, 14,000 in Guatemala, and some 4,500 
Maras in Nicaragua. El Salvador's National Police also offers the same statistics for 
gang numbers in these countries, approximately 70,000 members for the whole of Central 
America (Boraz and Bruneau, 2006). The Unites States Agency for International 
Development (US AID) used estimates of Mara membership in the United States and 
Central America in its 2006 gang assessment report which provided similar statistics. 
However, estimates by NGOs and academics say the numbers could be as high as 
200,000 (Rodgers, 2007). A 1998 Honduran newspaper report claimed that there were 
more than 60,000 gang members in Honduras alone (Diario El Heraldo, 1998). La 
Tribuna (2003) estimated that Honduras had around 100,000 members of Maras, and El 
Salvador could potentially have somewhere between 70,000 to 150,000 active members 
(Elbert, 2004). According to Carranza (2003/2004), determining the number of gang 
members in the region is difficult due to the three stages of incorporation that these 
groups practice. The first refers to active gang members who have passed through all the 
rites and are formally part of the group engaging in all of its activities. The second stage 
consists of the collaborators. These are not formal members but they are closely related 
to the group and sometimes portray the same identity that active members do. Finally, 
there are the 'calmados' or the 'quiet' ones who represent the oldest members of a typical 
Mara gang. They receive special permission to be excluded from daily gang activities in 
order to dedicate themselves to family or employment. Whatever the numbers are, the 
tendency shows an alarming quantity of gang membership in the region, comparable to 
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an army of 'urban child soldiers' whose impact on their communities can only be 
extremely negative. 
The two most numerous gangs in the region are Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 
their rival, Mara 18 (M -18) (Univision, 2008; Ribando, 2005; Ribando 2007). Although 
other Mara formations are in existence, such as Los Cholos, Los Batos Locos, Los 
Puchos, Los Rockeros, this research will focus specifically on MS-13 and M-18 activities 
and practices. Besides Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador, members of Mara 
Salvatrucha can be found in at least thirty-one states of the United States, as well as 
Mexico, Canada and even Spain. The Maras are becoming a transnational phenomenon, 
similar to the Hell's Angels, who have franchises in the U.S., Canada, and various 
countries of the European Union. (Manwaring, 2007; Bruneau, 2005; Breve, 2007; 
Arana, 2005; Saltsman and Welch III, 2008; Riesmann, 2006, Valdez, 2000). 
Origins 
Most of the literature on Central American gangs and Mara Salvatrucha agrees on 
their origins and historical background. The origins of MS-13 gang activity in the United 
States and, later on, in Central America date back to the 1980s when El Salvador was 
engulfed in a bloody civil war between the leftist guerrilla FMLN (Farabundo Marti 
National Liberation Front) and the right wing military government supported by the 
United States (For more on the civil conflict see Montgomery, 1995; Bonner, 1984; 
Wood, 2003; White, 1996; Romero, 2005; Library of Congress8, 2005). From 1980 until 
1992, the year the Chapultepec Peace Accord was signed, approximately 75,000 people 
were killed and nearly 1 million people were displaced, half of which are believed to 
8 Web accessed on May 20, 2008 from: http://lcweb2,loc.gov/frd/cs/svtoc.html 
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have entered the United States as refugees (Roush, 1997; Johnson and Muhlhausen, 
2005). Among these refugees were guerrilla recruits with knowledge of weapons, 
explosives and combat tactics. Most of the people who fled from El Salvador during the 
1980s were relocated in the 'Rampart' section of Los Angeles, where they faced 
problems of adjusting to life in North America. Also, many had a difficult time finding 
work due to their poor education. This area already had established gangs, like the M-18 
or 18th Street Gang, which was created in the 1960s by immigrants from Mexico 
(Saltsman and Welch III, 2008). Other gangs included the African-American Crips and 
Blood, the Mexican-American EME, the Mexican Mafia, which technically speaking 
does not constitute a gang due to its highly developed criminal organization (Bruneau, 
2005). Most of the young displaced Salvadorans joined the M-18, where they were 
welcomed because of their combat knowledge and skills. Others, harassed by these 
gangs or rejected from them, decided to form their own organization calling it Mara 
Salvatrucha 13 or MS-13, based on the 13th street, and becoming a major rival for M-18. 
Although these gangs existed, and had developed structures and rituals, it was not until 
the 1990s that they began to cause attention by creating fright and fear. MS-13 was 
growing rapidly and began challenging M-18 for control of the streets. These two gangs 
have engaged in many violent confrontations that still continue to this day. According to 
the U.S. Department of Justice (2002), in 1993, MS-13 became so strong that they took 
on the Mexican Cartels and their tax on drug sales. MS-13 eventually agreed to become 
suppliers of cocaine and marijuana in exchange of drug tax exemption, forging a close 
relationship between both organizations. Because most of the activities Maras were 
involved in were of a criminal nature, many were arrested and imprisoned, where they 
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"further defined and honed their gang identities and criminal skills" (Bruneau, 2005, p.g. 
2). This situation was exacerbated by the events of the Rodney King riots of 1992, after 
police determined that most of the damages, looting, and violence had been carried out by 
members of local gangs, including Mara Salvatrucha (Libcom, 2006) . According to 
Arana (2005), California responded by implementing strict anti-gang laws. Gang 
members were being charged as adults instead of minors, and many young Latino 
criminals ended up in jail. 
Mara Salvatrucha as well as other forms of Maras started gaining presence in 
Central America after the mid-1990s. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigrant 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which expanded the categories of 
immigrants subject to deportation (Ribando, 2007). It included a clause that allowed for 
the repatriation to countries of origin of those non-citizens sentenced to a year or more in 
prison. As a result, in 1996, approximately 38,000 immigrants were deported 
(Papachristos, 2005). By 2003, the United States had forcibly removed a total of 186,151 
persons, including 19,307 who returned to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Some 
50,000 of these had criminal records (U.S. Department of Justice, 1999; Department of 
Homeland Security 2004). By 2006, Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for 95 
percent of the almost 197,000 people deported; Honduras received approximately 26,000, 
while about 18,000 were returned to Guatemala, and some 10,000 to El Salvador 
(Ribando, 2007). These countries were ill-equipped to receive this influx of young 
people. With no housing available, these deportees sought out the urban slums (Johnson 
9 Web accessed on May 20, 2008 from: http://libcom.org/historv/1992-the-la-riots 
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and Muhlhausen, 2005), where they "ruthlessly destroyed local gangs and took control of 
huge swathes of Central American cities" (Elkus, 2007, p.g.l). 
These countries not only suffer from a lack of resources, but neoliberal economic 
policies have also exacerbated traditional inequalities. The societies thus have provided 
the perfect environment for gangs such as Mara Salvatrucha and Mara 18 to thrive in, 
converting them into a transnational phenomenon. Mara Salvatrucha is now present in 
states such as Oregon, Alaska, Texas, Utah, Michigan, New York, Florida, Georgia, and 
countries like Canada and Mexico (Valdez, 2000). This phenomenon, growing in the 
backyards of Canada and the United States, requires more attention considering the 
national and international development and security issues at stake. As a transnational 
phenomenon, the Maras not only affect local communities in North America, but 
internationally as well, especially in countries like Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador 
who lack the resources to address the problem. 
Comprehending the Mara Phenomenon in Central America 
This section will present a brief description of maras; their organizational 
structure, hierarchy, culture and activities. Maras, especially Salvatrucha, are drawing 
the attention of authorities across North America as the problem has grown beyond 
Central America. According to CBC News (2008), Canadian authorities are increasingly 
concerned with the spreading of MS-13 activity and are taking action by arresting gang 
members in the cities of Toronto and Vancouver, in attempts to stunt its growth. MS-13 
also has a presence in Montreal and Calgary where there is an established Latin American 
community (Globe and Mail, 2008). 
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Organizational Structure 
Details on the structure of Mara Salvatrucha are not completely accurate and vary 
according to region. Some authors like Harness (2006) argue that the structure of Maras 
is not very clear, due to its decentralized nature. Others like Logrono (2008) state that 
Maras have a clearly defined structure and hierarchy. Logan and Morse (2007) describe 
the vertical and horizontal chains of command of Mara Salvatrucha. Most investigators 
do agree that die phenomenon is extremely territorial. According to a 2007 Central 
American study carried out by Demoscopia and funded by CABEI and SIDA, 
territorialism is a very important aspect in this particular gang culture, as it is in others. It 
consolidates their identity and therefore Maras express themselves by appropriating key 
locations or areas in which their lucrative and illegal activities take place. Mara 
structures function as networks with transnational linkages (Boraz and Bruneau, 2006). 
Smaller groups named "clickas" or "cliques" are formed within the name of Mara 
Salvatrucha in specific neighbourhoods and barrios, at local and international levels, and 
communicate on a regular basis. They are assigned names such as "Marineros", 
"Sureno-13" or "Big Gangsta Locos" (Logan and Morse, 2008; Demoscopia, 2007; 
Walking with El Salvador10, ND; U.S. Department of Justice, 2002; Cauvin, 2006; 
Walking with El Salvador, n.d.). These subgroups are assigned individual functions such 
as recruiting, criminal activities, and information cells. When it comes to the issue of 
their hierarchical structure, one encounters a discrepancy between the fieldwork carried 
out by specialized research, namely the empirical data obtained from gang members 
themselves, and die views held by authorities and police intelligence. According to 
10 No author identified and no date provided. Web accessed on June 11, 2008 from: 
http://www.walkingwithelsalvador.org/Karen/Mara%20SaIvatrucha%20Paper.pdf 
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Demoscopia (2007), police and government authorities seem to have a vertical perception 
of Mara structures as extremely hierarchical, with a centralized direction, with fluent 
patterns of communication and cooperation patterns, and obeying a regional leader. The 
Salvadoran Anti-Drug Commission states that the structure of MS-13 and M-18 is 
particularly complex involving cliques and centralized hierarchies of local and regional 
leaders. This particular perspective is in line with what authorities generally perceive 
about structures of organized crime. Conversely, narrations and interviews of gang 
members emphasized the horizontal and decentralized nature of the organization and 
rejected the idea of a head or general leader (Demoscopia, 2007). 
Figure.4 1 Gang Structures 
A Organized crime and • international narco activity bosses 
/ Transnational \ 
/ gang leadership \ 
/ Gang cell members \ 
/ Neighborhood gang members \ 
/ Vulnerable youth at risk of joining a gang \ 
Source: Adapted from USAID Central America arid Mexico Gang Assessment, 2006. 
The figure above represents the vertical assumption of Central American gang 
structures by USAID (2006). The top echelon consists of the highest level of leadership, 
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such as narco-leaders and organized crime networks, usually belonging to the Mexican 
Cartels. According to USAID, it is believed that some drug bosses work closely with the 
leaders of transnational gangs. The transnational gangs represent the leaders of MS-13 
and M-18; they oversee the subgroups or "cliques", which is the next lower level of gang 
member cells. They are involved in illegal activities such as extortion, collection of war 
taxes, drug distribution, and generally carry out orders from higher leaders. The next two 
levels are detached from the Mara organization. They represent the other barrio gangs 
that attempt to imitate MS-13 or M-18 and fight for territorial control as well. These are 
formed by youth from marginal areas and are viewed as 'illegitimate' by other stronger 
gangs. The last level comprises the vulnerable youth at risk of joining a gang, namely 
those between 8-18 years who live in poorer areas with limited access to education or job 
opportunities. 
The next figure is a representation of the structures according to horizontal 
perceptions, adapted from the study carried out by Demoscopia (2007). Accordingly, this 
is the only form of organization of the Maras as described by actual gang members: 
Figure.4 2 "Clicka" Structure 






The veterans constitute those gang members who have been immigrants to the 
U.S. They enjoy special prestige within the organization but they do not occupy formal 
leadership roles. They serve as consultants and informants of activities in other countries 
and are referred as the founding groups or members of the organization. The "ran/Zero" 
is a type of administrator who takes on the role of treasurer and organizes the "mirins" or 
the formal meetings the members have. In these "mirins" all members of the gang 
participate, but there are special positions held by selected members labelled first voice, 
second voice and even third voice (if the gang is large in numbers). They conduct the 
mirins and are responsible of being the spokesmen in inter-clique meetings. The soldiers 
are the newcomers or ordinary members who obey orders from the leaders of the clique. 
These names vary according to region and country, but the essence of the Mara 
composition remains the same. In this horizontal construction, gang members refuse the 
idea of having bosses, rather they accept the notion of having group leaders. The 
horizontal analysis also includes the communication flows between cliques in a specific 
region, creating national networks of crime (Logan and Morse, 2008). 
Although the perceptions of Mara organization vary from vertical to horizontal 
concepts, the fact remains that these groups appear to have sufficient organized structures 
that allow them to carry out their deviant activities in the most effective and beneficial 
way for the group. 
Mara Culture 
Although differences exist according to the regions of origin or cliques they 
belong to, most of Mara behaviours and cultures share similar traits. It is also important 
to highlight that rites, organization and operations, differ from gang to gang. For 
example MS-13 has more of a presence in Central America, while M-18 is more 
widespread in the United States (Iniguez, ND). Maras are characterized by their 
notorious tattoos, which records their accomplishments and narrates their personal 
experiences. They "commemorate dead homies, girlfriends, gang calligraphy, religious 
symbols, and even names of streets in Los Angeles" (Del Barco, 2005). According to 
Iniguez (ND), each gang has particular rules of what types of tattoos they can sport, for 
example no MS-13 member can bear a tattoo of the Guadalupe Virgin or a combination 
of green, white and red colors, as they make allusions to Mexico's national symbols. 
Tattoos must be earned through acts that benefit the clique. These symbols are their 
methods of expression and identity and help attribute ranking within the cliques, 
depending on their number and significance (Salgado, 2008; Demoscopia, 2007). Graffiti 
marks their territories, and they also use a specific coded hand language called "stacking" 
which they employ to communicate with each other {National Geographic, 2006). 
According to Carranza (2003/2004), the symbols and modes of expression such as tattoos 
and clothing styles, may generally be the same in Central America as those in Los 
Angeles, yet the motivations, ways of expressing violence, and rules are not. Each Mara 
gang has its own elaborate internal rules as to what members are allowed to do or what is 
acceptable within their codes of values and judgments. Maras have distinct dress codes 
including shaved heads and baggy pants (Hadden, 2003). "The use of violence is 
probably the most defining characteristic of maras" (Boraz and Bruneau, 2006, p.37). 
Most of their operations, rites, language, and lifestyles are characterized by brutality and 
violence (Chase, 2005; Peralta, 2005). Their initiations rites include the violent beating 
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of candidates by all the gang members, a process called "brincado" (Reguillo, 2005; 
Demoscopia, 2007). If it is MS-13, the new recruits have to endure a beating for thirteen 
seconds, whereas M-18 initiation beatings go on for eighteen seconds. This initiation 
aims to test the physical and emotional resistance to pain. In the case of women, if they 
are strong enough, they will also endure the beatings. However, for the most part, they 
have to agree to have sexual relationships with all the gang members in order to enter the 
clique (Portillo, 2006; Salgado, 2008; La Nation, 2006; National Geographic, 2006, 
Argefial, 2006; Walking with El Salvador, ND). As a rule of thumb, once people have 
entered the gang, they are in for life. They cannot leave because doing so is seen as 
treason punishable with death (National Geographic, 2006). As part of the ascension 
process, Mareros have to kill a member of a rival gang to prove loyalty, a process called 
sangre afuera, sangre adentro, "blood in, blood out" (National Geographic, 2006, Boraz 
and Bruneau, 2006). Maras compete for the control of a territory, and therefore engage in 
violent acts in rivalry with other Maras, as well as the authorities. According to Tamayo 
(2005), in their struggle for identity, Maras employ acts of violence to a.) dominate their 
rivals, b.) terrorize the community in their territories under control, and c.) to obtain 
economic resources. 
Maras label themselves according to the ranking each holds within the gang. The 
most influential and with more seniority are often termed "cabecillas" or "jengas" 
(Reguillo, 2005). The general membership refer to each other as "homies" or 
"homeboys" (Logrono, 2008) and women are often called "hainas" or "haynas", a term 
implying lover or companion (Reguillo, 2005; Logrono, 2008). Females usually play the 
role of conjugal partners, but also of prostitutes or drug mules. 
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According to Elbert (2004), Maras have been modernizing their arsenals 
throughout the years. Although they started out with home made guns, known as 
"hechizas" or "chimbas" (Breve, 2007), they now have access Ak-47s, machetes, 
grenades and small handguns. In general, maras show no fear of law enforcement and 
consider them one more of their enemies (Valdez, 2000). Another key characteristic 
which differentiates Maras from many other youth gangs, is the extreme brutality used 
when they commit their acts. In an interview with a former gang member, Elbert (2004) 
noted that killings of rival Mara members or enemies had to be deliberately cruel, 
inflicting the most pain and suffering imaginable to the victim, including torture, 
mutilations, burning, and dismemberment. These acts are not only done to the 
unfortunate member of a rival gang, but also to their families, friends or romantic 
partners. Mara vengeance may at times lead to authentic massacres. "From a cultural 
point of view, the pandillas and Maras create their own world around them, which is 
differentiated and explicitly separated from "normal" society" (Leibel, 2002). 
Activities 
According to Cabezas (2008), Maras are involved in a number of delinquent 
activities such as drug and arms trafficking, extortion, kidnapping and assaults, 
prostitution, and trafficking of people (Breve, 2007; Cabezas, 2008; U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2002, Hadden, 2003; Carranza, 2004, Demoscopia, 2006). Drug dealing seems 
to be their principal activity and is the cause for their suspected connections to 
international drug cartels. It is assumed that Maras control drug trafficking at the local 
level within each country and region, supplying logistics and armed protection to the 
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large cartels (Demoscopia, 2007). However, the exact nature of the relationships 
between the Maras and druglords is not clear. U.S. studies point out that the majority of 
drug deals of Mareros happen at an individual level and not as part of organized crime. 
Others like Breve (2007) argue that Mara growth has been facilitated by organized crime 
or rogue elements of the state security apparatuses. It is evident that such a relationship 
between narco-traffickers and maras is a dangerous development. Still, it remains to be 
determined to what extent the drug economy foments Mara activity within a specific 
region? 
More recently, the smuggling of people into the United States has become a 
central activity for Maras, especially MS-13 (Chase, 2005; Cabezas, 2008; Breve, 2007; 
Walking with El Salvador, ND). There are different motivations for this. People 
smuggling is a lucrative business, with fees ranging from US $5,000-$8,000 per person 
(Arana, 2005; Breve, 2007). Secondly they gain new recruits, as the children of those 
illegal immigrants who are left behind, often join gangs. Thirdly, as a result of strict U.S. 
immigration policies, gang members are constantly deported. However, it is an objective 
to try to return immediately to the United States, and Maras provide the necessary 
smuggling networks (Papachristos, 2005). 
Another frequent activity that Maras carry out is extortion, by 'taxing' the 
community. The 'impuesto de Guerra' or 'war tax' is employed to obtain daily resources 
by charging money to small businesses, neighbors, bus drivers and anyone who interacts 
with the community. This is for protection services either from themselves or rival gangs 
(Avila, 2006; Johnson and Mulhausen, 2006; Demoscopia, 2007). As far as other 
activities are concerned, the daily El Heraldo (2006) in Honduras reports that M-18 
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members do not serve as hit men, they do not get paid to commit homicides and only kill 
for vengeance or treason. Conversely, M-13 kills are motivated by vengeance, payment 
or rivalry. 
As mentioned before, Mara victimization is usually intra or inter-group related, as 
gangs fight each other over territorial control. However, on December 2004, a group of 
MS-13 attacked an urban bus northern Honduras, killing twenty-eight innocent 
passengers, women and children included, to express protest and defiance to the 
government, which was engaging in anti-gang raids (El Nuevo Diario, 2004; La Tribuna, 
2004). 
It is evident that Maras are not merely groups of young misguided people who 
commit random acts of violence. Rather, these gangs have sufficiently complex 
structures and internal codes which define their daily activities, as well as behaviour in 
general. Although many laws were passed and strategies implemented by governments 
to contain the threat, the Mara phenomenon seems to be spreading uncontrollably. The 
next section will address the specific situation in Honduras and Nicaragua. 
The Maras in Honduras: A State of Terror 
According to Univision (2005), the Maras have converted Honduras into the most 
dangerous country in Central America. The issue has become the biggest social problem 
facing the region (Bertodano, 2008). Street gangs have existed for many years, but it was 
not until the late 1990s that the phenomenon began metamorphosizing into its present 
state. In 2005, police estimated that there were approximately 489 gangs in Honduras, 
with some 30,000 to 40,000 members (Duran, 2007). Even though El Salvador is the 
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country most frequently linked with Mara activity, the numbers are actually higher in 
Honduras. 
Socioeconomic Context 
Honduras is a lower middle class income country in Central America bordering 
on Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. By 2006, the population was estimated at 7.4 
million and its per capita income stands at US$ 1,170 (World Bank, 2008)11. The major 
population centres in Honduras are Tegucigalpa, the capital, and San Pedro Sula, which is 
considered to be the most industrialized city. 
Honduran society is rife with economic inequality, poverty, and malnutrition. 
The country is one of the poorest in the Western Hemisphere (U.S. Department of State, 
2007). According to USAID's (2006) Honduran gang assessment, 
Overall, 71.1 percent of Hondurans lives in poverty, and 77.7 percent of the rural 
population is poor. In urban areas, some 63.1 percent are poor. Income inequality 
is a critical issue. The richest 20 percent of households receive 54.3 percent of 
the total income of the country, while the poorest 20 percent receive only 3.2 
percent. Of the country's 7 million inhabitants, 41 percent are under age 14. 
Because the population is fairly young and economic conditions are harsh, a 
large number of marginalized youths struggle daily to subsist. Youths head 10 
percent of Honduran households, and 68 percent of these households are below 
the poverty line. USAID, 2006, p.g. 4. 
A review of the human development indicators of the United Nations Human 
Development Report (2007/2008)12, stated that by 2004, the Honduran human poverty 
index, which is an indication of the standard of living in a country where lower the 
Web accessed on June 17, 2008 from: 
http://web.worldbank.orgAVBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/HONDURASEXTN/0..menuPK 
:295076~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:295071.00.html 
12 Web accessed on June 17, 2008 from: 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/countrv fact sheets/ctv fs HND.html 
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percentage the better, was placed at 16.5. The Gini index measuring inequality was 53.8, 
whereby the value of 0 represents complete equality and a value 100 represents complete 
inequality. Military rule, a large gap between the rich and the poor, crime, and natural 
disasters have rendered Honduras one of the least developed and secure countries in 
Central America (BBC News, 2005). Therefore, poverty, unemployment, and according 
to Sullivan (2005), leftover weapons from the 1980s, and the U.S. deportation of 
criminals to the region, have turned the country into fertile ground for Mara activity. 
Located in Central America, Honduras is on the transit route for drugs from the 
South to the North like Guatemala and Mexico (Duran, 2007). Thus, it is no surprise that 
groups such as Maras partake in the smuggling and distribution of narcotics, and 
contribute to extremely high levels of violence. According to the Policia Nacional 
Preventiva (National Preventive Police of Honduras) and ECLAC (2007), Honduras 
reached its peak of 55.89 deaths per 100,000 in 2002, compared to 40.41 deaths per 
100,000 for 2007 (OCAVI, 2007). 
MS-13 and M-18 are the two most dominant gangs in Honduras (Carranza, 2006). 
MS-13 became prominent in Honduras in 1989 and M-18 established itself in 1993 
(USAID, 2006). These two gangs are now deeply entrenched, especially in the main 
cities where they are held responsible for many crimes. According to the study Maras in 
Honduras completed by Save the Children and ACJ (2002), it was estimated in 1999 that 
34, 202 members of gangs, were organized into 397 groups. Yet according to official 
Honduran government reports, due to the persecution of these groups during 2004 and 
2005, an estimated 3,000 gang members have fled the country seeking refuge in the 
United States, Mexico, Guatemala and even El Salvador {El Heraldo, 2005). Although it 
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is evident that MS-13 and M-18 are the dominant youth gangs in the country, Andino 
Mencia (2006) identifies six different types of gang formations in Honduras: 1.) the 
California gangs, which represent M-13 and M-18, currendy dominating the gang 
scenario and surviving in conditions of repression and social cleansing; 2.) satellite 
gangs, which are sympathizing peripheral gangs who remain organically separated from 
the California gangs, but retain certain ties to it in order to secure their own survival; 3.) 
independent traditional gangs, which focus mainly on coming together to control their 
neighbourhood and to consume drugs and alcohol; 4.) Gangs of wealthy youths, which 
are integrated by young adults from the middle and upper class of the Honduran society 
who come together to consume drugs and carry out certain acts of crime and violence; 5.) 
the professional mafias, which are more like organized crime groups that carry out illegal 
activities such as drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, kidnappings, auto theft, etc.; and 
6.) school gangs that originate within educational facilities in the high risk classes of 
society and generate violence in school. Generally these are independent but can quickly 
merge into the more dominant MS-13 and M-18 gangs (Andino Mencia, 2006, p. 9). 
In spite of identifying many different types of gang formation in the country, it is 
widely recognized that MS-13 and M-18 pose the biggest threat and represent the most 
dominant groups. Firstly, they are the only gangs with a national dimension, present in 
the main cities of Honduras. Secondly, they appear to be sufficiently organized, 
territorial, and expansionist. The severe repression against them has made them band 
together and struggle to survive at any cost. Thirdly, it is believed they receive 
international support from MS-13 and M-18 groups in other countries, especially those 
active in the United States. 
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To date, the Mara phenomenon in Honduras is still a clamorous reality that 
remains unaddressed by the government and ignored by the international development 
community. In recent years, Honduras has seen the growth of juvenile violence beyond 
the two largest cities of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. Smaller population centres 
such as La Ceiba, La Paz, Tela, Choluteca, Puerto Cortes, Comayagua and El Progreso 
(Meza, 2007) have also come to experience problems with Maras. 
Mara Situation in Nicaragua: A case of Pandillas 
Nicaragua is said to be the safest country in Central America, however, Maras can 
also be found there. Most studies place the number at 4,500 members (USAID, 2006; 
United Nations, 2007; Ribando, 2007; Boraz and Bruneau, 2006; Bruneau, 2005). 
Nicaragua's youth gangs are most commonly known as pandillas, and have not yet 
acquired the characteristics of Maras. They are less violent and are more of a localized, 
rather than a transnational phenomenon (Rocha, 2006). 
Socioeconomic Context 
According to the assessment made by USAID (2006), Nicaragua is the poorest 
country in Central America and the second poorest in Latin America after Haiti. 
"Approximately 70 percent of Nicaraguans live in extreme poverty (less than a US$1 per 
day), and unemployment hovers around 60-65 percent. 50 percent of the unemployed are 
people under the age of 24" (USAID, 2006, p.4). According to the World Bank (2008),3, 
during the 1950s and 1960s, Nicaragua had one of the fastest growing economies in the 
region, but lived under a dictatorship. Its history of civil wars and natural disasters has 




created unfavourable economic conditions for the country. By the early 1990s, the 
country "had the slowest economic growth in the region and was one of the most 
indebted and economically unstable in the world" (World Bank, 2008). With Managua 
as its capital city, Nicaragua is a country with a population of 5.6 million (United 
Nations, 2006)14. 
Its population is fairly young: 40 percent are under the age of 12, while 35 percent 
are between 13-29 years of age (USAID, 2006). Most Nicaraguan youth have little 
access to education. Only 8 percent have obtained a university level education, while 
over 13 percent never had any schooling (Ibid). A review of the human development 
indicators of the United Nations Human Development Report (2007/2008)15 showed that 
Nicaragua's GDP per capita (PPP) was of US $3,674. Its human poverty index was 17.9 
in 2004, and its GINI index for equality was 43.1. According to PAHO (2008), a quality 
of life survey carried out in 1993 by the National Statistics and Census Institute (INEC) 
indicated that 75 percent of Nicaraguan households had one or more unmet basic needs, 
and 44 percent lived in conditions of extreme poverty. In rural areas, the proportion of 
households in extreme poverty was 60 percent. However, even though Nicaragua 
experiences such poverty, it is still one of the safest countries with lower rates of violence 
than the rest of its neighbouring countries. For example, in the 1990s, the official 
homicide rates stood at an average of 16 deaths per every 100,000 (Serbin and Ferreyra, 
2000). According to Rodgers (2004) the homicide rates changed little and remained at an 
average of 15 deaths per 100,000 between 1990 and 2003. This compares to almost three 
14 Web accessed on June 18, 2008 from: http://data.un.org/Country Profile.aspx?crName=Nicaragua 
15 Web accessed on June 18, 2008 from: 
http://hdrstats,undp.org/countries/country fact sheets/cty fs NIC.html 
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times as many annual deaths in Honduras. Another study by PAHO-OPS (2005) stated 
that by 2002, the homicide rates for Nicaragua were 12.3 per 100,000 (in Cohen and 
Rubio, 2007). In comparison, a report by the Honduran National Police and ECLAC 
(2007) showed 55.89 deaths per 100,000 habitants in 2002. This represents a difference 
of 43.59 deaths per 100,000 habitants only for 2002. 
According to Rocha (2006), Nicaragua is not yet home to MS-13 and M- 18 gang 
franchises. This is not to say that Nicaragua lacks the presence of youth gangs, which 
more commonly known as pandillas (Rocha, 2006; also see Rodgers, 2002; USAID, 
2006). However, these are in general fragmented local formations, less permeable to 
foreign influence and not tied to transnational groups. According to Rodgers (2002), 
these Nicaraguan pandillas generally 
.. .consist of a variable sized group of overwhelmingly male youths aged between 
7 and 25 years, who engage in illicit and violent behaviour- although not all gang 
activities are either illicit or violent- and have a particular dynamic. Most 
notably, pandillas are territorial and tend to be associated with a particular urban 
neighborhood (2002, p.g. 5). 
According to USAID's gang assessment in Nicaragua (2006), the country's 
problem significantly differs from neighbouring Honduras, El Salvador and Guatamala. 
During the 1990s, pandillas in Nicaragua seemed to be more motivated by the protection 
of their neighbourhoods and engaged in petty crime such as theft, mugging, pick 
pocketing, shoplifting, etc.,. However, by the early 2000, these pandillas were 
increasingly involved in drug trafficking, more interested in the individual accumulation 
of wealth and status and less concerned with the protection of their neighbourhoods. The 
same study stated that gang activity in Nicaragua had decreased over the years. In 1999, 
an estimated 110 pandillas with approximately 8,500 members could be found in 
Managua, the capital. However, by 2005, the police registered only 108 gangs with 
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2,201 members. Nicaraguan pandillas are so different from their counterparts in 
Honduras and El Salvador, that Rodgers (2005) argues that under certain conditions they 
may be viewed not as destructive elements of society, but as socially constructive forms 
of "social sovereignty" that provide localized systems of order in areas that have been 
neglected by the state. 
Nicaraguan government policies responded to gang problems in a more of a 
preventive nature, rather than by simple repression. According to Bellanger (2006), the 
integral and less repressive focus of the National Police against Nicaragua's gangs 
avoided the violence its neighbours' policies resulted in. For instance, Rocha (2006) 
argues that Nicaraguan police processes dub their operations against youth gangs with 
names linked to public holidays- i.e. The 'Bethlehem Plan' at Christmas, or the 'Beach 
Plan' in Easter week, in contrast to the repressive labels that Honduran, Guatemalan and 
Salvadorian police have: 'Broom Plan', 'Zero Tolerance Plan', 'Hard Hand Plan' or even 
'Super Hard Hand Plan'. 
Nicaraguan legislation seems to favour the protection of youths. According to 
Rocha and Bellanger (2004), Nicaragua has been one of the countries that, in recent 
years, has vigorously moved towards the design and implementation of policies for its 
youth. For example, in May of 1998, Nicaragua implemented the Codigo de la Ninez y la 
Adolescencia, or Code for Childhood and Youth, which promoted a legal framework for 
people younger than eighteen years. In June 2001, the National Assembly passed a law 
known as Ley de Promotion del Desarrollo Integral de la Juventud, or Law for the 
Integral Promotion of Youth, which seeks to encourage strategies for the development of 
youth while fully enforcing their fundamental rights. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ELEMENTS OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: DATA PRESENTATION 
It is manifest that youth gang dynamics, as well as the policies made to address 
them, differ significantly in Nicaragua from those of neighbouring Honduras. The Mara 
phenomenon, especially Ms-13 or M-18, have not yet extended their operations into 
Nicaragua in spite of their expansionist tendencies. Seeing that both countries share 
similar socioeconomic conditions as well as geographic proximity, we must pose the 
question, why is there such a stark difference in the hosting ofmara activity between 
Honduras and Nicaragua? 
I have identified four factors that, in my judgement, contribute significantly to the 
differences in Mara presence between Honduras and Nicaragua. The objective of this 
chapter is to present the reader with empirical data for each factor and country. This will 
be followed by my interpretation of the data, to answer the problematic presented in this 
thesis. 
Factor One: Migration and Deportation Patterns 
Migration flows have been trademarks of this contemporary era of globalization. 
With a growing gap in social and human development within less developed societies, as 
well as the increasing incapacity to access basic needs, it is no surprise that individuals 
around the world migrate to more developed countries, searching for better opportunities 
that will provide a better quality of life. The case is no different for Central Americans. 
In recent decades, Central American migration, for the most part, has flowed to the 
United States. Large amounts of undocumented migrants have characterized these flows, 
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making it an important security issue for the international agenda, especially for the U.S. 
and its war on terror. 
At the end of the 1970s, the economic, social and political crisis of Central 
America, paved a new path for international migration trends in the region. Nicaragua, 
Guatemala and El Salvador, saw increased the movement of people out of their territories 
because of their internal conflicts during the 1980s. According to Alvarado (2006), 
Belize and Costa Rica became the biggest receptors of these populations, offering refugee 
to those fleeing conflict. Other countries, like Honduras and Mexico, became transit 
territories: 
In the decade of the 1980s, due to the armed conflict, more than one million of 
Central Americans migrated to other regional countries, including Belize and 
Mexico. At least one million people were internally displaced; and 
approximately fourteen percent of the population in Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Nicaragua, abandoned their communities, mobilizing to other countries (...) El 
Salvador had the largest amount of internal displacements, representing at least 7 
percent (400,000 people), expelling approximately 15 percent of their total 
population (Alvarado, 2006, p. 14). 




























































* Less than 500 people 
Adapted from: Del Cid, in Casillas, 1992, p. 38. 
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Towards the end of the 1980s, when the armed conflict began to decrease in the 
region, a shift in migration trends occurred. By the 1990s, migration flows were no 
longer triggered by political displacement or wars, rather they began to increase due to 
the inequality and poverty caused in part by the new neoliberal agenda. Thus, the United 
States became idealized as the land of opportunities and of the good life. It is estimated 
that at least 20 million people from Latin America are expatriates, residing mostly in the 
United States, Canada and Spain (INE, 2006). In the last thirty years, the United States 
experienced an increase in Latin American immigrants from 1.7 million to 14.4 million, 
and in the last 10 years, it has increased by 6.1 million people (Ibid). According to the 
U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) (2003), from January 1990 until January 
2000, the amount of illegal migrants from different Central American regions increased 
from 3.5 million to 7 million people. 





























* Five selected countries with the most illegal immigrants living in the United States. 
Adapted from: USCIS, 2003, p. Q16 
Web accessed on July 15, 2008, from: 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrarv/assets/statistics/publications/Ill Report 121 l.pdf 
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Although, the United States continues to receive a major influx of migrants from 
Central America, the region also incurs in intraregional migration. This type of migration 
is less significant than international migrations just described. However, according to 
Alvarado (2006) and SIEMCA (2003), in the case of Central America, Costa Rica has 
been the historical recipient for Nicaraguan migrants, which is an important factor in this 
thesis. Hondurans, on the other hand, tend to migrate to the United States. My basic 
assumption is that Honduras has a greater Mara presence in part because its citizens tend 
to migrate to the United States, where Mara culture is strong. Through deportation, this 
gang culture was transmitted back to Honduras, creating a type of transnational link 
between gangs in the U.S. and those created in the Central American countries. 
Conversely, the majority of Nicaraguans migrate to Costa Rica, which lacks the Mara 
culture and therefore no transculturization occurs (Rocha, 2006). The next section shall 
provide the data to support this assumption, presenting migration and deportation patterns 
for Honduras and Nicaragua of the last 20 years. 
Honduran Migration 
The main reasons driving Honduran migration have mostly been because of 
economic and political upheavals, and natural disasters. During the 1980s, the military 
repression in the country and the region, forced the exit of many Hondurans. In 1998, 
Hurricane Mitch not only devastated the most productive areas in the country, but it 
displaced thousands of people who joined the urban areas in the main cities of 
Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. During the 1990s, the economic crisis which included a 
severe devaluation of the currency, unemployment, lack of an agrarian reform, increase 
in oil prices and hence die increase in the price of basic staples, also forced many 
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Hondurans to migrate in search for better opportunities (Foro Nacional para las 
Migraciones en Honduras (FONAMIH), 2003). 
In an intra-regional context, the beginning of the 1990s saw 40.5 percent of 
Honduran migrants moving to Nicaragua, while 37 percent went to El Salvador. 
However, the majority tended to migrate extra-regionally, notably the U.S. The 
following table shows an approximation of Honduran citizens living in other countries for 
the decade of 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, demonstrating that the United States received 
most of these migrants. 






































































































Adapted from: Statistical Information System on Migrations in Central America (SIEMCA), 2002, p. 178. 
Sistema de Information Estadistica sobre las Migraciones en Centroamerica 
(Systems of Statistic Information on Migration in Central America) (SIEMCA) (2003) 
estimated that for Honduras, 2.2 percent of the population immigrated to the United 
States in 1990, increasing to 4.4 percent by 2000. As previously discussed, Honduras is 
one of the poorest countries in the global South with high levels of inequality and 
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unemployment. This situation has resulted in the increased migration to the United 
States, where families have become exceedingly dependent on the remittances sent by 
members working abroad (Schmalzbauer, 2004). Honduran migration towards the U.S. 
is mostly illegal, and those Hondurans are part of the 1 million undocumented migrants 
who annually join the 10 million already working in the United States illegally (The 
Economist, 2005). 
As seen in Table 4.2, during the decade of 1990s, Honduras was among the five 
countries with the largest amount of illegal migrants living in the United States. By the 
turn of the millennium, Honduras still remains in the top ten list of countries of origin of 
illegal migrants. A 2006 study on unauthorized immigrants residing in the U.S. estimated 
that approximately 7.6 million of the total 10.5 million of unauthorized immigrants living 
in the United States during 2005 were from North America, including Mexico, the 
Caribbean and Central America (Department of Homeland Security, 2006). These top 
ten countries accounted for 79 percent of the illegal immigrant population in 2005: 
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- Figure rounds to 0.0 
Adapted from: Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics, 2006, p. 7. 
By 2005, Honduras figured with approximately 180,000 illegal migrants residing 
in the United States. The same study illustrated the states in which illegal immigrants 
tended to concentrate in. By 2005, an estimated 6.1 million of the 10.5 million 
unauthorized residents lived in the five states of California, Texas, Florida, New York 
and Illinois (Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2006). Furthermore according to 
the 2004 U.S. Census Bureau, Hondurans tend to concentrate in these states and/or cities 
as well: 
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Table.5 5 Major U.S. Cities/States hosting Honduran Migrants (2004) 
State of 















Adapted from: U.S. Census Bureau, 2004, in Rocha, 2006. 
The 2007 report on the unauthorized immigrant population by the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security shows a significant increase in the number of 
Hondurans residing illegally in the United States for 2006. The Honduran population 
increased approximately 55 percent in one year, representing almost 100,000 new illegal 
residents (DHS, 2007). Thus, Honduras managed to be, once again, one of the top five 
countries with the largest amount of illegal migrants to the United States. By this year, 
an estimated 8.4 million of the total 11.6 million unauthorized immigrants living in the 
United States in 2006 were from Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America 
(Ibid). It is worth noting that Guatemala and El Salvador are also included in the top five 
countries with large amounts of illegal migrants in the U.S. from the 1990s up to 2006, 
and they too, deal with a strong Mara presence in their countries. 
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Table.5 6 Country of Origin of Unauthorized Immigrant Population in the U.S., 
2006 (thousands) 
1 
Country of ! Estimated Population in 
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Adapted from: Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics, 2007, p. 4. 
The sources of the previous tables are U.S. government offices and international 
organizations. However, the Honduran government, through the Institute Nacional de 
Estadistica (INE) (Institute of National Statistics) and FONAMIH (National Forum for 
the Migrations in Honduras), has also produced reports on the migration patterns of its 
citizens. The Honduran Migration State Report published by FONAMIH (2007), 
estimated that by 2006, some 185,000 Honduran nationals left for North America, 
constituting an average of 15, 416 per month, 3,557 per week, and 508 per day. They 
estimate that for every 100 Hondurans who leave the country to migrate into the United 
States, only 7 percent make it through legal channels, 17 percent do it in an illegal 
fashion, 75 percent are deported from Mexico and the United States, while 1 percent 
stays along the way (Ibid). 
According to a study carried out by INE (2006), the majority of the Honduran 
migrating population is male with an average age range of 15 to 34 years old: 
Figure 5.1 Average Age of Honduran Migrating Population 
i i i 
0 5 10 15 
Adapted from: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, 2006, p.g. 27. 
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From a Honduran perspective, the same study by INE shows that 91.4 percent of 
the total migrating population resided in the United States, while the other 8.6 percent 
was distributed among other countries such as Spain and Mexico. With over 80,000 
Hondurans trying to reach the United States annually, it is undoubtedly clear that 
Hondurans, for the past 20 years, have mobilized mainly to the United States (Sladkova, 
2007). 
Figure 5.2 Countries of Residence of the International Honduran Migrant 
Population 
United States, 91.4 
Adapted from: Instituto National de Estadistica, 2006, p.g. 25. 
In the case of Nicaragua, migration patterns differ significantly from those of 
Honduras. As mentioned before, it appears that the majority of Nicaraguan nationals 
prefer to migrate to Costa Rica, rather than to the U.S. Although there are Nicaraguans 
residing in the U.S., it is not to the same extent that Hondurans do. 
Nicaraguan Migration 
Nicaragua, like many other Latin American countries, has a long history of 
bipolar migration. Nicaragua is the only Central American country that has Costa Rica as 
its primary destination, with the United States coming in second. According to Vargas 
(2005), from the 19th Century to the end of the 1970s Costa Rica was the main destination 
for Nicaraguan migrants. This changed during the 1980s with the Contra war where 
there was an increase in migration to the United States. However, once the armed 
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conflicts ceased, Nicaraguans began flowing back to Costa Rica like never before, as the 
reasons behind migration were no longer political, but socioeconomic. 
According to Mahler and Ugrina (2006), Nicaraguan migration to Costa Rica has 
historical roots in agricultural labour. Many Nicaraguans have migrated seasonally to 
Costa Rica to work in the banana, coffee and other export-commodity industries. 
Generally, Nicaraguans have migrated to Costa Rica because of greater employment 
opportunities, higher wages, and better social benefits. However, current migration from 
Nicaragua to Costa Rica is much more urban and diverse: 
Although a third of male Nicaraguans continue to work in the agricultural sector, 
that percentage has declined while urban occupations in construction, 
manufacturing, and informal retail have risen to constitute 48 percent of their 
employment (...) Projections suggest that Nicaraguan migration will account for 
one-quarter to one-half of Costa Rica's population increase. (Mahler and Ugrina, 
2006)17. 
This has undoubtedly strained relations between both countries. Border disputes 
as well as growing anti-Nicaraguan sentiment has had consequences for Nicaraguan 
migration. The Costa Rican government, throughout the years, has increased its punitive 
immigration laws, raising penalties for smugglers, and facilitating deportations of 
undocumented immigrants. 
The Direction General de Migration y Extranjeria (2008) (General Office for 
External Migration), which is the Nicaraguan Office of Migration, published for 2008 the 
national migrant traffic from 1984 to 2005, registered the largest movements to Costa 
Rica and the United States: 
17 Web access on July 17, 2008 from: http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/displav.cfm?id=386 
Table.5 7 Migratory Traffic for Nicaraguan Nationals: Costa Rica and United 
States, 1984-February 2006 
! Total per Year 1 | 
(including 
1 movement in , • 


















































































































































Adapted from: Direction General de Migration y Extranjeria, 200818. 
Evidently, for the past 20 years, Nicaraguan migratory movements have been 
greater to Costa Rica than to the United States. Still, according to the U.S. Immigration 
and Naturalization Services (2003), by 1990 approximately 50,000 unauthorized 
Nicaraguans resided in the United States. By the year 2000, the number went down to 
Web accessed on July 17, 2008 from: http://www.migracion.gob.ni/eventos.php?OP=3&ID=8 
21,000. In contrast, Honduras, by 1990 had 42,000 unauthorized residents, but by the 
year 2000 the number increased to 138,000. 
The U.S. Census Bureau (2004) showed that by 2004, the main states where 
Nicaraguans lived were Florida and California: 


















Adapted from: U.S. Census Bureau, 2004, in Rocha, 2006. 
With exception of the decade of the 1980s and 1990s, it is apparent that Honduran 
presence in the United States has been far greater than the Nicaraguan one: 
























































Adapted from: U.S. Census Bureau 2000, * American Community Survey, in Mahler and Ugrina, 2006. 
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Deportation Trends 
Due to the fact that the bulk of Central American migration of recent years is 
mostly illegal, deportation becomes a very important issue for the discussion of my 
thesis. 
Deportation refers to the procedures by which a foreign person is removed or 
expelled from a country. Generally, these procedures include the decision of a 
competent authority with respect to the nationality of an individual and his right 
to obtain a legal status or a refugee status in the country where he finds himself. 
(Red Regional de Organizaciones Civiles para las Migraciones, RROCM, in 
FONAMIH, 2007, p.g. 41). 
In recent years, U.S. immigration laws have become restrictive, if not draconian. 
In the case of Honduras, deportations from the United States can be traced back to the 
early 1990s. Nicaragua has also experienced deportation, but to a much lesser extent than 
its neighbouring country. The differences between Nicaragua and Honduras are 
manifest. The Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
showed that by 1992, approximately 9,497 Hondurans were deported, versus the 1,585 
Nicaraguans: 
Table.5 10 Hondurans and Nicaraguans Deported and Naturalized from 1992-2002 
Legal Action 
Deported from 1992-1996 
Naturalized from 1992-1996 
Deported from 1998-2002 











Adapted from: Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in Rocha, 2006. 
Moreover, the amount of Honduran deportees increased almost five-fold in less 
than ten years, whereas the level of naturalizations did not significantly increase during 
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the decade. Comparing the two countries, for the period of 1998-2002, the difference 
between Honduran and Nicaraguan deportees is 58, 613. 
If we take a closer look at each country, we can observe individual patterns. 
According to data from the Secretaria de Gobernacion y Justicia, the Honduran 
Department of Governance and Justice, from 1992 to 2003 the number of deportees from 
the United States registered was 41,019 (Flores, 2003). FONAMIH (2003/2007) 
presents a more detailed account of Honduran deportations for the last twenty years: 



















Adapted from: FONAMIH, 2003. 









































































Adapted from: FONAMIH, 200819. 
Web accessed on July 16, 2008 from: 
http://www.fonamih.org/Base%20de%20Datos/ESTADISTICA%202008.pdf 
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For Nicaragua, the Direction General de Migration y Extranjeria published the 
official register of nationals deported, rejected and re-embarked for the period of 1996-
2005, which clearly demonstrated that Costa Rica was the main country sending back 
Nicaraguan nationals: 
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Adapted from: Direction General de Migration y Extranjeria, 2008 . 
1 Web accessed on July 17, 2008 from: http://www.inigracion, gob.ru7eventos.php?OP=3&ID=8 
It is important to mention that in 1997, President Clinton signed the Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). This act provided various 
forms of immigration benefits and relief from deportation to certain Nicaraguans, 
Salvadorans, and Guatemalans, as well as some Cubans and nationals of the former 
Soviet Union countries, mostly due to the political conflicts their countries suffered 
(Davy, 2006)21. The fact that Honduras was not part of the agreement could have 
contributed to the stark difference in the number of deportees for each country. 
However, it seems logical that if Honduras experienced more migration to the U.S. then 
its levels of deportation are bound to be greater to those of Nicaragua. 
Deportation of criminals is also a relevant factor when addressing deportation. 
According to the UN (2007), between 1998 and 2005, the United States deported almost 
46,000 convicts to Central America. These deportations took place in addition to those 
caught undocumented, therefore criminal deportation involve people who have been 
convicted of separate offences such as drug offences and violent crimes: 
































































Adapted from: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006, in United Nations, 2007, p.41. 
With this evidence in mind, the question still remains: what do migration and 
deportation patterns of Central American countries have to do with increased criminality 
in the region? Specifically, is there a link between the migrating trends of Honduras and 
Nicaragua and their respective abundance or lack of gang activity? According to Rocha 
(2006), migration leads to transculturization, which refers to the different phases of the 
transition from one culture to the next. This process implies a partial de-culturization and 
a neo-culturization; the former meaning a detachment from the original culture, and the 
110 
latter involving the creation of new cultural phenomena. However, with the new 
globalised dynamics and technological advances, plenty of cultural diffusions between 
North and Central America occur without physical mobilization. Cultural remittances, as 
termed by Rocha, include music, dress codes, and lifestyles that have a high impact on 
younger generations, leading to complex cultural mixtures of all types. This has been 
further accentuated with migration and its by product, deportation. In the cases of 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, the local gangs were quickly absorbed by their two 
dominant U.S. born counter parts from MS-13 and M-18. This took place during the 
1990s, which coincides with the deportation flows from the United States back to Central 
America. 
According to Falla (2001), the open migration to the United States causes ideas 
and organizational elements of Maras to flow back into the Central American countries. 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in its 2007 report on Central American 
crime, states that Maras "are fuelled by criminal deportee flows from the United States" 
(United Nations, 2007, p.49). 
Other more sensationalist sources, such as the Salvadoran daily El Diario de Hoy, do not 
hesitate in establishing a direct link between deportation and violence: 
The local authorities are convinced that many of the criminal deportees 
have contributed, to a great extent, to the increase in violence and the 
change in operations of local gangs, to the point of considering them as 
structures of organized crime. The extortions, assaults, and murders 
have incremented as many gang members formed in the streets and 
jailhouses of California, Arizona, Texas, and Washington, have arrived 
to the country to recreate that style of life (...) The biggest concern with 
national deportees with criminal backgrounds is that they come back 
with more sophisticated methods, organizational structures and contact 
with criminals in the United States. {El Diario de Hoy21, 2006). 
22 Web accessed on July 16, 2008 from: http://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/2006/10/16/nacional/nac6.asp 
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The history of the U.S. origin of Maras and the data presented in this section 
suggest a relationship between migration tendencies and the existence of Maras for the 
Central American case. When comparing the data for both countries, the last twenty 
years Honduras reported higher migrant and deportation rates to and from the United 
States than Nicaragua. Furthermore, its citizens tend to be concentrated in Los Angeles, 
the U.S. city the Maras were established. In addition, Table 4.8 shows that those 
Nicaraguans who did reside in the United States tended to concentrate in Miami, not Los 
Angeles, therefore being less exposed to cultural elements such as Maras. It also appears 
that Nicaraguans have benefited more from naturalization processes in the U.S. than 
Hondurans, influencing the quantities of deportees. 
It is important to note that Nicaraguans who migrate mostly to Costa Rica are less 
likely to experience transculturization, as the cultures are fairly similar. Thus, even if 
deportation does occur, there are no neo-cultural elements brought back to Nicaragua. 
However, this is not the case for Honduran migrants. Because North American culture 
distinctiy differs from the Central American one, Hondurans face more transcultural 
issues, such as adaptive capacity, language, even religious changes, making them more 
vulnerable to adopting Mara traits. Consequently, when deportation occurs, the new 
acquired cultural elements, which can include criminal characteristics, are inherently 
transferred. 
With this analysis, one can extrapolate that the different migration and 
deportation patterns of Honduras and Nicaragua in fact contribute to the striking 
difference of Mara presence in each country. However, other significant factors also 
contribute to this situation which are discussed below. 
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Factor Two: The Presence of Drugs and Availability of Firearms 
Illegal drugs and weapons, especially firearms, are two key areas of crime that are 
linked with gang activity around the world. When addressing the issue of drugs, the case 
is no different for Central American Maras. Furthermore, not only does Central America 
suffer from being the conduit for the most highly valued flow of drugs in the world, the 
region also experiences one of the world's highest murder rates. According to the most 
recent U.S. estimates, some 88 percent of the cocaine destined for the United States 
transits through the Central American corridor. Approximately 50 percent is smuggled 
along the Eastern Pacific in fishing boats, and the other 38 percent along the Western 
Caribbean coast of Central America (United Nations, 2007, p. 4). It is important to 
mention that Nicaragua and Honduras comprise the longest stretch of coastline along the 
Caribbean route. 
It is no surprise that Maras get directly associated with such clandestine activities. 
Nevertheless, although there is literature that suggests that Maras engage in the 
trafficking of drugs and weapons, the issue here is to discover to what extent the presence 
of drugs and illegal firearms contribute to the existence or lack of Maras in Honduras and 
Nicaragua (Fernandez and Ronquillo, 2006). 
Drugs in Honduras 
Drug trafficking, which has a transnational nature and constitutes one of the most 
sophisticated expressions of organized crime, began gaining notoriety in Honduras during 
the 1970s. According to Ortez Abadie (2007), from the beginning, drug traffic in 
Honduras was closely linked to the military and high ranking government officials. 
However, during the 1980s, drug activity and arms trafficking increased with the 
113 
sponsorship of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States. Within the 
context of the Contra war, Colombian and Mexican drug cartels represented timely allies 
for the U.S.: 
This alliance allowed the cartels to traffic, with minimum risk, drugs to Mexico, 
the United States, and Europe. In exchange, the drug lords would transport 
weapons and other services to the anticommunist troops located in Honduras, 
who would operate against the Sandinista Front in Nicaragua (Ortez Abadie, 
2007, p. 1). 
The Kerry Report (1989), published after press accounts concerning links 
between the U.S. backed Contras and drug traffickers, stated that there was clear 
evidence that individuals who provided support to the Contras were involved in drug 
trafficking, and accordingly, the supply network of the Contras was used by drug cartels, 
and members of the Contras received financial and material assistance from drug lords. 
However, towards the end of the 1980s with the end of the Contra war, U.S. 
repression against the drug cartels intensified. Despite increased efforts to fight 
narcotraffic, both from the local government and the United States, Honduras continues 
to be a transit country for illicit drugs coming from South America destined to the United 
States. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (2001), maritime 
trafficking has traditionally been the primary method used by cocaine smugglers 
operating out of Honduras. Sea transit among the many coastal, island, and cay areas is 
relatively risk-free, with few police patrolling and scarce population. 
The statistics provided for drug trafficking in Central America are based on 
seizures, which do not necessarily reflect the actual flow of drugs through the region. In 
addition, the countries that are believed to be home to drug trafficking are not necessarily 
the ones that make the largest seizures. However, a general picture of the condition of 
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drugs emerges from the information provided by government sources, as well as 
international agencies: 
Table.5 14 Drug Seizures in Honduras 1996-2000 
Cocaine (kilograms) 
Marijuana (kilograms) 



























Adapted from: Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, 2001. 
The Inter American Commission for the Control of Drug Abuse (CICAD) (2008) 
published the seizures for drugs in Honduras from 1998 up until 2006: 
















































































23 Adapted from: Comision Interamericana para el Control del Abuso de Drogas (CICAD/OAS), 2004 . 
23 
Web accessed on July 18, 2008, from: 
http://www.cicad.oas.org/oid/Estadisticas/resumen2004/RED2004/honduras%202003.pdf 
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Table.5 16 Drugs Seizures in Honduras 2003 - 2006 
Marijuana 
Total Cocaine and its by-
products: 
Cocaine Salts 

























































Adapted from: Comision Interamericana para el Control del Abuso de Drogas (CICAD/OAS), 2008 . 
As it can be observed, the confiscation of cocaine in Honduras increased 
following the new millennium. According to the Honduran daily El Heraldo (2008), it is 
estimated that around 60 to 100 tons of cocaine transit through Honduras annually. In 
2007, approximately 6 tons of cocaine where confiscated by the Honduran police, some 
3.5 kilograms of crack stones, 1.7 tons of marijuana, 1 kilogram of heroine, and 789 
people have been detained suspected of illicit association with narcotraffic {El Heraldo, 
2008, p.6). 
Drug trafficking through countries results in the development of domestic 
consumer markets. Still, the UN (2007) estimated that for Guatemala, of the 150 tons of 
cocaine that pass through the country, only 10 percent remains in that country for local 
consumption, stating that cocaine use in the region appears to be remarkably low. This 
opinion is also shared by the World Drug Report (2007), stating that less than 200,000 
people use cocaine in the seven countries of Central America every year, compared to a 
user population of 5.5 million in the U.S. According to the DEA (2001), no reliable 
Web accessed on July 18, 2008, from: http://www.cicad.oas.org/apps/oidstat.aspx?Iang=ESP 
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estimates for domestic consumption are available for Honduras. However, among the 
Honduran population, alcohol and inhalants are the most common substance abused, 
while fewer persons abuse marijuana and cocaine: 
Cocaine hydrochloride (HCI) and crack cocaine are found in the urban areas of 
the country and on the north coast. Crack cocaine use was limited prior to 1999, 
but increased rapidly during 1999 and 2000, especially in the capital Tegucigalpa 
and in northern areas such as San Pedro Sula, Puerto Cortes, La Ceiba, and the 
Mas de la Bahia. Cocaine HCI is abused by a relatively small group of middle-
and upper- class youui, and is most readily available in Honduras' largest cities. 
Trafficking in cocaine for local consumption is controlled mostly by Honduran 
traffickers (Drug Enforcement Administration, 2001, p. 4-5). 
According to the United Nations (2007), a sizeable cannabis production takes 
place in Central America, mostly for domestic use. However, they too agree that the 
levels of cannabis use in the region are remarkably low. In Central America, Guatemala 
leads the share of the population using cannabis each year. This same study shows that in 
Honduras, less than 1 percent of the population 15-64 years old use cocaine annually. Of 
this group, no more than half are chronic users (United Nations, 2007, p.62). 
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Figure 5 .4 Estimated Share (%) of the Population who use Cocaine Annually 
£ 0.8-
Adapted from: United Nations, Crime and Development Report, 2007, p.g. 62. 
Drugs in Nicaragua 
Drug trafficking has gradually increased in Nicaragua since 1987. Due to its 
geographic position in the middle of Central America, the country also constitutes a 
principal transit area between drug production zones in South America, and consumers in 
North America. According to Nicaragua's National Anti-drug Plan (2005), the increase 
in the crime of drug trafficking and subsequent crimes have had the following causes and 
conditions: 
• Border zones and maritime seaboards with little police surveillance 
• High rates of unemployment and poverty 
• Interest of cartels to take over the territory as a transit zone. 
• Weak legal framework 
• Decrease in the technical measures, military control and detection, monitoring 
capacity, and the reduction of the Nicaraguan Army after the armed conflict 
• Little specialization in the police institutions of Central America 
• Economic profit that is generated through the smuggling 
(Consejo Nacional de Lucha Control las Drogas, 2005, p. 15) 
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According to the DEA (2005), drug traffickers use Nicaragua's long Pacific and 
Caribbean coasts for refuelling and way stations en route from Colombia to the North. 
Traffickers in the area use speed boats, fishing boats and coastal freighters to move drugs 
towards Mexico and the U.S. 
The Inter-American Commission for the Control of Drug Abuse (2004/2008), 
published statistics on the number of drugs seized from 1997 until 2006: 













































































Adapted from: Comision Interamericana para el Control del Abuso de Drogas (CICAD/OAS), 2004' 
25 Accessed on July 18, 2008 from: 
http://www.cicad.oas.org/oid/Estadisticas/resumen2004/RED2004/nicaragua%202003.pdf 
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Table.5 18 Drugs Seized in Nicaragua 2003-2006 
^ > : ^ " >\ * 
Marijuana 
Total Cocaine and its 
byproducts: 
Cocaine Packs 
























































Adapted from: Comision Interamericana para el Control del Abuso de Drogas (CICAD/OAS), 2008 . 
However, Nicaragua's National Police has also published, through the National 
Antidrug Plan (2005), the following chart of seizures: 

































































Adapted from: National Police in Consejo Nacional de Lucha Control las Drogas, 2005, p. 18 
In terms of use, the Nicaraguan government states that drug use occurs mainly 
from the Caribbean coast to the Pacific, especially in Managua. The fact that Managua, 
Web accessed on July 18, 2008, from: http://www.cicad.oas.org/apps/oidstat.aspx71ang=ESP 
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the capital city of the country, remains to be the epicentre of drug transit in Nicaragua, is 
due to the fact that the seven internal routes that begin in the border areas of the country, 
all end in the city of Managua. Subsequently, the drugs are distributed to the centre and 
north of the country. 
According to the National Anti-Drug Plan (2005), marijuana is the illegal drug of 
choice for high school students. Crack and cocaine are not used to the same extent, and 
the use of these narcotics normally starts at the age of 16 and 20 years of age. As seen in 
Figure 5.4, Nicaragua has a higher consumer rate of cocaine than Honduras. For 
Cannabis, the United Nations (2007) reported the share of Central American using the 
drug during 2006: 
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Adapted from: United Nations, 2007, p.51 
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Figure 5.6 Annual Prevalence of the use of Amphetamines as a Percentage of the 
Central American Population 15-64 years of age, 2003 
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Adapted from: United Nations, Informe Mundial sobre las Drogas, 2006, p. 396. 
Figure 5. 7 Annual Prevalence of the use of Ecstasy as a Percentage of the Central 
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Adapted from: United Nations, Informe Mundial sobre las Drogas, 2006, p. 396. 
Although little information is known on the approximate amounts of drugs 
flowing through the country annually, it is evident that Nicaragua's drugs situation 
regarding is not too different from that of Honduras. 
Correlating Maras and Drugs 
Street gangs, especially Central American Maras, are universally associated with 
drug dealing as part of their clandestine economic activities, and drug consumption as 
part of their socializing ones. This may be the case for the Mara franchise in the U.S. 
According to the FBI, the National Drug Intelligence Centre (NDIC), and the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (B ATFE), these gangs are the first 
distributors of drugs in the streets of the major cities of the United States (Fernandez and 
Ronquillo, 2006). Some of these gangs, including M-13 and M-18, have created links 
with Mexican cartels dedicated to the traffic of narcotics. 
Much has been made of the possible connection between Central America's 
street gangs, or maras, and related groups resident in the USA. (...) Here, youth 
became involved in street gangs (such as the 18th Street gang) and formed some 
of their own (such as Mara Salvatrucha). These groups spread to Central America 
after large numbers of gang members were deported following criminal 
convictions under the broadened provisions of the 1996 Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. Street gang members are key in drug 
distribution in the USA, and the presence of these youth in a drug transhipment 
zone raised the spectre of transnational drug networks arranged along gang lines 
(World Drug Report, 2007, p. 180). 
Although Maras are involved in drug trafficking in the United States, this largely 
takes place at a street level. Most of the U.S. drug market is run by Mexican cartels. Yet, 
because the presence of Mara Salvatrucha and M-18 has increased in Central America, it 
is assumed that their involvement in the drug economy is similar to the one carried out by 
their U.S. peers. However, this might not be the case for Central American Maras. 
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Although USAID's (2006) assessment of Honduras states that as gangs have become 
more sophisticated because of increased involvement in the trafficking of drugs and 
access to weapons, while they also consume the products they sell, the lack of concrete 
data makes it hard to know what the exact relationship of Maras with narcotics is. The 
United Nations (2007) is sceptical about the connection made between Central American 
Maras and drug trafficking for two main reasons. First, Central America represents more 
of a transit zone than a potential consumer market. As previously discussed, the 
consumption rates in Central America, compared to North America, are remarkably low. 
The region does not represent a major lucrative business for sophisticated organized 
crime networks. Second, most of the narcoactivity occurs in isolated coastal areas of the 
country, and Maras tend to concentrate inland in the main cities. "The bulk of cocaine 
trafficking through the region occurs in large shipments controlled by well resourced 
drug trafficking organizations, generally dominated by Colombian and Mexican 
nationals" (United Nations, 2007, p. 63). Even if Maras were to be located on the coast, 
it is unclear what role they would play, given that it is unlikely for them to have advanced 
nautical skills. 
The objective here is to evaluate the drug situation of Honduras and Nicaragua, 
analyzing whether it is different to the extent that it could explain the substantial 
differences of their mara hosting. The data appears to suggest that levels of drug 
smuggling are not drastically different in Honduras as in Nicaragua. Although seizures in 
Honduras appear to be higher, this could be attributed to different factors other than 
increased drug trafficking, such as more effective drug raids, increased police patrolling 
on the key areas of drug transit, even more efficient government strategies. However, 
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when taking a closer look at the drug consumption rates, it can be observed that 
Nicaragua has slightly higher rates than Honduras. Therefore, if the initial premise is to 
suggest that drug traffic and consumption in the population of a country are positively 
correlated to Mara presence in that country, then it can be inferred that for the case of 
Honduras and Nicaragua, this premise does not apply. Nicaragua, despite having similar 
levels of drug seizures and even higher rates of consumption, has still less of a Mara 
presence in its country than Honduras. 
Availability of Firearms 
Drug trafficking through the region has been accompanied by illegal trafficking of 
arms left over from the region's civil wars. Central America is known for the easy 
availability of firearms and poor legislation for gun control. If the presence of drugs is 
not a major factor in determining the difference of Mara existence in Honduras and 
Nicaragua, could the availability of firearms be a more contributing factor? 
According to the International Network on Small Arms (2008), there are an 
estimated 1.6 million guns in Central America, of which about 500,000 are legally 
registered. For the purposes of this research, I shall use the term 'small arms' and 'light 
weapons', whose definition according to the United Nations (2006)27, covers a wide 
range of weaponry, including commercial firearms and military weapons that can be used 
by a an individual soldier or a member of a gang. The main focuses are military and 
According to the United Nations (2006), small arms include revolvers and pistols, rifles and carbines, 
assault rifles, sub-machine guns, and light machine guns. Light weapons include heavy machine guns, 
hand-held and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, 
portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of less than 100mm caliber. 
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civilian firearms, however, home-made weapons and hand grenades are included in the 
discussion. 
In Central America, the influx of firearms began in the decade of the 1980s, when 
the various armed forces and insurgent groups in the region began receiving military 
arsenals, mainly from the United States and the former Soviet Union. El Salvador and 
Honduras were the largest recipients of arms from the U.S. government in the 1980s and 
early 1990s in order to offer support to the forces fighting left-wing rebel movements in 
the region. In El Salvador, the government received most of the armament to fight the 
Farabundo Marti National Liberal Front (FMLN), and Honduras was the primary base of 
operations for the Nicaraguan resistance known as Contras (Godnick, Muggah, and 
Wasznik, 2002). The Sandinistas received military support mostly from the Soviet Union 
and Cuba. 
Table.5 1 Reported deliveries of selected arms to Central America 


























































Adapted from: US Defense Security Assistance Agency in Godnick, Muggah, and Wasznick, 2002, p. 5. 
After the conflicts ended, many of the surpluses of military firearms entered the 
illicit market, spreading throughout Central America. Today, the availability of weapons 
is due to more than just the remnants of the civil conflicts of the region. According to de 
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Leon (2006), the availability of firearms increases because of the arsenals built by 
organized crime, small transactions made at the street levels, and weak commercial 
control over the sales of firearms in the Central American region. 



























Adapted from: Cruz and Beltran (2000) in Godnick, Muggah, and Wasznick, 2002, p. 4 
Table.5 22 Estimates of Registered Firearms in Central America, 2006 
Legally registered ' Licenses to Carry a 
















Adapted from: IPEDADES in de Leon, 2006, p. 49 
It is evident that the amount of registered weapons has increased considerably 
in less than ten years for most Central American countries. Estimates are also available 
of the number of illegal weapons flowing in the region for 2006: 
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Adapted from: IPEDADES in de Leon, 2006, p. 50 
The circulation of small arms in Central America is strongly correlated to drug 
trafficking. According to Wasznick (2000), the drug networks in the region are being 
used for the transit of weapons as well, sometimes being employed as payment for drugs. 
According to Small Arms Survey (2007), in Honduras, the military is heavily 
involved in the legal transfer and distribution of small arms. The Ministry of Defense 
authorizes all small arms imports and grants licenses to importers. The Military Pension 
Institute, which is controlled by the military, has a monopoly on firearms retail 
commercialization in the country. On the illegal side, military have been involved in 
several high profile arms trafficking scandals. The National Congress estimates that 
approximately 400,000 to 500,000 illegal firearms are in circulation in Honduras (RCMP, 
2006). 
During the decade of the 1990s, social violence came to substitute the political 
violence that the region was experiencing. In Honduras, from 1988 to 2000 there has 
been a 500 percent increase in the number of crimes reported to the police (Castellanos, 
ND). In Honduras, by 2000, 78.2 percent of all homicides were committed with a 
firearm. By 2001 the figure had increased to 82 percent (Ibid). Honduras allows its 
citizens to legally bear arms, under the Ley de Tenencia y Portacion de Armas (Law of 
Ownership and Bearing of Arms). The law requires that individuals fill out an 
application, submit two photos, and a criminal background report in order to get a license 
128 
for their weapon. Another law, the Ley de Control de Armas y Munciones, (Law of Arms 
and Munitions Control) approved by the Honduran Congress in 2000, stipulates that 
people within the national territory are allowed to carry weapons so long as they are 
authorized to do so by the law. This facilitates the availability and spread of weapons 
without major control and at an accessible price. However, Honduran law prohibits the 
use of certain weapons, such as automatic and semiautomatic revolvers and guns, rifles 
and shotguns, including the infamous AK-47. Yet, these firearms still find their way out 
to the illegal markets. 
During the 1990s, Nicaragua was the first country in conflict to undergo a peace 
process that included serious disarmament efforts. Nearly 100,000 military firearms were 
destroyed, however, given the enormous distribution of weapons that occurred in the 
country, the impact it had on the overall circulation of weapons was minor. According 
to the Small Arms Survey (2007), Nicaragua's relatively lower statistics on the existence 
of firearms and violence cannot be trusted, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the 
Nicaraguan government's institutional capacity is the weakest of the Central American 
countries; therefore the incidence of violence and arms trafficking may be widely 
understated. Secondly, Nicaragua has experienced the re-emergence of armed groups in 
the northern and eastern part of the country, where there is a substantial lack of 
government and police presence. 
Nicaragua has a great number of weapons and people who know how to use them. 
By 2000, Nicaragua had an estimate of 52,390 legal weapons, Costa Rica had fewer with 
43,241, but Panama reported higher amounts with 96,614 (Rocha, 2006). In 2002, the 
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Nicaraguan Ministry of Government estimated that 140,000 firearms were in civilian 
hands, of which only 69,167 had been legalized. 
If we count the "homemade" weapons - hammers added to metal tubes with the capacity 
to fire AK-47 rounds - the availability of firearms in Nicaragua increases. According to 
my own calculations during the field work for this study, there are at least three 
"homemade" pistols for every twenty houses in some Managua neighbourhoods. 
Nicaragua could also have both a low registry and a high distribution of weapons as the 
Sandinista government created a number of armed defense mechanisms that achieved 
mass recruitment during the Eighties in its desires to knock out the counterrevolution. 
(Rocha, 2006, p. 14). 
According to the Nicaraguan daily La Prensa (2000), the type of weapon mostly 
owned by civilians is the revolver, with an estimated circulation of 16, 938. This is 
followed by 13,992 guns (short magazine), 12,449 rifles, and 8,441 shotguns. The 
Instituto de Estudios Estrategicos y Politicas Publicas (IEEPP) (Institute of Strategic 
Studies and Public Policies) of Nicaragua published that the number of firearms in the 
hand of civilians was approximately 98,000 by May of 2005. The National Police has 
not established an ideal method to calculate the number of illegal weapons circulating in 
the country. However, by August of the same year, it was estimated that about 133,083 
firearms were registered by civilians (IEEPP, ND) . Nicaraguan law is relatively weak 
in regard to small arms control. This country also allows its citizens to bear arms; there is 
no specified limit on the number of weapons an individual may own and each license is 
valid for a three-year period. In addition, there are no quantitative limits on ammunition 
purchases. 
zs Web accessed on July 24, 2008, from: 
http://www.ieepp.oro/download/armas/docs/Presentacion.Transferencia Armas Nicaragua.pdf 
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Correlating Maras and Firearms 
It is no surprise that youth gangs in Central America have taken advantage of the 
easy access to firearms. Maras employ a variety of weapons in their criminal activities, 
and the most common ones used are grenades, shotguns, and revolvers. These they 
acquire in exchange for drugs, or by theft from private security guards or policemen 
(Wasznick, 2000). The abundance of arms combined with a weak economy, the lack of 
opportunities, and a slow, and sometimes inefficient, reintegration of deportees, has 
resulted in a society with a high level of citizen insecurity. Armed violence has 
increased in recent years, and in countries like Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, 
the blame is placed mostly on the Maras and their activities. 
Some authors such as Saltsman and Welch (2008:9), state that the proliferation of 
firearms in the region has contributed to the growth of the Mara problem due to the fact 
that weapons are easily obtainable. According to Walking with El Salvador (ND), the 
ready availability of guns is an enabling factor for youth to join gangs. The argument is 
that with weapons, it is easier for them to obtain economic benefits, as well as reputation 
and status. Statements like these are common in the study of Maras. However, within 
the context of this analysis, the assumption that the existence of firearms, legal or illegal, 
is the cause for a greater Mara presence in countries like Honduras has to be questioned. 
The data suggests that overall the five Central American countries experience a high 
presence of firearms; some more than others. Although Honduras reports higher 
quantities of weapons than Nicaragua, the difference is not sufficient to hypothesize that 
this is a crucial factor in shaping the difference in Mara presence in Honduras and 
Nicaragua respectively. In addition, the legal availability of weapons appears to be 
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almost the same in Honduras as in Nicaragua. Nicaragua would have to have notably 
lower rates of weapons in order to establish a positive correlation between the existence 
of firearms and the presence of Maras. Panama and Costa Rica also report high levels of 
firearms, but they lack the presence of Maras. Thus, like drugs, firearms aggravate the 
Mara problem already existing in countries like Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, 
but they do not cause it. If that were the case, then countries like Panama, Nicaragua and 
Costa Rica, would experience higher Mara activity. 
This is not to say that drugs and firearms are irrelevant to the problem of Maras in 
Central America. If anything, they intensify the already existing criminal issues of 
countries and should be taken into consideration when addressing these issues. 
Nevertheless, in the case of this specific research, the levels of activity for drugs and 
weapons reported for Nicaragua against Honduras are not remarkably different. 
Therefore, it would be inappropriate to suggest that they constitute a significant factor 
when it comes to identifying the reasons behind the stark difference of Mara presence in 
Honduras and Nicaragua. 
Factor Three: Government Approaches to Youth Gangs 
Youth gangs are not a recent phenomenon in Central America. The existence of 
youth groups of rebellious youth goes back to the 1960s and 70s, although in Honduras, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador, their character has changed significantly in the 1990s 
turning into what we now refer to as Maras. The governmental responses to youth crime 
have varied over time and across the region. Some have focused on tougher law 
enforcement and repression, while assigning minimal resources to rehabilitation and 
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prevention, whereas others have focused on preventive strategies and reinsertion. 
Notably in El Salvador, Honduras and to some extent the Unites States, draconian 
legislation has been enforced against Maras. According to Cruz (2005), despite sharing 
similar socioeconomic conditions to the rest of Central American countries, Nicaragua 
and Costa Rica offer different scenarios of violence and youth gang formations, while 
governments have historically reacted differently when dealing with these issues. 
Therefore, it is possible that the manner in which the Honduran and Nicaraguan 
governments have addressed youth problems in the past has contributed to the differences 
in the gangs they host today? 
The Honduran Approach: Fighting Fire with Fire 
When it comes to youth gangs, the Honduran government has generally not 
focused on prevention, but has opted for methods and strategies that come close to 
repression and institutional violence. It has chronically lacked the preventive and 
educational programs that provide opportunities for its young population to obtain 
training and employment. In addition, its inefficient judicial system is not appropriate to 
deal with the thousands of youths that are mired in cycles of violence and drugs. In the 
case of Maras, the Honduran model has attempted to offer an immediate sensation of 
security, based on the repression of 'anti-socials', segregating, persecuting and 
stigmatizing the young deviated population that has resulted from the government's own 
neglect. However, even before Maras existed, the Honduran government has employed 
poor, evasive strategies that may have contributed potentially to the presence of Maras 
today. According to Andino Mencia (2006), the Honduran government has historically 
gone through three stages when dealing with youth gang problems: a.) indifferent stage 
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(1992-1995); b.) containment stage (1996-2001); and c.) repressive offensive stage 
(2002- present). 
The Stage of Indifference (1992-1995) 
Initially, Honduran gangs existed in a much contained, traditional fashion. In 
spite of creating some discomfort for the police and society, they did not cause social 
concern since their activities were very localized and controlled by small doses of 
repression. At this point, these gangs were not referred to as Maras. According to 
Equipo de Reflexion Investigation y Comunicacion (ERIC) (2005), by 1984, youth gangs 
in Honduras would combine daily activities with the consumption of drugs and violent 
acts against society. However, the violence was random and rarely reported. During this 
period, the State was committed to the adaptation of its internal legislation to the recently 
ratified Convention de los Derechos del Nino (Convention of Children's Rights) (Andino 
Mencia, 2006:62). The public debate pivoted around the involvement of youth under age 
in crime, especially economic offences and a few homicides. However, the discussion 
seemed to focus more on questioning the efforts to approve the Codigo de la Ninez y 
Adolescencia (Code for Children and Adolescents), rather than focusing on prevention 
strategies. At the shadow of the state's indifference, youths at risk were already forming 
groups in the marginal slums. By 1994, the local news began reporting on violence 
associated with youth gangs and by 1995 gangs began to gain notoriety as a regional 
problem. At this point it is important to mention that the Honduran obligatory military 
service was eliminated in this same year, an issue that will be addressed below. 
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The Containment Stage (1996-2001) 
The second stage of the gang phenomenon in Honduras began manifesting itself 
in 1996 when the rates of violence in the country began creating social panic. According 
to local newspaper magazines (Diario Tiempo, 1996), delinquent activity carried out by 
youth gangs was increasing, especially in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. The 
government strategy at this moment was to implement the newly approved Code of 
Children and Adolescents, which boarded the issues of offences carried out by youth 
under age and their respective rights. However it did not address the reasons behind the 
uprising of gangs. 
The Honduran Institute for Children and Family, designed for another type of 
problematic (individual violators or small groups), was not prepared- nor did it 
seek to prepare itself- to deal with groups as aggressive as the new gangs, which 
by 1997 began to be addressed as 'Maras' (Andino Mencia, 2006, p.63) 
By 1997, reports of violence had doubled. Local newspapers began reporting on 
the phenomenon and efforts were made to quantify the magnitude of the Mara problem 
(ERIC, 2005). During the first half of 1998 the country experienced a new wave of gang 
activity, which increasingly involved MS-13 and M-18. However, with Hurricane Mitch, 
the topic of gangs took a back seat. The strategy of the President at the time, Carlos 
Flores Facusse, between 1999 and 2001 was to administer the economic crisis and 
contain the phenomenon of Maras through limited police repression. He was careful not 
to antagonize Human Rights groups who demanded less repressive methods when 
dealing with troubled youth. 
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The Repressive Offensive Stage (2002-Present) 
This stage is characterized by the implementation of one of the most repressive 
campaigns against crime in the history of Honduras. The first attempt to implement a 
preventive law against Maras was introduced to Congress by aspiring Presidential 
candidate Rafael Pineda Ponce, naming it Ley de Prevention y Rehabilitation de 
Pandillas (Law of Prevention and Rehabilitation of Gangs). The project was approved in 
November 2001, during President Carlos Flores' term of office, but it never managed to 
be implemented. With the triumph of Ricardo Maduro as President of Honduras for the 
2002-2006 period, the law was quickly shelved and the repressive policies set forth by 
Carlos Flores' term were further strengthened and employed. 
Although Maras have had presence in Honduras for the past fifteen years, 
according to Carranza (2006), the present situation of gangs in this country is influenced 
by the policies of President Ricardo Maduro. While campaigning, he had promised to 
fiercely fight crime and insecurity, making it his winning ticket to power. Once in office, 
Maduro categorized all youth gangs into 'Maras' and called in the military and the police 
to initiate raids in many areas in Honduras, a campaign called "Zero Tolerance". This 
unleashed a violent war between the government and the gangs. In 2003, shortly after the 
raids began, the Honduran Congress modified article 332 of the Penal Code, passing the 
new 'Anti-gang Law', which made it illegal for any person to be a member of a gang 
(Elbert, 2004; USAID, 2006). Any charge of illicit association of a person with a gang 
meant up to six years in prison and up to twelve years for identified Mara leaders. This 
operation became known as Mono Dura or Firm Hand (WOLA, 2006; Arana, 2005; 
Mejia, 2007; Latin Trade, 2002; Walking with El Salvador, ND; Univision, 2005). 
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Similar approaches were subsequently implemented in El Salvador and Guatemala. 
According to the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) (2006), under this 
operation, thousands of youths have been indiscriminately arrested for merely sporting 
tattoos or wearing baggy pants, which represented a violation of basic rights of these 
young Hondurans. The large number of detentions of young people led to the collapse of 
the already overcrowded penitentiary system. This was apparent on the 5 of April of 
2003 in the penitentiary of El Porvenir, in northern Honduras, when one of the biggest 
jail massacres in the country's penal history took place. Sixty-six members of M-18 
were killed and mutilated (La Tribuna, 2003; Moreno, 2006; Tejeda, 2003). In 2004, 
another incident occurred in a prison located in the city of San Pedro Sula, where a fire 
burned and killed one hundred and four members of Mara Salvatrucha (La Tribuna, 
2004; El Heraldo, 2004; Diario La Prensa, 2004). 
This caused Maras to retaliate against the government by launching a wave of 
violence: "Shortly after the introduction of the new anti-gang laws, they began killing and 
beheading young victims; at least a dozen decapitated bodies were found in Honduras 
and Guatemala, grisly symbols of the Maras' undiminished power" (Arana, 2005). 
Gangs went underground and lowered their public profile to avoid persecution, and as a 
result, they became more organized, making them harder to identify (WOLA, 2006). 
Many critics have come to argue that such repressive policies seem to have worsened the 
Mara problem in Honduras. Although it evidently did not resolve the problem, it was an 
attempt to make citizens feel more secure (For more on critiques see Mejia, 2007; Elbert, 
2004; Proceso Magazine, 2003; Noticen, 2007; Hayden, 2004; Benitez, 2008). 
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According to Floresi, Mejia, Mejia, Moreno, and Serrano (2004) the legislation of 
the Honduran government has been almost non-existent regarding youth. The particular 
legislation addressing Maras and gangs has been a topic of discussion of only recent 
years. However, it conceals an inheritance of ignorance and denial of the real condition 
of youth in the country, particularly of the marginalized sectors. The study, Maras y 
Pandillas de Centroamerica (Maras and Gangs of Central America) (2005), is an 
extensive study of the country's underage population and their needs. It concluded: 
The governing policies have been characterized for implementing superficial 
measures without touching the roots of the biggest problems in the country. For 
the case being, the State pretends to reduce crime without having a strategy 
against organized crime, which is becoming more complex in Honduras, and 
without addressing the problems of substance that make the levels of crime to 
rise in the country. The Honduran State, in this and other governments, has not 
implemented the measures that have a prevention nature oriented to attack the 
causes of the delinquency in the country. Repressive measures have been 
favored without addressing crucial aspects such as education, employment, and 
the alarming rates of Honduran poverty (Flores, et.al., in ERIC, IDIES, IUDOP, 
NITLAPAN, and DIRINPRO, 2004, p.g. 201) 
The repressive measures that the Honduran government has implemented in order 
to address certain sectors of the juvenile population have had two major consequences in 
the country. Firstly, the law has stigmatized the organized youth of Maras and gangs as 
the cause of all crime in the country. Secondly, the policy of the state validates the 
practice of social cleansing that clandestine death squads have been carrying out over the 
years against children and youth in the marginal slums. From 1998 until 2003, Casa 
Alianza de Honduras, a humanitarian organization that helps children in the country, 
documented a total of 2,054 cases of homicides of children and young adults under the 
age of 23, most of them gone without any legal investigation (Casa Alianza, 2003). 
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Interestingly enough, this "Zero Tolerance" repressive approach to combat Maras 
was not originated in Honduras. According to Democracy Now! (2004), the Manhattan 
Institute, a conservative think tank, and the Giuliani Group, formed to export the ideas of 
New York's hard line "zero tolerance" campaign against street people to Latin America; 
were the two agencies responsible for advising the Honduran president to implement such 
strategies. The Manhattan Institute is an organization based in New York that is 
associated with "broken windows" policing and "zero tolerance" measures; Giuliani's 
program to combat crime in New York, gained popularity among the middle class New 
Yorkers in the 1990's, reducing approximately 65 percent of criminality in the city 
(Terra, 2003). It antagonized inner city residents where thousands of young people were 
arrested. These two agencies became consulting firms exporting ideas to countries like 
Honduras, without taking major consideration of the individual realities and situations of 
the Latin American context. According to Lovegrove, the implementation of this foreign 
strategy led to the "invisible genocide" and a type of social cleansing where thousands of 
youths were murdered, especially unemployed men who were marked as criminals by 
society who had no room for them, 
So, although I am referring here to the particular case of Honduran human rights 
abuse, the various structures that facilitate them are international in scope. While 
Giuliani's policy did not result in large-scale killings in New York, many accused 
it of criminalizing poverty and cleaning the streets to aid economic investment 
that never trickled down to the poor. Zero tolerance was implemented in New 
York and then Honduras to stop a violent yet vague threat, "delinquency," just as 
the Patriot Act, which reconfigured the U.S. constitution toward creating a 
security state, was implemented in the name of stopping the vague enemy, 
"terrorism." (Lovegrove in Honduras this Week, 200829). 
Honduras is not the only Latin American country that has received 
recommendations from Giuliani's private consulting firm. Mexico also was recipient of 
29 Web accessed on August 23, 2008 from: http://quotha.net/node/51 
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these recommendations. According to Terra (2003), Giuliani was hired in 2002 as an 
advisor to reduce the violence and crime the country was experiencing and paying a total 
of US $4.3 million to his consulting firm for services rendered. It is evident that such 
strategies have soundly failed within the context of Latin America, further proving that 
imported strategies lack a comprehensive understanding of local realities and historical 
events, which in turn result in the waste of resources and the aggravation of the situation. 
The children and youth of Honduras are groups in society who have not received 
much institutional attention. It is evident that the favoured policies for youth throughout 
the years have been repressive in this country. The next section shall look into the 
government approaches of Nicaragua to analyze whether this is a significant contributing 
factor to the central theme of research. 
The Nicaraguan Approach: Policies directed towards Youth 
Nicaragua's approach to youth gang has been very different from that of other 
countries in the region. The presence of gangs in many cities of the country has been 
detected since the 1990s. However, as mentioned previously, the nature of Nicaraguan 
pandillas is very different from that of the Maras found in Honduras, Guatemala, and El 
Salvador. They demonstrate much lower levels of aggression, organization and are more 
concerned with individual wealth than protecting territory. According to USAID's 
(2006) gang assessment in Nicaragua, the Sandinista movement has been attributed as 
being one of the main reasons for the low levels of criminality in the country. In 
addition, Nicaragua's National Police strategies seem to have chosen a strategy of 
prevention, rather than repression, when addressing youth violence. 
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The Sandinista Legacy 
Much of Nicaragua's safety and nature of gangs has been attributed to the 
influence the Sandinista government had on the social fabric of the country. After their 
triumph in July 1979, the Sandinistas encouraged a mixed economy and carried out 
national crusades against illiteracy and disease. According to Oettler (2007), the Frente 
Sandinista de Liberation National (FSLN), aimed at fostering a system of mass 
organizations with the Sandinista Youth, the Women's Organizations, Asociacion de 
Mujeres Nicaragiienses 'Luisa Armanda Espinoza' (AMNLAE), and the Worker's 
Association, Central Sandinista de Trabajadores (CST). 
Aside from the efforts of the government to include youth in social programs, it is 
important to mention the militarization aspect of this period. Militarization became a key 
FSLN tool for mass mobilization, regimentation, and social control in the country. The 
size of the armed forces increased more than twelve-fold between 1979 and 1985, when it 
peaked around 75,000 active duty personnel (Bugajski, 1990). 
Since the early days of Sandinismo, militarism has constituted a central 
organization ingredient. Commitment to the armed struggle has been perceived 
as an almost purifying experience for the FSLN because the discipline of the 
armed forces evidently facilitates class consciousness, political indoctrination, 
cadre training, and 'democratic centralism' (Bugajski, 1990, p.39-40) 
The military draft law of 1983 lowered the age of recruitment to 17 and involved 
2 years of military duty for any young man between 17 and 25. Evidently, during this 
period, tens of thousands of young male Nicaraguans passed through the armed forces 
and thereby experienced intensive political indoctrination. The army became the primary 
school of socialist politics. 
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The FSLN encouraged and fostered grassroots movements, the strongest one 
being the Comites de Defensa Sandinista (CDS), which become key when analyzing the 
legacy of the movement. These Sandinista Defence Committees were formed in all urban 
neighbourhoods and many rural areas as part of the regime's security and surveillance 
apparatus. In addition to civil defence functions, the CDS conducted intelligence 
gathering and counterintelligence work, administrating food distribution, price controls, 
and job placements. About 15,000 CDS operated around the country, acting as the eyes 
and ears of the FSLN with a total membership of approximately 600,000 people by the 
mid-1980s (Bugajski, 1990:31). The mass organizations of women, youth, workers, 
children, and professionals served as the implementing elements of the Sandinista policy. 
According to Rocha (2005), a significant factor was the transformation of the 
Sandinista police into the National Police. The existence of Sandinista and traditional 
networks within the National Police generated different strategies and actions towards 
youth violence, where the focus became the rehabilitation and prevention of youth 
violence, rather than the repression of them. The Nicaraguan government actually made 
efforts to reintegrate 'youth at risk' as a marker of difference indicating the democratic 
nature of Nicaraguan politics. 
Most of these developments occurred during the first half decade of Sandinista 
rule, however by the second half, due mostly to the efforts directed in fighting the Contra 
war, most of the social and economic programs of the country began declining. With the 
electoral defeat in 1990, Sandinista civil society imploded and struggled against structural 
adjustment and privatization policies implemented in the new neoliberal agenda. After 
the electoral defeat, NGOs dealing with child protection mushroomed throughout the 
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country (Oettler, 2007). The Institute de Promotion Humana-Esteli (The Insitute of 
Human Promotion - Esteli), the Centro de Prevention de la Violencia (Centre of 
Violence Prevention), and the Fundacion de Protection de los Derechos de Ninos, Ninas 
y Adolescentes Infractores de la Ley (Foundation for the Protection of the Rights of 
Children and Adolescents Offenders of the Law), were some of the most important ones 
working with youths at risk (Ibid.) Most of these NGOs were dependant on foreign 
funding and in conjunction with Nicaraguan decision-makers, the notion of youth 
violence emerged as a substantial public issue that was rapidly addressed. 
Contemporary Government Responses 
Although Nicaragua briefly adopted a repressive approach to the problem of 
youth gangs in 1999, it did not last very long. By 2000, the government had changed 
course towards a more preventative nature (USAID, 2006). As previously (discussed, 
currently the Nicaraguan legislation favours the protection of youths. Several 
constitutional articles and laws protect youth and provide resources for various programs 
directed at improving the situation of youths in the country. Among them is Law 392, 
which encourages the establishment of youth programs. Law 228 directs the National 
Police to establish plans and policies to prevent youth violence. Finally, Law 212 names 
a Special Inspector for Youth and Adolescents to ensure respect of their human rights, 
among others. In 2005, there was an initiative on an anti-gang law, similar to the ones 
approved in Honduras and El Salvador, introduced to the Nicaraguan National Assembly. 
However, the Justice Commission and local consultants agreed that the law would violate 
the Constitution and it would not solve the problem of youth violence in the country. 
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In response, Nicaragua has developed programs on both the government and civil 
society sectors to deal with the prevention of youth violence: 
a.) Program for the Attention and Prevention of Violence: implemented by the 
Secretaria de Juventud (Secretary of Youth), which provides marginalized and at-
risk youth alternatives to gang membership. The government also has 
implemented an intervention program for the rehabilitation of former gang 
members into productive members of society. 
b.) The Ministerio de Gobernacion (Ministry of Interior) has initiated a significant 
program called Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana (Co-Existence and Citizen 
Security), funded by the Inter-American Development Bank and the government. 
Its basic purpose is crime prevention initiatives in eleven departments of the 
country. The program targets youth at-risk, youth in gangs, and youth in the 
penal system. 
c.) The National Police has coordinated efforts with different sectors of society, 
including the media, different state institutions, the private sector, and former 
gang members, to implement the Prevention of Juvenile Violence program. The 
program provides psychological counselling, educational opportunities, 
vocational training, and job placement. Nicaraguan police are noted for not using 
repressive force on the younger population, and are visibly outgoing towards 
incarcerated gang members. Such a relationship does not exist in the 
neighbouring countries. 
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The Nicaraguan government has also made efforts to improve conditions in the 
country's penitentiaries. Those who are rehabilitated in prisons are encouraged to 
participate in vocational and artistic activities, including music and arts (Ibid). 
Conversely, the state of prisons in Honduras is derelict. In some penitentiaries, gang 
members are housed together in a one-story concrete block building in overcrowded 
living conditions and with no activities. The approach of both governments is clearly 
distinct. 
A closer look at the National Police Prevention Model (2008) can clearly show 
that the Police have opted to pass from a reactive model to a prevention model when 
dealing with youth gangs: 
The complex dynamic and the dangerous nature of other gangs in various 
countries of Central America have obliged us to focus on this phenomenon with 
great alert, knowing how it originated and how it developed, we have an 
enormous responsibility today, because we cannot leave to our future generations 
uncertainty, unrest, and the terror that other gangs are cultivating in the region. It 
is important in historic terms, and for the development of our institution, to 
recognize that it was a mistake that before gangs and delinquency were 
confronted without any difference, under the same procedure: persecution, 
detention, and jail (Nicaraguan National Police, Modelo Preventivo Policial, 
2008). 
The model implemented by the Nicaraguan National Police seeks to address the 
dynamics of youth violence, as well as its sociological, economic, psychological, and 
cultural causes. Gaining knowledge on the risk factors and strengthening the protection 
factors will allow them a more effective and appropriate police intervention. The 
following figure represents the risk factors for youth gangs and the strategies to be 
implemented to address them: 
Web accessed on July 29, 2008 from: http://www.policia.gob.ni/cedoc/seetor/prevenc/fich.htm 
Figure 5. 8 Situational Analysis and Prevention Focus 
Risk Factors 
INDIVIDUAL 
Psychological and behavioural disorders 
Drug Consumption 
Frustration, lack of values, rejection to social 
norms and low self esteem 
History of abuse and parental mistreatment 
RELATIONAL 
Dysfunctional family, violence, and 
addiction 
COMMUNITY 
Easy access to weapons and drugs 




Culture of Violence 
Protection Factors 
Psychological Treatment 
Rehabilitation of addictions 
Strengthening of personal values, self esteem 
and leadership 
Family psychological treatment 
Family therapy of livelihoods and 
rehabilitation 
Disarticulation of drugs and weapons shops 
Facilitate spaces for recreation, culture, 
education, and sports 
Conflict resolution training 
Skills training and employment opportunities 
Stimulation of a culture of peace 
Adapted from: Nicaraguan National Police, Modelo Preventivo Policial, 2008, p. 13-15 
As the model seeks to reinsert youth into society, the report claims that at least 
4,000 youths have been reinserted as productive members of the community through the 
prevention strategies. 
A comparative analysis of the different institutions and policies for youth for 
Nicaragua and Honduras could be misleading due to the similarity of the names and 
responsibility of the laws and agencies, which is often deceptive. Bellanger and Cruz 
(2007) demonstrate it through the following figure: 
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Adapted from: Bellanger and Cruz, The Politics of Policies about Gangs in Central America, 2007, p. 118 
Contextualizing State Policies with Maras 
The cases of Honduras and Nicaragua clearly demonstrate divergent policy 
approaches to youth crime. Using largely repression, the Honduran government has 
attempted to address the frequent deadly violence that has riddled the country for the past 
ten years. However, today it is evident that violence in Honduras has worsened. With 
overcrowded prisons, no effective rehabilitation programs for gang members and 
convicts, and deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, the hope for social peace and 
freedom from fear for its citizens is slim. In Honduras, youth gangs have become the 
'public enemy number one', and social cleansing policies and extrajudicial executions are 
implemented with atrocious results. Although on paper there exists the "Law for the 
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Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Re-entrance into Society of Persons Belonging to Gangs 
or Maras" approved in 2001, it has been tabled and most people have not heard of it. 
With pro-repression factions, the Honduran government clearly has failed to address 
youth issues in the country. In marked contrast, Nicaragua's entire citizen security 
policy is smoothly set forth by the government with clear prevention and rehabilitation 
strategies, and it is considered the Central American country to have the best relations 
between gang members and the National Police (Bellanger and Rocha, 2007). 
In the context of this research, the task lies in discovering whether the historical 
government responses of Honduras and Nicaragua have dictated the difference of Mara 
presence in each country. The police repression that occurred in Honduras, especially 
during 1996 to 2001, disbanded many smaller traditional gangs without offering any 
options of social reintegration or rehabilitation. During this period it is important to 
remember that M-13 and M-18 influence was beginning to assert itself in the country 
through deportation processes. According to some experts, the domestic gang members, 
without anywhere else to go, soon joined the foreign, more aggressive, franchise of M-13 
and M-18. As noted by Andino Mencia (2006), "in other words, the repressive policies 
applied during these years made an indirect contribution to the fortification of these youth 
groups instead of preventing their development" (2006: 10). Also it is important to 
observe here that these repressive policies have led to the 'invisibility' of the Mara 
phenomenon in the country because they have adopted an extremely hermetic modus 
operandi, making it harder to observe and study them. Avoiding persecution and social 
cleansing, Maras have not only been forced to improve their organization, they have 
reacted in more vengeful violent ways. In short, the repressive strategies that Honduras 
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has implemented to fight the Mara phenomenon have not only failed, but have been 
counterproductive. 
In the case of Nicaragua, it is noticeable that the influence of the old Sandinista 
social network managed to transcend throughout time into contemporary government 
strategies. It not only helped implemented government prevention approaches, but 
facilitated more community participation in crime prevention policies and ideologies. As 
a result, Nicaragua has had to invest fewer resources in repressive law enforcement 
efforts to deal with gang violence. Paradoxically, Nicaragua is one of the poorest 
countries in the Central American region, yet it has prioritized the channelling of 
resources towards prevention and intervention efforts. The positive outcome, therefore, 
can be tangible with a perceived reduction in costs normally associated with violence, 
such as increases in health-related costs, loss of productivity, deterrence of foreign 
investment, and others. In addition, the almost non-existence of Maras in Nicaragua 
could be attributed to the manner in which the government has chosen to address the 
issue. Therefore, by understanding the nature of youth deviance and implementing 
prevention programs, one can construe that such policies are a contributing factor when 
accounting for the difference in Mara presence in the Central American region, especially 
Honduras and Nicaragua. 
One important aspect was the militarization that the Nicaraguan youth 
experienced during the decade of the 1980s. As previously discussed, the army served as 
an indoctrination institute who exerted discipline and patriotism. However, although 
Honduras had a strong military presence in the 1980s, military obligatory service for 
citizens was eliminated from the country in 1995 by initiative of President Carlos 
149 
Roberto Reina, eliminating the strongest disciplinary institute for thousands of youths in 
the country. While perusing the literature, the issue of obligatory military service and the 
possible impact it might have on gang formation (or lack thereof) in the Central 
American region, is scarcely addressed, if not at all. Breve (2007) is one of the few 
authors who link the elimination of obligatory military service with the uprising of the 
Mara phenomenon. I have identified this unexplored factor as a potential contributing 
element that might have significant relevance when trying to identify of the reasons 
behind Honduras' and Nicaragua's Mara hosting disparity. 
Factor Four: Obligatory Military Service 
Throughout time, the armed forces have had a central role in many of the Latin 
American countries. However, in the case of Central America, it appears to be that the 
decline in importance of the military occurred simultaneously with the emergence of 
structural adjustment programmes. Conscription has been predominant in the history of 
Latin America. According to Cameron, Dorling, and Thorpe (2000), in the case of Latin 
America, coercion is engaged in contracts for military service to replace voluntary 
participation. In these cases, recruitment relies on physical force- as opposed to 
voluntary drafting or even draft lottery- when the geopolitical condition of a country 
renders it important and viable for the manning of ranks: 
One would expect voluntary enlistment to be slight, and coercive methods more 
common, in countries where the military functions to serve the interests of an 
elite, where social and political cohesion is partial, and where the military is 
rigidly stratified with little or no mobility between tiers. Force is particularly 
likely where culture and ethnic differentiation is acute and the economic base 
allows some degree of independence, on two accounts. First, when potential 
recruits are not party to the ideology of the dominant culture, then the concept of 
patriotism will not be such a persuasive motivational factor in encouraging the 
voluntary recruitment. Second, social and economic commitments and rituals 
within the potential recruits' own communities are likely to be incompatible with 
periods of absence, serving the interests of an alien and often hostile political and 
economic body. (Cameron, Dorling, and Thorpe, 2000, p. 48). 
Military service before the 1990s was for the most part obligatory in Central 
America. This could be easily assimilated due to the civil conflicts that countries of the 
region were undergoing. However, with the arrival of peace accords and a new economic 
model, things changed and the military lost significant participation in governmental 
issues. This was the case for Honduras and Nicaragua; however the issue lies in the 
extent in which this decreased military power encouraged or hindered the proliferation of 
youth gangs for each country. 
Conscription in Honduras 
Conscription was not a new phenomenon in Honduras, dating from the time of the 
government of Marco Aurelio Soto, which introduced obligatory military service under 
Article 16 of the 1880 Constitution. The decade of the 1980s represented an especially 
important period for the military. As Honduras was employed to serve as U.S. military 
base against the Contra War in Nicaragua, the military benefited financially as the United 
States transferred increased aid flows. Although military bases were home to some 1,200 
U.S. soldiers, local manpower was required. At this point, the military retained the right 
to veto appointments to the Cabinet, control the police and security forces and have 
immunity from human rights or corruption investigations, making obligatory service 
more draconian and arbitrary. As tensions mounted, drafting in Honduras increased to 
15,400 soldiers in 1989 (Ibid). The Honduran military rounded up large numbers of 18 
year olds for their obligatory military service practice which lasted until 1995. The 
drafting process was similar to a hunt, as military men would scout grounds of certain 
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vicinities, including secondary schools, soccer matches, or other events where young 
males gathered, who would fit the profile for recruitment. Exemptions did take place 
based on the notion of age (under 18 or over 30 were exempted), marriage or physical 
and mental disabilities. An interesting aspect of these exemptions was the social class 
discrimination that frequently occurred. Most of the individuals who were targets of 
forced recruitment were from the poorer classes of the Honduran society. The young 
males from the elite, normally could get exemptions, based on influence or bribe, and 
usually did not participate in the military barracks. Needless to say, this process was 
feared by society in general, as it literally represented hunting for potential soldiers. 
Obligatory military service gave way to a culture of violence that subordinated 
civil power to the military, creating a wall of impunity against all the abuses carried out 
by those in uniform. Although this coercive draft represented one of the oldest forms of 
institutional violence in the country, it also served as a disciplinary institution for the 
thousands of youths who had little or no access to a secure social net provided by the 
state. The barracks offered employment, occupation, and discipline. 
However, according to the Honduran Network of Sustainable Development 
(2002), the Honduran population became increasingly intolerant with military abuse, 
which included the disappearance and torture of many people, as well as murders of 
innocent civilians. By the beginning of the 1990s, alongside with international pressure, 
the Honduran society opened spaces for the discussion of the possible demilitarization of 
the country. With the election of President Carlos Roberto Reina, the era of the military 
came to an end: 
The arrival to power in 1994 of the ex President of the Interamerican Court of 
Human Rights, the liberal Carlos Roberto Reina, propelled the reforms that 
finally left the military out of combat, and that fortified the position of 
organizations defenders of human rights. Under popular pressure, the Reina 
government eliminated the obligatory military service and substituted it for a 
democratic and volunteer one; in addition, he replaced military with civilians in 
the administration of public institutions. (Oliva, 2003)31. 
Conscription was temporarily suspended in 1993, then replaced with a lottery-
based system in 1994 before finally being abolished in 1995 (Cameron, Dorling, and 
Thorpe, 2000). In May of 1994, the Honduran Congress modified article 276 of the 1982 
Constitution, in which all healthy men between the ages of 18 and 30 years old were 
subject to two years of military service. The constitutional amendment established the 
voluntary military service in times of peace (CONCODOC, 1988). The reduction of 
military was significant, from an estimated 26,000 soldiers in 1986, to approximately 
18,000 in 1997 (Ibid). To date, the most relevant military statistics for Honduras are 
represented in table 4.24: 
Table.5 24 Honduran Military Statistics, 2005 est. 
Armed Forces Growth 
Armed Forces Personnel 
Manpower Fit for Military Service: Female Age 18-49 






Adapted from: Nation Master, 2008 . 
As the data suggests, the number of personnel for the armed forces has decreased 
significantly over the years. From 1998 to 2005, it was reduced almost by 10,000 
soldiers. 
31 Web accessed on July 31, 2008 from: http://www.nuestraamerica.info/leer.hlvs/1285 
32 Web accessed on July 31, 2008 from: http://www.nationmaster.com/red/country/ho-honduras/mil-
militarv&all=l 
Conscription in Nicaragua 
During the ruling of Anastasio Somoza, conscription in Nicaragua was 
established in the Constitution, however it was not implemented. By nature of the 
dynasty, power lay with the National Guard, the elite force that was passed on by family 
ties. In the last years of the 1970s, the Somoza government began to use forced 
recruitment and ordered the drafting of young people. According to the 1998 report of 
the Conscription and Conscientious Objection Document Project (CONCODOC), 
approximately 40 percent of the recruits for the National Guard were drafted when they 
were 15 years old or younger. During this period, the young population in Nicaragua 
suffered a severe repression due to Somoza's fear that they would join the uprising 
Sandinista movement. Youths between 14 and 18 years of age were considered the most 
prone to join the Sandinista opposition. 
From the Sandinista perspective, the movement did not have major difficulties 
recruiting volunteers during its opposition to the Somoza regime. Once the FSLN was in 
power, initially it relied on the voluntary enrolment of civilians to join the army. 
However, as the Contra war intensified, the Sandinistas began considering the obligatory 
military service to fill the barracks of the Ejercito Popular Sandinista (EPS) (Sandinista 
Popular Army), a military force of popular origins. Therefore, conscription was 
introduced in 1983 by the FSLN through the approval of the Ley de Servicio Militar 
Patriotico (Law of Patriotic Military Service), which established that all men between the 
ages of 18 and 40 years were subject to military service for the term of two years 
(CONCODOC, 1998). 
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According to Conscience and Peace Tax International (2008), the early draft of 
the Law had included provisions to enable religious objectors to perform an alternative 
service, but this clause was soon withdrawn as a result of the increasing tensions between 
the Sandinista movement and the Catholic Church. Although for the most part, in 
practice these conscientious objectors, most notably Mennonites, were not recruited, 
some were still imprisoned for refusing military service. Initially, the government 
announced that out of the 250,000 young people between the ages of 18 and 15 that had 
to register, only 15,000 would be drafted. In addition, it is important to mention that the 
Contra movement itself practiced obligatory recruitment, called "Contra kidnap", which 
occurred not only in Nicaraguan, but in Honduran territory as well (Lindsey-Poland, 
1988). 
During the 1980s, the EPS played a dominant role in Nicaraguan society as the 
military arm of the FSLN: 
With arms and training supplied principally by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and 
Eastern Bloc countries, the EPS developed sufficient resources, internal 
cohesiveness, and organizational structure to contain, but not eliminate, the 
forces of the National Resistance. By 1987-1989 the human and economic costs 
of the prolonged war had led to a series of negotiations that considered, among 
other issues, the demobilization of the Contra forces and the reduction of the 
EPS. Thus, over the course of a decade, the EPS evolved from guerrilla units 
born out of revolution into a partisan, semi-professional institution closely 
identified with the popular sectors (Premo, 1997, p. 65). 
With the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in 1990, the EPS now faced possible 
eliminations by its opposition, as it represented a threat to the autonomous control of the 
country. After much negotiations and attempted transitions, President Chamorro agreed 
to respect the integrity of the EPS according to the Constitution of the country. However, 
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the Patriotic Military Service Law was repealed by an Act of December 1990, and the 
abolition of obligatory military service was subsequently entrenched in a constitutional 
amendment34. 
By 1986, at least 50 percent of government expenditure was devoted to defence 
and the army had 50,000 soldiers, two thirds of whom were conscripts. Young men and 
women between 18 and 24 were required to give two years of patriotic service (The New 
Internationalist, 1986). By January 1990, the army consisted of 96,660 soldiers, a 
number which was drastically reduced to 41,000 by July of the same year. By 1992, 
Nicaragua, which once had fielded the largest army in Central America, counted with 
only 15, 200 men and women in uniform (Premo, 1997). Today, Nicaragua's main 
military statistics stand as follows: 
Table.5 25 Nicaragua's Military Statistics, 2008 
Armed Forces Growth 
Armed Forces Personnel 
Manpower Fit for Military Service: Males Age 18-49 






Adapted from: Nation Master, 2008 . 
It is evident that even though the obligatory military service was abolished in 
Nicaragua, the army has still managed to remain at the same level of personnel from that 
of 1992, which indicates that voluntary enrolment is much higher in Nicaragua than in 
Honduras. This is particularly interesting when taking into account that the Honduran 
3 Law that deposed the Law of Patriotic Military Service 
34 Law of Partial Reform to the Political Constitution, No. 192 of 1995. 
35 Web accessed on August 1, 2008 from: http://www.nationmaster.com/country/nu-nicaragua/mil-militarv 
population is approximately 7.4 million people, whereas Nicaragua has 5.6 million 
people; a difference of almost 2 million, and yet the Nicaraguan army remains double 
than that of Honduras. 
Military Service and Maras 
As the data suggests, both countries had strong military presence during the 
decade of the 1980s. In addition, they both experienced a drastic reduction of manpower 
and demilitarisation as the new neoliberal economic model was implemented in the 
Central American region. For both countries, the speed in which the reduction of the 
military institution was carried out clearly exacerbated unemployment, poverty, and 
social unrest. Now thousands of young people no longer had an institution that offered 
them discipline and occupation. In the case of Honduras, the timeframe of the 
elimination of conscription fits in with the beginning of deportation of criminals from the 
United States. With the end of the Contra war, Nicaragua's military obligatory service 
was also eradicated, which led to the rise of a new wave of relatively innocuous gang 
activity better known as pandillas (Rocha, 2006). However, as previously discussed, the 
nature of these gangs varies significantly from the Mara phenomenon present in the 
neighbouring countries. Furthermore, taking into account the rest of the Central 
American countries, in the cases of Guatemala and El Salvador, who also have a strong 
presence of Mara activity, conscription has not been officially enforced since 1994 and 
1992, respectively (CONCODOC, 1998). Therefore, it appears to be that the elimination 
of obligatory military service is associated with the increase in youth gang activity in 
most Central American countries. For Honduras, the elimination of conscription 
aggravated already existing conditions contributing to the rise of Mara gangs. In 
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Nicaragua, even though conscription was abolished, gang activity of a different nature 
still proliferated, except that it interacted with different prevention state programs for 
youth and the different migratory patterns of the country. This counteracted any 
possibility for the specific Mara phenomenon to proliferate in that country. 
An important element in the present analysis is the evaluation of the fabric 
pertaining to the military culture in Honduras and Nicaragua. Although both countries 
eliminated conscription by the start of the 1990s, this alone is not enough to discredit the 
factor as irrelevant to the problematic of this thesis. In reality, beyond the physical 
existence or presence of men in the barracks, it is important to consider the legacy and 
the culture that was passed on by the martial institutions of each country, and the way it 
affected civil-military relations. Nicaragua's armed forces and revolutionary institutions 
are not separate from the history of the country and were not imposed superstructures, but 
rather seemed to be born from the active participation of the people who laid the 
groundwork for the revolution to occur. Before the Sandinistas came into power, the 
Somoza governments were highly characterized by patterns of repression and brutality 
towards the general populace. The praetorian National Guard seemed to exude 
characteristics of an "interventionist" army who protected interests of the United States, 
rather than domestic interest (Envio, 1983). However, with the Sandinistas in 
government, the role of the army changed. Their objective was to involve all 
Nicaraguans in national defense and protection of the revolution. The military actively 
participated in tasks of reconstruction, helped in emergency situations like floods, fires, 
and border vigilance. Overall, in Nicaragua, the military was seen as an institution that 
protected its citizens and national interests, therefore it witnessed higher levels of 
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voluntary participation, transpiring a high sense of patriotism and duty. According to the 
Sandinistas, the legalization of conscription was seen as the institutionalization of the 
military service which the reservists and militia had been doing voluntarily since the 
revolution; it was never perceived as a forceful, imposed service to society. Conversely, 
the Honduran military institution did not appear to receive the same respect from civil 
society as the Nicaraguan army did. The military in Honduras was highly influenced by 
U.S. interests and rather than offering protection and a sense of security among its 
citizens, it further institutionalized a culture of violence. The sycophantic nature of many 
of its officers and members, combined with ruthless drafting methods, led to severe 
tensions between civil society and the military, as well as a marked anti-military 
sentiment. Furthermore, the nature and methods of conscription did not sit well with 
society in general, potentially leading to disdain and lack of respect to authoritative 
figures. Hence, Honduras has never seen high levels of voluntary military service. 
It would be presumptuous to conclude that the different military cultures of each 
country eventually led to the proliferation or lack of Maras, however, the legacies that 
each martial institution left to their respective societies is evident. The elimination of 
conscription in Nicaragua left thousands of youths without an ideological base, but who 
were rescued by prevention programs and alternate social inclusion strategies. Whereas 
in Honduras, the elimination of conscription appeared to be a social triumph against 
repression and persecution from an institution they disrespected in the first place, 
potentially leading to a more defiant, arrogant attitude of youth towards authority. This 
combined with other factors, such as government approaches to youth, deportation trends, 
and marginalization, could then represent a significant factor to the proliferation of gangs. 
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Based on the aforementioned analysis, it is evident that the elimination of 
obligatory military service by itself did not give rise to the Mara phenomenon in 
Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador; however, one can extrapolate that the elimination 
of military recruitment represents a crucial element to the genesis of Maras. Although it 
further perpetuated a culture of violence, the military represented an institution of 
rigorous discipline and stability for the young population. In a speculative manner, if 
conscription would not have been eliminated in Honduras, this could have potentially 
neutralized or delayed the effects of migratory and deportation trends by offering idle 
youth alternative occupation and source of income, thus the effects of Mara 
transculturization could have occurred in a lesser degree if not at all. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CLOSING THOUGHTS ON A GLOBAL ISSUE 
A major criticism in the discourse of crime in the Latin American context is that 
governments fail to address the underlying causes of such violent societal dynamics. 
Thus, with an erroneous comprehension of the violent state, crime in all its forms, will 
perpetuate, if not worsen within this region. The case is no different for the hostile gang 
situation in Central America. Although the study of Maras in Central America has 
gained popularity in the academic arena, the discussion appears to be superficial and 
relegated to blaming the United States for exporting its crime problems to poorer Central 
American countries. With this, expectations for solutions are globalised and left to the 
international community to contend with, assuming little or no local state responsibility. 
Taking on a different analytical perspective, through method of historical 
comparison, the previous chapter has managed to present key issues that might offer a far 
more introspective and appropriate analysis of why Maras predominate in Honduras and 
are virtually inexistent in Nicaragua. More specifically, the analysis takes into 
consideration local probable causality. After analyzing the data, one can begin to observe 
the interrelatedness of such factors and attribute weighing importance to them 
accordingly. Migration and deportation patterns clearly play the central role on the 
transfer of Mara know-how into the Central American region. As the data has suggested, 
it is unquestionable that Honduran migratory paths aim north to the United States, 
whereas Nicaraguans mobilize south to Costa Rica. Moreover, it is the obvious 
difference in deportation processes that suggest the origin of the problem. Nevertheless, 
this factor alone is insufficient to provide full reason behind the stark difference of Mara 
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hosting for both countries. Thus, a factor that appears to have sound impact on the levels 
of gang activity in each country is the individual state approaches to youth violence. 
Prior to the migratory and deportation phenomenon, Honduras and Nicaragua historically 
had the presence of youth gangs. However, as reflected by the data, the approaches in 
dealing with such social deviance have been completely bipolar as Honduras has opted 
for repression and institutional violence, whereas Nicaragua has implemented prevention 
strategies. In both cases, the nature of such approaches can be traced to even before 
Maras reached their contemporary state. At this point, the combination of both factors 
begins to delineate the separate ways youth gangs have expressed themselves in each 
country. Atop these fundamental aspects, a third factor, the elimination of obligatory 
military service, presents an interesting, separate correlation for each country. In the 
case of Honduras, it is evident that the elimination of conscription, when combined with 
the previous factors, played an essential role that contributed to the proliferation of Maras 
in the country. In other words, the influx of thousands of youth with newly acquired 
criminal skills, combined with inexistent social programs to receive them, as well as the 
disappearance of a draconian disciplinary institution, likely contributed to the emergence 
of the Mara phenomenon in Honduras. However, the elimination of conscription does 
not appear to be of significant relevance in determining the absence of Maras in 
Nicaragua. In my judgement this is mainly due to the fact that the first two factors were 
sufficient to counterbalance any impact demilitarization could have inflicted on the youth 
population in the country. Finally, the data suggests that the state of drugs and 
availability of firearms do not contribute to the reasons why Honduras has Maras and 
Nicaragua does not. Nicaragua shows similar levels of activity for both issues; therefore 
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it becomes problematic to positively correlate Maras with drugs and weapon activities. 
Furthermore, if the problem of drugs and firearms ceased to exist in each country, it 
would be hard to say that the Mara phenomenon in Honduras would disappear as well. 
Nonetheless, drugs and access to firearms, in my opinion, tend to aggravate the Mara 
problem in Honduras as much as they would the pandilla problem in Nicaragua. 












Direct: contributes to the 
transculturization of Mara culture 
from the U.S. to the Central 
American region. Deportation 
processes are the vehicle for such 
criminal know-how. Constitutes the 
key factor for Mara genesis. 
Direct: repressive approaches to 
youth gangs further aggravate the 
problem, fomenting them to 
organize themselves better. 
Preventive approaches and inclusive 
programs tend to have more positive 
results. 
Indirect: further aggravates the 
already existing Mara problem 
when combined with previous 
factors. By itself it does not 
originate it. 
Indirect: potentially contributed to 
the aggravation of the already 
existing Mara problem. The 
elimination of OMS led to the 
creation of a large number of idle 
youth, which combined with other 
factors, could have contributed to 
the proliferation of Maras. By 
itself it does not originate it. 
Honduras: main country for migration is 
the United States where Maras originate. 
Thus the majority of deportees proceed 
from this country. 
Nicaragua: main country for migration is 
Costa Rica where there is no presence of 
Maras. 
Honduras: historically has adopted 
repressive approaches to address youth 
problems. Applied U.S. "Zero Tolerance" 
campaign to address the Mara problem. 
Nicaragua: Sandinista government 
implemented inclusive programs for youth 
which have managed to transcend to present 
day policy. Today, the country's police 
strategy has a preventive approach with 
reintegration programs for youth. 
Honduras: Shares similar conditions of 
drug trafficking as the rest of the Central 
American corridor. Consumption levels are 
relatively low in comparison to North 
America. 
Nicaragua: Shares similar conditions as 
Honduras in terms of drug trafficking. 
Levels of consumption are higher than in 
Honduras. 
Honduras: Eliminated OMS in 1995. The 
surplus of youth without any alternate 
occupation, no social programs, repressive 
state policies and deportation influxes from 
the U.S., could have made Honduras prone 
to the proliferation of Mara presence. 
Nicaragua: Eliminated OMS in 1990. 
However the idle youth was met with 
inclusion programs and preventive 
approaches to avoid further gang activity. 
Preliminary Honduran police statistics for 2007 indicate that 3,855 homicides 
occurred in a country of 7 million people. This represented an estimated 400 to 750 more 
homicides than in 2006 (OSAC, 2008). Clearly, violence and crime are integral parts of 
life in Honduras which are still on the increase. The last record of 2007 stated that the 
country's homicide rate was 40.41 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (OCAVI, 2007). 
Despite some positive steps, government corruption, impunity for violators of the law, 
and gang violence has exacerbated serious human rights problems in the country. 
Honduras remains the Central American country mostly affected by Maras. According 
to the U.S. Department of State (2007), year end statistics indicated that the country had 
approximately 30,000 to 40,000 gang members; many of them minors, belonging to 
nearly 500 separate groups. An estimated 5,000 actively participate in criminal activities 
and they are deemed responsible for 20 to 50 percent of the violent crime in the country. 
MS-13 and M-18 are the largest and most violent gangs, accounting for approximately 40 
percent of gang membership countrywide. 
By contrast, Nicaragua, despite being the poorest country in the region, is also one 
of the safest. By 2006, its homicide rate stood at 12.46 per 100,000 inhabitants (OCAVI, 
2007). Although the country experiences some violent crime in its capital city of 
Managua and some rural areas, delinquency largely takes the form of pick pocketing and 
occasional armed robberies. Gang activity in the form of pandillas is present, however 
their nature and levels are not comparable to those found in its neighbouring countries. 
The policies introduced in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, have viewed the Mara 
situation as national emergencies that require an urgent response. Thus, they have turned 
to the United States and the international community for aid. Consequently, policy 
164 
packages like the Merida Initiative have been proposed to offer support in the combat of 
gangs and organized crime across Mexico and Central America. The initiative, born in 
May of 2007 and currendy under consideration, is a multi-year purpose plan to provide 
equipment and training to support law enforcement operations and technical assistance 
for long term reform and oversight of security agencies. The budget proposal includes aid 
from the U.S. of US $450 million for Mexico and US $100 million for Central America 
(U.S. Department of State, 2008). More specifically, the Merida Initiative would 
provide funding for: 
• High technology equipment for the intersection of drug and weapons trafficked; 
• Technologies to improve criminal communication systems across the isthmus; 
• Technical advice to strengthen the institution of justice; 
• Helicopter and surveillance aircrafts to support the tracing of smuggling activities; 
• Equipment and training to implement anti-gang measures (Ibid). 
Interestingly enough, no prevention programs are mentioned. 
At the core of this thesis lies the ultimate objective of exploring the root causes of 
why Maras exist in Honduras but not present in Nicaragua, despite the fact that the 
countries experience similar socioeconomic conditions, while being in geographical 
proximity to each other. Ideally, these causes should in turn suggest solutions on how to 
address and mitigate this growing crisis in Central America. Therefore, the discussion 
becomes a strategy with which I pretend to construct a conjunct vision of the diverse 
dimensions of the Mara phenomenon in the country through method of comparison. 
Although youth crime constitutes a transnational problem that affects numerous of 
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countries across the globe, the solutions must begin at the local domestic level before the 
problem becomes an international one. 
Overall, the significant contributing factors that dictate the difference of Mara 
hosting for Honduras and Nicaragua remain evident. These dimensions have merged to 
contribute to the already existing systemic and structural inefficiencies that generate 
public insecurity in the everyday life of many Central Americans. Anathematized by 
poor and corrupt political leadership, Honduras has been condemned to a patronage 
network that controls the government and maintains insoluble links to the private sector. 
These issues represent further obstacles to any conflict resolution process. Furthermore, 
the influence of certain factors has suggested that it is not the case that young people in 
Nicaragua do not participate in Mara activity because they are in a better situation with 
respect to other Central American countries. In my judgement, however, it is the 
combination of especially local elements and strategies that determine the absence or 
presence of such a phenomenon. 
So what can be done? With a holistic analysis of the data, one can conclude the 
following. First, the criminalization of migration and deportation does not represent a 
viable solution to the Mara problem in Central America. The literal construction of a wall 
across the United States border epitomizes the counterproductive approaches that validate 
repression as an effective control mechanism. Central American countries affected by 
such migration and deportation patterns can no longer afford to rely on the international 
plead to the United States to halt deportation, much less expect the local population to 
stop migrating. At best, countries like Honduras should be able to address the reasons 
why the population leaves and why migration occurs in the first place. However, one 
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must remember that this represents double jeopardy for the governments as financial 
remittances constitute a great support for the economies of Central America. Therefore, it 
is essential to implement reinsertion programs for deportees and construct social security 
nets for those forced back. 
Second, the institutionalization of violence and the validation of social cleansing 
as solutions are highly ineffective in addressing the Mara problem. Experience, data, 
and time have demonstrated that repressive approaches to youth violence soundly fail in 
Central America. Nonetheless, these measures continue to be implemented by local 
authorities, squandering precious resources that could otherwise be directed to more 
effective prevention programs. A first step should be the adoption of policies and 
discourses that decriminalize young people and adolescents, and offer social inclusion. 
Third, with the analysis of the impact the abolishment of conscription had on the 
proliferation of Central American gangs, it is not to suggest that obligatory military 
service be reinstated. However, this analysis does give insight to the necessity of 
governments to offer alternate occupational and disciplinary programs, whether they are 
of a martial nature or a civil one. Governments must acknowledge that idle youth 
combined with social marginalization and external influences are bound to exacerbate 
problems such as the Maras. Most importantly, governments must recognize the 
importance of prioritizing and including youth in active state policy. 
Connecting my findings back to the literature review, there are three main angles 
in which I have attempted to create a dynamic link between theory and practice. The first 
angle addressed pure criminogenic concepts of why youth gangs exist, and as previously 
discussed, my research and findings seem to be best supported by structural theories of 
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crime rather than the individual theories. For the particular case of Honduras and 
Nicaraguan youth gangs in the form of Maras, the four factors discussed tend to focus on 
societal forces rather than individual motives, especially structural ones relating to the 
role of the state and its policy in regards to youth gang activity. Elements of the 
environment are evident to be key in the analysis of the genesis of Maras, as the question 
is not why youth gangs exist, but rather, why the particular form of Maras are present or 
lacking in the regions under discussion. 
Second, the literature review addressed the intersection of criminological and 
development theories. In this respect, the perspective on radical criminology-dependency 
seems to make a better fit in a more analogical fashion, rather than a literal one. The 
theory argues that imperialist states employ criminal law tools to exert influence on 
colonies. To a certain extent, the data has made this tendency evident as we can witness 
the issue of having U.S. crime models implemented in Latin America, where local input 
has been relegated to the sidelines of policy work. The case of Honduras clearly 
exemplifies how such models have failed to address the local problems of Maras, and 
have created dependency on foreign strategies and resources for a viable solution. 
Nicaragua on the other hand, implemented indigenous solutions to its youth gang 
problems, while Honduras imported its crime control policies from the United States. As 
it is with many other aspects of development, the aggressive nature of U.S. foreign policy 
in terms of crime control has once again situated countries in a position that leaves them 
more vulnerable and open to failures. It would be Utopian to assume that the United 
States and other powerful nations will change their strategy-exporting ways. Clearly, the 
United States will not stop exporting its gang problem to countries like Honduras, 
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Guatemala, and El Salvador; moreover, it will not refrain from advising such 
governments on how to address such problems. Therefore, it is imperative that countries 
like Honduras halt the imposition of foreign solutions and begin creating home-grown 
strategies that take into consideration local realities, historical elements and domestic 
resources that could offer a more pragmatic solution to the problem. 
Third, the literature review identified a number of implications that crime and 
violence had on development. Namely, these constituted consequences for the economic 
and social spheres of a country including the deterrence of foreign investment, increased 
structural costs for the state, decreased human capital, lower rates of labour market 
participation, poor employment productivity, and low investment incentives. In 
addition, violence threatens governance and the organic state of democracy. Evidently, 
for the Central American region, crime has a detrimental impact on stability and 
development. However, when conferring on the best approaches to mitigate the impact of 
crime in all its expressions, there appears to be a false dichotomy on the short term goals 
between the immediate sensation of security versus long term social development. This 
situation, however, precisely leads to the validation and implementation of repressive 
actions. With regards to gangsterism in its specialized Mara form, it is hard to think that 
a young person will be scared out of a gang through criminal justice threats, persecution 
and stigmatization. This is the case because the defiance of society and the state are the 
main component of the ethos of Mara gangs. Although the implications of gang activity 
on development are by association, one cannot deny that the Mara phenomenon has 
hindered the capacity of countries like Honduras to offer its citizens the basis of a secure 
social structure, which ultimately furthers the well-being of society in general. As there 
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are no absolutes, one cannot measure success or failure of development simply in terms 
of economic growth, but it should also include the reduction of the gap between social 
classes, and access of basic necessities. Moreover, my research is confident that key 
local and transnational factors identified in this thesis influence the presence of gang 
activity in Honduras, which in turn affects the social fabric and stability necessary for 
development to occur. This, it is not to say that the underdeveloped state of Honduras 
and Nicaragua is caused solely because of gang activity, as there are a number of other 
factors involved that are not pertinent to this research. 
Maras are a transnational phenomenon that continues to expand and diversify, 
while they are increasingly known as "The World's Most Dangerous Gangs" (National 
Geographic, 2006). Influenced by politicization, internationalization, and structural 
sophistication, Maras have already reached the third generation, potentially refining 
network designs and technological advances that threaten the sovereignty of nation states 
and carve out new spheres of gang activity. So the question then remains, what is the 
next phase for Maras? Although Nicaragua has managed to hold the line, how much 
longer can it do so on its own? In a globalised world, countries currentiy affected by 
Maras desperately require a reengineering of their repressive state policies, in the hope of 
ever controlling such a virulent phenomenon and offer their future generations what 
many in the developed world take for granted: freedom from fear. 
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